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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
THE WESTERN SAHARA AND THE SEARCH FOR
THE ROOTS OF SAHRAWI NATIONAL IDENTITY
by
David Suarez
Florida International University, 2016
Miami, Florida
Professor John F. Clark, Major Professor
This work is a socio-historical study of the roots of Sahrawi national identity. The Sahrawi are a
community of people who live in the Western Sahara, a former Spanish colony. Most of its
territory has been occupied since 1975 by Morocco, which denies the existence of a distinctive
population inhabiting the Western Sahara. In contrast, the POLISARIO Front, vanguard of the
Sahrawi nationalist movement, argues that the Western Sahara belongs to the Sahrawi and seeks
its full independence. It bases its claims on the notion of a distinctive history, language, and
culture for the Sahrawi, separate from that of Moroccans.
The central question of this study asks, “What are the origins of Sahrawi national
identity?” This study provides a detailed account of Sahrawi identity formation and how it has
developed in intensity and scope. It renders a clear understanding of the Sahrawi phenomenon,
useful to the international community in its deliberations on the validity of their nationalism. This
study examines the foundation of Sahrawi identity through three different theoretical lenses,
namely, primordialism, instrumentalism, and constructivism. The study analyzes arguments
derived from each of these theoretical approaches, acknowledging the diversity of arguments
about the sources of national identity. This study also demonstrates how a national identity can
develop over a long period of time as a succession of layers. This study locates the final moment
of Sahrawi identity formation in the twentieth century, but adds that this conclusion utilizes
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essential markers of differentiation that persist over time—the building blocks of any national
identity.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This dissertation is a socio-historical study of Sahrawi national identity. The study aims
to explore the roots of Sahrawi nationalism and discuss the arguments for independence of the
Western Sahara. Although there have been several studies on Sahrawi nationalism, most have
focused on the current territorial stalemate. Reports, memos, and other documents discuss the
issue of the Western Sahara as an indeterminable conflict based on the intransigence of both
parties involved: the Kingdom of Morocco and the Frente Por la Liberación de la Saguia El
Hamra y Río del Oro (POLISARIO1). More meaningful discussions of the claims of the Sahrawi
are found in passages or chapters that attempt to trace a historical account of Sahrawi nationalism.
Despite these attempts, there is not one work that has evaluated the sources of national identity or
contextualized them in any type of theoretical framework. Accordingly, this socio-historical case
study will incorporate a theoretical framework that will be useful for approaching both the
question of the Sahrawi and other nationalism studies.

Socio-Political Background
The problem of the Western Sahara traditionally seemed to be very isolated and largely
disregarded by the international community. The geo-political environment has recently changed,
however, even if the dilemma remains localized to northwest Africa. Over the last ten to fifteen
years, the “Berber movement” has gained new ground in its quest for recognition in language and
culture.2 The Sahrawi, who have claimed to be descendants of the Berber, have appropriated
these goals for their own cause and have sought an independent land, separate from the Kingdom
1

POLISARIO is the Spanish acronym for the Frente Popular de Liberación para Saquiat el-Hamra y Río de Oro
(Popular Front for the Liberation of Saquiat el-Hamra and River of Gold). The POLISARIO is the former militant, now
guardian entity spearheading the independence of the region, claimed and administered by the Kingdom of Morocco,
called the Western Sahara.
2

Berbers seek not only more autonomy in certain regions of North Africa (Kabylia, the Atlas Mountain region in
Morocco, and across much of the Sahel) but also more protection for their cultural rights—specifically in language and
custom.

of Morocco. In the last ten years, the imminent threat from Islamists groups affiliated to AQIM
and MUJAO has transformed the Western Sahara from a narrow bilateral dispute to a transborder regional security dilemma. Reports from the Sahrawi refugee camps in Tindouf, Algeria,
have indicated that militias fighting in northern Mali have recruited several youths. These militias
are loosely affiliated with the Islamist networks that prey on the disgruntled and restless younger
generation and may begin to threaten the security of not only the region but also the nature of the
conflict over the Western Sahara.

Prevailing Diplomatic and Scholarly Analyses
Much of the discussion concerning the Western Sahara involves the POLISARIO movement,
Morocco’s repression of the Sahrawi within its administrative borders, or historical accounts
leading up to the current political stalemate. Intermittent work on Sahrawi nationalism has
revolved around the origins of Sahrawi national identity. A few of these studies have criticized
and questioned the origins of their nationality. At the beginning of this endeavor, the present
writer was told that ‘a lot had already been written about’ Sahrawi nationalism. Despite these
claims, my research has discovered that of the several documents and volumes discussing the
Western Sahara, only a handful focus on Sahrawi nationalism. The biggest issue among these
authors has been the lack of theoretical analysis to support the claims of either the POLISARIO
or those who cast doubt on the veracity of POLISARIO claims. Much has been assumed in the
literature, and little has been offered as an explanation of how Sahrawi identity had been formed
or how it evolved into nationhood.
The research corpus on the topic is small, especially from scholars in North America.
Most of the work related to the Western Sahara can be found in European libraries. Almost all of
those studies are either in Spanish or French. The scant research in English usually includes the
Western Sahara as a sample among regional studies of the Middle East or as a case issue in
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nationalism. American scholarship has been marginal. Although the most comprehensive recent
writings concerning the Sahrawi come from scholars such as Zunes and Mundy (2010), American
monographs or books detailing this topic are scarce. An even wider deficit in the literature exists
in the theoretical grounding of these few works. Most discussion over the Western Sahara focuses
on

either

legal

(ICJ

rulings,

UNSC

resolutions),

political

(Morocco’s

policy

of

inclusion/development of the ‘southern provinces,’ UN-sponsored talks), and socio-economic
features (Sahrawi demographics, the Sahrawi refugee problem, and the human rights dimension)
of the conflict. Those involved in the dispute in Morocco, Europe and the U.S. consider it a
political issue, not an ethnic, linguistic, or territorial problem. The overwhelming majority of
writers approach the Sahrawi problem by ignoring or assuming incorrectly the origins of Sahrawi
identity. Those who consciously consider the problem of Sahrawi nationalism tend to use the
more popular constructivist notions of nationalism uncritically. Other approaches have largely
been disregarded and therefore existing studies provide an incomplete picture. Thus, the intent of
this study is not only to make this issue more prominent in North America and more accessible to
English-speaking scholars, but also to provide an in-depth theoretical approach to Sahrawi
identity.

Problem of Sahrawi Nationalism
The Western Sahara, located in northwest Africa, has been the site of one of the longest-running
international disputes on the African continent. At the moment, there is a bitter, though nonviolent, stalemate between the Kingdom of Morocco and the region’s people, the Sahrawi. The
latter are represented by the leaders of the POLISARIO, who have claimed independence for the
Western Sahara. This project investigates Sahrawi nationalism by answering a central question
(CQ), namely: “What are the origins of Sahrawi national identity?” Most contemporary literature
suggests that Sahrawi identity, as a nationalist movement, has been socially constructed through
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variable subjective factors. However, the key players of the independence movement stress more
objective elements to propel their independence struggle. Without understanding from whence
and why parties to the conflict take these approaches to discussing the roots of Sahrawi national
identity, it is difficult for scholarly analysts to get a clear picture of the real origins of Sahrawi
nationalism.
The struggle of the Sahrawi for control over the Western Sahara began well before
Spanish colonization in the late 1880s. The European powers began to encroach on the coasts of
Morocco and the rest of northwest Africa through commercial ventures and journeys of
exploration in the mid-1800s. Spain, for instance, attempted to stake claims in various locations
off the coast of the Western Sahara primarily to prevent other powers from gaining the upper
hand in Africa. However, the 1884-1885 Berlin Conference gave the Great Powers a ‘justifiable’
argument to take not only coastal emplacements in Africa but also its interior lands so long as the
original inhabitants acquiesced to their rule. Of course, these decisions were discussed without
the consent of any African representatives. Thereafter, several treaties (1860, 1904, 1912) were
agreed upon between the Great Powers and the Sultanate of Morocco delineating Spanish and
French possessions in northwest Africa. By 1934, the Spanish zones were placed under the
control of the High Commissioner for Spain in Morocco (López-Pozas Lanuza 2015, 69). In
1946, África Occidental Española (AOE) or the Spanish West Africa administrative unit was
established to integrate all of its northwest African zones. Although intermittent revolts against
Spanish and French rule were put down, the population of the Western Sahara once again began
to rebel after Morocco won its independence in 1956.
The crisis in Spanish leadership and the momentous ‘Green March’3 decision taken by
King Hassan II of Morocco produced the Madrid Accords4 of November 1975. Spain formally

3

The Green March (al-Massira al-Khadra) was “a well-coordinated procession by some 350,000 Moroccan civilians”
and government officials “into Western Sahara” on 21 October 1975. “The Green March was instrumental in
pressuring Spain into abandoning its plans for self-determination in its last African colony and to arrange for the

4

withdrew from the region and ceded administrative control of the Spanish Sahara to Morocco and
Mauritania in 1976. Morocco and Mauritania partitioned the Western Sahara between them, and
the POLISARIO relocated to Algeria.5 However, before Spain committed itself to leaving the
Western Sahara, Morocco had approached the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to adjudicate its
and Mauritania’s claims over the territory. The UN had already determined in 1965 “that both Ifni
and the Saharans had the right to freedom from ‘colonial domination’ and called on Spain to
‘enter into negotiations on the problems relating to sovereignty presented by these two
Territories” (Jensen 2005, 25). The King of Morocco had offered Spain to jointly appeal to the
ICJ in late 1975,6 but Spain “proved unwilling” (Jensen 2005, 27). Nevertheless, Morocco
presented the case to the UN in October of 1974. Subsequently, the UN General Assembly
adopted a resolution to have the ICJ hear the case. The ICJ deliberated between 13 December
1974 and 16 October 1976. The final ruling by the Court stated that,
The materials and information presented to it [the ICJ] do not establish any tie of
territorial sovereignty between the territory of Western Sahara and the Kingdom
of Morocco or the Mauritanian entity. Thus the Court has not found legal ties of
territory to be instead partitioned between Morocco and Mauritania with no role for either the POLISARIO Front or the
[Sahrawi] people generally.” The March along with the domestic crisis caused by the terminal illness of Spain’s leader
Generalissimo Francisco Franco led Spain to “accede to Rabat’s wishes and sign the Madrid Agreement on” 14
November 1975, “which provided for Madrid’s full and final withdrawal from the Western Sahara by late February
1976. Anthony G. Pazzanita, Historical Dictionary of Western Sahara, Third Edition, s.v., “Green March,” (Lanham,
MD: The Scarecrow Press, 2006), 178-179.
4

The Madrid Accords are also known as the “Declaration of Principles on Western Sahara by Spain, Morocco, and
Mauritania.” United Nations Treaty Collection, Declaration of Principles on Western Sahara by Spain, Morocco and
Mauritania, Vol. 988, No. 14450 (New York: United Nations, 1983), 259, accessed June 15, 2012,
http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/MA-MRES_751114_DeclarationPrinciplesOnWesternSahara_0.pdf. Also found in the UN Dag Hammarskjöld Library, UN
Security Council Third Report by the Secretary-General in Pursuance of Resolution 379 (1975) Relating to the
Situation Concerning Western Sahara, DAG Digital Library, S/11880, 19 November 1975, accessed May 25, 2016,
http://repository.un.org/bitstream/handle/11176/71032/S_11880-EN.pdf?sequence=2&isAllowed=y. However, “the full
text of the agreement was never published, either at the time or at any point since.” Pazzanita, Historical Dictionary of
Western Sahara, s.v., “Madrid Agreement (Of November 14, 1975),” 248.
5

Previously, the origin and base of operations for the POLISARIO was in Mauritania (or along the border with
Mauritania and the Western Sahara, but the group subsequently relocated to Algeria after the Madrid Accords
6

The King of Morocco foresaw (incorrectly) that the population would join with the Kingdom if allowed to determine
its fate. Erik Jensen, Western Sahara: Anatomy of a Stalemate (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Second, 2005),
27.

5

such a nature as might affect the application of resolution 1514 (XV) in the
decolonization of Western Sahara and, in particular, of the principle of selfdetermination through the free and genuine expression of the will of the peoples
of the Territory (ICJ Reports 16 October 1975, 162).
Both Morocco and Mauritania largely interpreted the 1975 ruling in their favor whereas
the POLISARIO claimed that the judgment by the ICJ was undeniable proof of the right of
Sahrawi self-government. Morocco’s King Hassan II did not waver in his attempt to claim the
Western Sahara and despite the World Court’s ruling, pushed ahead with the Green March. The
King declared on 16 October 1975, in one of his speeches:
Yes, dear people, our law has been acknowledged and the International Court of
Justice answered the questions ... the Sahara has never been "terra nullius" before
the Spanish occupation ... It recognizes the existence of legal ties of sovereignty
and allegiance between the kings of Morocco and the Sahara populations ... so
there were legal ties and ties of allegiance ... Because the word allegiance is best
suited to the period during which the Sahara was occupied ... the doors of the
Sahara are legally open for us, everyone has recognized that the Sahara belongs
to us since the dawn of time. so we have to occupy our territory7 (Portail Du Sud
Marocain 16 October 1975).
Thus, the King’s interpretation was grounded, not on the western conception of sovereignty and
statehood, but on Islamic juridical tradition. This interpretation hinges on the use of ‘allegiance.’
“The act of allegiance made by subjects to the King was tantamount to a collective recognition
that the king is the sovereign, the temporal leader whose legitimacy is at once hereditary and
spiritual” (ICJ 2007, 2). However, King Hasan II appeared to set aside the rest of the ICJ’s
conclusions. Mauritania, for its part, agreed with the King’s sentiments as they had already
colluded with Morocco to partition the Western Sahara.

7

Translated from the French by the Dr. Maria Antonieta Gracia: “Effectivement, cher peuple, notre droit a été reconnu
et la Cour internationale de justice a répondu aux questions …le Sahara n’a jamais été ‘terra nullius’ [belonging to no
one] avant l’occupation espagnole…Elle reconnaît l’existence de liens juridiques de souveraineté et d’allégeance entre
les Rois du Maroc et les populations du Sahara…Il y avait donc des liens juridiques et liens d’allégeance… Car le mot
allégeance est le mieux adapté à la période au cours de laquelle le Sahara a été occupé… Les portes du Sahara nous
sont juridiquement ouvertes, tout le monde a reconnu que le Sahara nous appartient depuis la nuit des temps. Il nous
reste donc à occuper notre territoire.” Portail Du Sud Marocain, Discours de feu Sa Majesté Hassan II (Le 16 octobre
1975 à Marrakech), accessed May 23, 2016, http://www.agencedusud.gov.ma/download/discours-SM-HassanII-75marrakech.pdf .

6

The ensuing conflict pitted the Moroccan Royal Armed Forces (FAR)8 and Mauritanian
military against the military wing of the POLISARIO, the Ejército de Liberación Popular
Saharaui (ELPS).9 The weaker Mauritanian military endured POLISARIO raids on their fragile
iron ore mining facilities, attacks on their key Zerouate—Nouadhibou Railway line, and
political/terror attacks in their capital, Nouakhchott, which damaged their mainly export-based
economy. Even with French Air Force intervention, ethnic divisions, economic losses, and
military setbacks led to the overthrow of the Mauritanian government by a military junta on 10
July 1978 (Damis 1983, 86). Mauritania withdrew from the Western Sahara after signing the
Algiers Agreement with the POLISARIO Front on 5 August 1979 (Jensen 2005, 22). With this
agreement, Mauritania also renounced its claims to the Western Sahara and left Morocco as
POLISARIO’s only antagonist. With military support from Algeria and Libya the ELPS managed
to hold and, at times, take control of certain towns in the Western Sahara and southern Morocco
until the construction of a massive sand berm was completed in 1987, which divided the land and
brought the conflict to a stalemate.10
The Organization of African Unity (OAU), today reconstituted as the African Unity
(AU), along with the UN had previously pressured Spain for decolonization of their possessions
in Africa. The AU did not directly become involved until the war broke out between the
POLISARIO Front and both Morocco and Mauritania in 1976. The AU unsuccessfully attempted
to mediate and provide for a process of decolonization in 1979 and 1980 using a select Comité
des Sages (Wise Men Committee) (Aggad and Toit Botha 2005, 70). In 1982, the AU admitted

8

Forces Armées Royales Marocaines.

9

Translated into English as the Sahrawi People's Liberation Army or SPLA. It is considered to be the armed forces of
the POLISARIO.
10

In addition to construction of the sand berm by Morocco, the geo-political consequences brought about by the end of
the Cold War (1989-1990) severely curtailed support for the POLISARIO Front. The disintegration of the Soviet Union
in 1991 and the beginning of the Algerian Civil War with the Front Islamique du Salut (FIS) diminished both
diplomatic and direct military aid to the POLISARIO.

7

the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR)11 to its organization in response to Morocco’s
inflexibility (Ohaegbulam 2002, 92). The SADR was formally seated at the AU Summit of 1984
in Addis Ababa because of overwhelming support by member states, but the Kingdom of
Morocco protested vehemently and became the only country to officially leave the continental
organization that same year (Pazzanita 2006, 314).
Since 1991, a cease-fire between the parties (Morocco and the POLISARIO) has been in
place and is monitored by a UN mission called MINURSO.12 Direct UN intervention in 1990
attempted to bridge the differences between the parties, and by 1991 the UN had resolved to
organize a referendum13 over the territory’s future. Despite mediation efforts by several notable
envoys appointed by the UN, the world organization has failed to reach an arrangement between
the POLISARIO and Morocco that would allow for a referendum. Thus, instead of the
referendum process clarifying the status of the region, the issue has become more contested and
has opened the debate about who exactly is a true Sahrawi. Estimates of eligible Sahrawi voters
have been muddled by Moroccan settlers in the Western Sahara and ‘Sahrawi’ who live in

11

The Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic was the government formed by the POLISARIO Front in 1976. Other
notations define the SADR acronym as the ‘Saharan Arab Democratic Republic.’ In this study, the ‘S’ will be referred
to as Sahrawi.
12

MINURSO, Mission des Nations Unies pour l'Organisation d'un Référendum au Sahara Occidental (The United
Nations Mission for the Organization of a Referendum in the Western Sahara), “was established by UN Security
Council resolution 69 [sic] of 29 April 1991, in accordance with ‘the settlement proposals’, as accepted on 30 August
1988 by Morocco and the” POLISARIO Front. “The Secretary-General's implementation plan, approved by the
Security Council, provided for a transitional period during which the Special Representative of the Secretary-General
would have sole and exclusive responsibility over all matters relating to a referendum in which the people of Western
Sahara would choose between independence and integration with Morocco. The Special Representative would be
assisted in his tasks by a deputy special representative and by an integrated group of United Nations civilian, military
and police personnel, to be known as the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara.” United
Nations, MINURSO—United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara: MINURSO Mandate, updated
27
May
2016,
originally
accessed
March
22,
2012,
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minurso/mandate.shtml .
13

Based on UN Resolution 621 (20 September 1988), UN Reports on The Situation Concerning the Western Sahara in
S/21360 (18 June 1990), page 9, paragraph 23, stating that, “…a referendum will be organized in Western Sahara to
enable the people of the Territory to decide their own future freely and democratically. The referendum will be
organized and conducted by the United Nations, in cooperation with the OAU, during a transitional period,” and in
S/22464 (19 April 1991), page 10, paragraph 37, it states that “the purpose of the referendum is to enable the people of
Western Sahara to choose freely between integration with Morocco and independence.”

8

Map 1.1: The Western Sahara and the ‘Sand Wall’ 14

14

Map by United Nations, Geospatial Information Section: ICTD Department of Field Support, Western Sahara, Map
No. 3175 Rev. 4, www.un.org, accessed May 27, 2016, http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/english/htmain.htm,
October 2012.

9

southern Morocco.15 Morocco has stated that any decision on the fate of the Western Sahara must
include those Sahrawi who live in southern Morocco; these former residents migrated after
Moroccan independence in 1954. On the other hand, the POLISARIO suggests that guidelines for
voter identification should be based on the last Spanish census of the region conducted in 1975.
To reach any consensus on this issue, however, one has to reach beyond this question of
‘eligibility’ and determine where the roots of Sahrawi national identity originate. As it stands,
Morocco administers the area west of the sand berm (see map 1.1) and claims full rights to all of
the Western Sahara, while the POLISARIO has access only to a sliver of the land east of the sand
berm as well as the “camps” outside of Tindouf currently under the protection of Algeria.

Academic Significance
There is no debate that Sahrawi nationalism exists. It is evident in the POLISARIO’s pursuit of
independence. There is, however, an implicit debate about the origins of their national identity.
The international community has rarely been as divided over the claims to independence of a
formerly colonized people. Contemporary scholarship has offered only but one solid account of
the formation of Sahrawi national identity. By answering a series of subsidiary questions and
ultimately the central question, this study will demonstrate the origins of Sahrawi identity.
Answers to these questions will aid in understanding the origins of nationalism in post colonial
states in general and the problematic stalemate in the Western Sahara in particular.
First, this study will provide a detailed account of Sahrawi identity formation and how it
has developed in intensity and scope. It will evaluate the claims that Sahrawi identity has existed
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Estimates vary. Freedom House states there are 567,000 (2015) and the CIA World Fact Book projections were
570,866 (July 2013 est.). These estimates, however, include the whole of the population within the Western Sahara,
with much of that demographic influx due to Moroccan immigration. These numbers do not include the Sahrawi
refugee camps near Tindouf, Algeria. POLISARIO sources indicated that they harbored more than 165,000 (1980s) but
the MINURSO mission had counted only about 150,000 eligible Sahrawi voters by 1998. United Nations, “MINURSO
Background,”
MINURSO,
www.un.org/en/peacekeeping,
originally
accessed
May
23,
2016.
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minurso/background.shtml ,
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from time and has been evident before the formal colonization of the Western Sahara. Second,
this study traces the development of the Sahrawi debate from an implicit to an explicit
conversation. Most formal studies have treated Sahrawi national identity in a constructed sense
without any substantive explanations. These works either use the term “constructed” or assume
that national identity has been synthesized through external (top-down) and internal (bottom-up)
influences.
Third, this study will render a clear understanding of the roots of the nationalist
movement, to help forge a consensus in the international community about the validity of
Sahrawi nationalism. It will outline the fundamental characteristics of Sahrawi national identity
and will illustrate how the Sahrawi example correlates to the existing theoretical framework. The
reader of this study will understand the different dimensions of national identity: primordial,
instrumental, or constructed. This study may also narrow the distance between the conflicting
parties and among interested international actors. Fourth, theoretical debates over the sources of
nationalist movements will be able to use evidence from this case. To date, the case of the
Sahrawi and the Western Sahara has not been analyzed along these lines. The use of these
approaches demonstrates that there are varied sources that can establish the base of a nationality.

Research Design
To uncover the roots of Sahrawi national identity the theoretical framework has been structured
around the three most prominent approaches to national identity: 1) primordialism, 2)
instrumentalism, and 3) constructivism. These approaches offer alternative explanations to the
rise of nations and nationalism. In this case, preliminary research for answers to the central
question has resulted in four possible hypotheses. The four hypotheses below are derived from
the three main approaches to national identity and from present scholarship.
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The first hypothesis argues that the Sahrawi are a distinct grouping of people separated
from neighboring peoples by language, territory, and custom; the first two are ethnic
characteristics, while the third is a cultural distinction. These distinctions set the Sahrawi apart
from Moroccans and others. The POLISARIO seeks an independent state on behalf of this
authentic national people. These distinctions are claimed to be socio-historically evident. This
hypothesis is primarily derived from primordialism and presumes that the roots of Sahrawi
identity are found deep in history.
The second hypothesis claims that the Sahrawi struggle is an extension of anticolonialism. The Sahrawi rebellion (against French, Spanish, and Mauritanian intrusion), which
was evident even before formal colonization, has evolved into a neo-anti-colonialist effort against
Morocco. These socio-political and anti-colonial arguments support the establishment of a
sovereign republic.
The third hypothesis has determined that foreign and domestic actors appropriated
Saharan identity for their own purposes: prestige, political power, and practicality. This idea
suggests that these actors gave rise to a Sahrawi identity and that in the absence of such actors no
Sahrawi nation would have ever developed. However, because of the length of the study, the
research will end in 1973, the year that the POLISARIO was established. This hypothesis is
derived from instrumentalism. A fourth hypothesis is difficult to articulate since it is based on the
idea of living freely—a purely ideological argument. Not very substantive, it would tend to be
incorporated by the traditional views of resistance to foreign subjugation under the first
hypothesis.
These theories will aid in clarifying which hypothesis or hypotheses best explain the
origins of Sahrawi national identity through a socio-historical methodology. In other words, the
history of the Sahrawi will be chronologically outlined to produce a narrative of the Sahrawi,
which will highlight the development of the nationalist movement from its ancient to pre-
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colonial, colonial, and post-colonial experiences. The choice for a segmented timeline is more
appropriate because it would be difficult to insert topics of study within their extensive history.
Thus, the project is divided as follows:
Chapter One will present the problem, provide a brief background to the conflict, and
explain its importance for studies in national identity and for scholars studying the origins of
nations. This section contains a summary of the theoretical framework upon which the project is
based and explains how the organization. Chapter Two details the theoretical structure that
supports the research, namely describing the three approaches to national identity. After
clarification of the theories for national identity, the three main hypotheses are expanded (from
preliminary research), to spell out the possible origins of the Sahrawi nation. Thereafter, a
literature review presents what past and current scholarship has demonstrated to be the roots of
the Sahrawi nation. Consequently, I will make clear the theoretical gap(s) found among Sahrawi
scholarship and the weaknesses that arise from this academic oversight.
Chapter Three analyzes ancient Sahrawi origins and assumes that Sahrawi history can be
traced to the original Berber inhabitants) of North Africa prior to the takeover of the Spanish fort
in Santa Cruz de Mar Pequeña (located in southwestern Morocco) by the Muslim army of the
Sa’adian Dynasty in 1524. It traces the Berber lineage of the Sahrawi and provides glimpses into
their cohesion and group development throughout this early period. Most of the analysis will
draw on historical research of the region where evidence suggests that the early origins of
Sahrawi identity may be based upon an ethno-cultural distinctiveness, as the first hypothesis
suggests. Finally, the first (primordial-derived) hypothesis will be thoroughly investigated as it
may only illuminate a sense of group cohesion for this one period and not answer the central
question. Chapter Four focuses on the pre-colonial Sahrawi experience between 1524 and 1757. I
will analyze the movements of the Sanhaja Berber and their involvement in the Shar Bouba War.
I will research the territorial control by key figures during the Sa’adian and Alawite Dynasties

13

and the historical claims by Morocco to the territory of Western Sahara. In addition, my analysis
will trace the origins of the Sahrawi in literature through library research at various Spanish State
archives, including the Archivo General de la Administración in Alcalá de Henares and the
Archivo Histórico Nacional (AHN) in Madrid, Spain. The analysis in this chapter will evaluate
whether the second (constructivist-derived) or perhaps third (instrumentalist-derived) hypotheses
are more plausible reasons for identifying a national awakening in this period.
Chapters Five and Six involve library research as well as archival documentation
conducted at the Archivo Histórico Nacional (AHN) and at the Biblioteca Nacional de España
(BNE) in Madrid, Spain. Chapter Five evaluates the Sahrawi experience through 1758—1859. It
features the Sultans of the period and their relationship with the foreign powers and actors
‘outside’ their spheres of influence. It also introduces the ideas of boundaries (territorial and
conceptual), literature, and ‘spiritual’ authority as markers of identity. In this section, I will be
seeking documentation to establish the early frontiers of the Western Sahara. Chapter Six assesses
the aggressive European encroachment by the Spanish and French and the reaction of the Sultans
in the greater Western Sahara. This section describes the rise of several independent entities and
assesses their link to the modern Sahrawi. I will search for the delineation of boundaries between
the Kingdom of Morocco (under early French rule and later as an independent country) and the
rest of the Saharan territory and attempt to discover the origins of Spanish and French boundary
claims.

Were these claims conclusions based upon group identities or other political and

economic reasons? Although hypothesis two and four (ideological argument) may provide the
most obvious answers to the central question in this period, all hypotheses may be applicable.
Chapter Seven examines the colonial period beginning in 1885 until the 1973. It will
comment on the treaties settled by foreign powers and those agreements with the Sultan of
Morocco. It will elaborate on European view of Morocco’s physical boundaries and interaction
with other independent entities in the region. It will highlight the abundance of autonomous
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groups that arose in the greater Western Sahara and if any of these independencies can be
associated to the Sahrawi of today. The second, third and fourth hypotheses figure prominently in
this last phase of the work. Finally, Chapter Eight assesses all four hypotheses for each period.
The Chapter will add interviews16 with the representatives of the POLISARIO about their view
about their origins. This section includes how well each hypothesis has fared and how they have
answered the central question overall. A critical examination will then determine which ones
answer the central question most effectively. This entire process establishes the usefulness of
each theoretical approach, removes some of the weaknesses in analyzing Sahrawi national
identity, and provides a better understanding of the Western Sahara conflict. Finally, this study
hopes to lay a clearer, theoretical framework toward the study of any national movement today
and hereafter and perhaps help break the stalemate in the Western Sahara.

Delimitations
One of the major obstacles faced in producing this study is the lack of sufficient literature on the
topic of the Western Sahara. Most of the present day literature centers on the current events of the
conflict evident in the CRS Reports (Migdalovitz 2006, 2008; Arieff 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014) or
several UN documents dating back to 1964 (Pazzanita 2006, 421). Other topics found on the
Western Sahara involve the historical facts surrounding the conflict or the legal grounds and
justifications for each party to the conflict. Discussions of Sahrawi nationalism are bountiful. Yet,
among the small number of scholars who do detail Sahrawi nationalism, almost nothing is written
about the approach taken for the study of the problem. The historical absence of a theoretical
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These questions asked what, in their opinion, are the roots of Sahrawi identity? What is to explain the rise of the
Sahrawi nation? For those who may well deny that any such group actually exists, the same questions are pertinent but
asked why they believe that such a national movement exists? What or how was it created? Being the most prolific of
periods for the subject of the Western Sahara, ample information among articles, books, and UN documentation will be
available. Interviews conducted by author with the assistance of Mohammed Omar, translator and guide, on 25 July
(Madrid) and 11 November 2013 (New York), and 28 September through 02 October 2014 (Sahrawi ‘refugee’ camps
in Rabouni and Smara, outside Tindouf, Algeria).
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framework for this case presents the researcher with mapping problems. This study will offer new
theoretical ground that may also be used in other case studies.
Literature on the Sahrawi is found in Arabic, English, French, and Spanish languages.
The researcher is fluent in English and Spanish with a modest to a high degree of fluency in
French. The literature in Spanish has proven to be valuable, but not without challenges. For
example, investigating the archives in Spain includes not only deciphering the Spanish intentions
of 200 to 300 years ago, but also navigating these documents solely with instructions and guides.
French would be considerably more challenging at this level.
Third, as an investigator, it became evident that monetary resources to conduct interviews
in Madrid, Algeria, Morocco, New York, and Washington, DC were stretched very far. The
requests for interviews were many; the responses were few. In addition, the availability of many
of the officials who responded did not often correspond to semester holidays or breaks in the
teaching schedule. It was often difficult to schedule meetings, especially when locations were in
distant countries.
Finally, the security situation has dramatically changed since the fall of Qaddafi in Libya.
Tuareg rebels in Libya joined the struggle against the Qaddafi government and were able to
acquire and transport modern weaponry across the region to affiliate with Tuareg MNLA rebels
in Mali. The conflict in Mali has subsided for the moment. It had, however, reportedly reached
SADR territory where kidnapping of foreigners and recruiting of the young in its POLISARIO
camps became a concern. The threat of militant Islamists has become more pronounced with the
announcement of a reinvigorated AQIM and a new group in Morocco called Sham al-Islam
(Crétois and Boudarham 2014; Roggio 2016). These threats did not deter the researcher from
undertaking field work, but did influence travel arrangements and navigation of the region.
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Definitions of Key Terms
I will make use of several terms in this study that have over time been interpreted in various ways
and do not have clear definitions. Some of these definitions are modern concepts in the field of
identity politics; a very recent subfield within international relations. Terms such as ethnicity,
nation, nationality, and nationalism are all related to each other but have to be distinguished from
each other to provide the reader with clarity and cohesiveness and to avoid conceptual confusion.
“Ethnicity” is most commonly defined as that which pertains to or is affiliated with something
‘ethnic.’ Ethnic by nature is generally associated with a certain social grouping and usually
described in French as an “ethnie.” This grouping is defined “as a collectivity within a larger
society having…[a] common ancestry, memories of a shared historical past, and a cultural focus
[toward] one or more symbolic elements” (such as religious affiliation, language, tribal
affiliation, or phenotypical features) (Hutchinson and Smith 1996, 6). In a separate work, Smith
expands the meaning of ethnie to include the ethno-cultural characteristics or elements mentioned
above as ones that are shared among these political communities (2002, 15). In general, these
political collectivities are considered ‘ethnic groups’ or ‘ethnic communities.’
A nation, however, is more than an ethnie. It is a socio-political collectivity, members of
which, first, not only share ethnic or racial origins, but also possess those particular elements of
the ethnie mentioned above (Op. cit., 15). Secondly, this collectivity should not only possess a
common economic life, a geographical location, a political base, but also a sense of common
identity. The key to this definition resides not in the characteristic ingredients of nation, but in the
use of the phrase, ‘a sense of common identity’ or belonging. Walker Connor has questioned the
common international relations textbook definitions of nation because of their use of these
ambiguous phrases for the social collectivesense of homogeneity, sense of belonging, feeling or
even group intuition. Despite this criticism, even though a sense of or feelings of oneness can
ultimately lead to broad interpretations, Connor emphasizes that what matters most “is not what is

17

but what people believe is” (Connor 1994, 93). Connor speaks of an intuitive conviction, which
can give nations a psychological dimension, a feeling of common lineage. Third, and perhaps the
most important difference between an ethnic group and nation, is that a nation has “the desire to
control a territory that is thought of as the group’s national homeland” (Barrington 1997, 713).
These beliefs define the composition of a group, a nation.
These ‘unbreakable’ beliefs are not up for debate among the in-group. The value that is
given to these objects of belief is transformed at the group level into shared perceptions of
identity. These perceptions evolve into subjective particularities, namely those objects of belief
that groups accept as realities (land, food, dress, history, language). These particularities are also
recognized by those outside the in-group. There might be those among the in-group who do not
recognize or simply decide to ignore these ‘collective’ notions. For example, Anderson has
written, even among the in-group, there is no possible manner in which a member of such a
socio-political entity can know “most of their fellow members,” in terms of desire and goals “yet
in the minds of each lives the image of their communion” (Anderson 2006, 6). Whether or not
these goals are initiated by the elite, the masses, or a combination of both, the goals for their
political communities largely rely on the interpretation of these objects of belief. The author
agrees that there are perceived ‘objective’ ethnic realities. As the group becomes larger, however,
and the pursuits of such an entity become more wide-ranging in scope and degree, goals diverge.
The difficulty in channeling, what was once viewed as objective, to the wider segment of the
population, may become interpreted differently and consequently, far more subjective.
This study agrees with Connor’s evaluation of the collective self-perception and
acknowledges there is a degree of subjectivity to nationhood. However, this position underscores
the need for a search for the source(s) of Sahrawi national identity, whether ambiguous or not.
These are the notions that have to be discovered to begin to understand the nature of the conflict.
This study further acknowledges that the concept of nation is associated with some type of
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emotional attachment to those symbolic elements that are ethnic in origin: blood, language, and
faith. Nation not only includes these ethnic elements but also expands them by adding domestic,
political, and economic structures through the ‘sense’ of both common identity and “purpose:
controlling the territory that members of the group believe to be theirs” (Barrington 1997, 713).
A nation will not be equally associated with the term state. State implies a legally binding entity
that has self-governing powers recognized by most global actors.17 It is evident that not all
nations have self-governing powers. Some are subject to majority group powers, prefer a more
cooperative structure with other nations, or are not recognized by global actors as legitimate
political entities with which to collaborate with in formal diplomatic, economic, or socio-cultural
terms. According to Connor, ethnic groups all self-differentiate themselves from other groups and
are in fact already nations (Connor 1996, 40).
National Identity is a complex term that can best be defined by asking what is its
elemental composition. Smith summarizes that it is “composed of a number of interrelated
components—ethnic, cultural, territorial, economic, and legal-political” (Smith 1991, 15). These
components fulfill the external and internal functions for groups and individuals. For instance, the
territorial, economic, and legal-political dimensions serve as the external functions of groups.
Groups search for ‘spaces’ within which to establish themselves as a cohesive society. They then
seek the control of resources for their survival, and define the legal, structural framework for its
individuals and lawmakers (ibid., 16). Internally, the nation serves to socialize its ‘citizens’
through educational standards. National identity also provides for its members, common bonds
via shared myths, symbols, and values.
Finally, Smith adds that national identity “provides” for the individual a manner in which
to place him/herself in the world by way of “collective personality” and “distinctive culture”
(ibid., 17). By understanding the external and internal dimensions of one’s shared culture, the
17

Controversy exists with certain entities such as Palestine, Kosovo, Taiwan as they still have not been officially
recognized by the major actors in the global arena such as China, Israel or in the case of Kosovo by Serbia.
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individual discovers or becomes ‘self-aware’ of these associations. If an individual or social
collective perceives a tie with other individuals or collectives because of certain common
elements, then it ‘identifies’ itself with such groups of individuals. This identification process, in
turn, creates conglomerates of individuals, groups, and social collectivities. These conglomerates
may eventually constitute specific nations composed of common essential traits. Smith describes
this as a “process of self-definition,” which is the ‘key’ to national identity (Smith 1991, 17).
This key, the source of self-definition, pinpoints the time at which a group became self-defined,
and the reasons why a group chose to self-define itself. This key is the most contentious issue
among studies of nationalism. This study builds upon these definitions to determine the roots of
national identity. It considers that both the internal and external dimensions of ‘selfidentification’ form integral parts of nationality. Thus, it is part of the ongoing conversation about
national identity, and also as an important step in resolving the issue over the Western Sahara.
The major objective of this study is to trace the origins of Sahrawi nationalism through
the socio-historical analysis of the Sahrawi experience. It draws insights from all of the major
theoretical approaches to nationalism in order to identify phenomena that should be explored.
This three-fold theoretical framework will answer the central question by using, in historical
order of origin, the three approaches to the study of national identity: primordialism,
instrumentalism, and constructivism. Why choose these three? Certainly there have been other
methods that have tried to explain the rise of nations. Perennialism, Ethno-symbolism, and other
theories have attempted to seek the origins of nations and nationalism. Socio-economic, sociocultural, and ideological reasons are all part of this discussion. However, all these other theories
and reasons are best understood and can best be placed in the first three approaches mentioned.
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Primordialism
Primordialism states that the origins of national identity are to be found in the distant past
(historical). It holds that nations have existed at all times of human history and that modern ethnic
groups have historical continuity into the far past. Nations, according to Armstrong, began when
“ethnic identification” became “widespread” and “intense” in Mesopotamia. Their different
attitudes towards territory and genealogy between sedentary agricultural populations and nomad
groups also became prevalent (Armstrong 1982, 8, 21, 132). Primordialism further states that
national origins are an organic part of human development. National identity is found among the
organic features of social existence. These cultural features are asserted to be part of the natural
order and hence associated as natural ‘givens.’ These features are attached “to the ‘cultural
givens’ of social existence” such as kin, race, language, and territory (Smith 2010, 56). Finally,
in more extreme versions, national origins are socio-biological extensions of the reproductive
drives of individuals. (Van Den Berghe 1987)
Primordialism locates the origins of nationality in the past, through kinship and in
biological heritage. The participant perceives ethnic ties collectively, as an externally given, even
coercive, social bond. In Shils’ study on primary groups, he found that, “modern society…is held
together by an affinity of personal attachments, moral obligations in concrete contexts,
professional and creative pride, individual ambition, primordial affinities and a civil sense which
is low in many, high in some, and moderate in most persons” (Shils 1957, 131). He concludes
that these affinities to “another member of one’s kinship group is…because a certain ineffable
significance is attributed to the tie of blood” (Shils, 142). Geertz confirms this idea by adding
that this tie is one that “stems from the ‘givens’…of social existence: immediate contiguity and
kin connection...These congruities of blood, speech, custom, and so on seem to have an
ineffable…coerciveness in and of themselves” (Geertz 1973, 259). Personal attachments are the
“ready-made set of endowments and identifications that every individual shares with others from
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the moment of birth by the chance of the family into which he is born,” which Isaacs refers to as
basic group identity (Isaacs 1975, 38). Such attachments or affinities as “common territory of
origin and residence, and biological connection,” entail beliefs about these cultural objects that
transform them into (primordial) givens (Grosby 1996, 54). The primordial givens or ‘objects’ of
“family, the locality, and one’s own people,” are considered sacred because they “bear, transmit,
and protect life” (Grosby, 1996, 56). This, Grosby states, is why “human beings sacrifice their
lives and continue to sacrifice their lives for their own family and for their own nation” (1996,
54). Primordialism then is the approach that recognizes specific and essential objects (blood,
place, and language) that bind one to another and form the group. In a sense, extending these
principal items creates a nation.
Yet, the origins of the theory did not begin with Shils, Isaacs, or Geertz. The main thrust
of the conceptual approach was attributed to the works of Fichte (1762—1814) and Herder
(1744—1803), and their ideals of German Romanticism. They believed that the most powerful
characteristic in forging a nation was language. The primordialist version of nationality was given
much more weight beginning with the French revolution. The nineteenth century saw European
nationalist revolts, leading to and culminating with both world wars. However, the ideological
conflict of the Cold War between the principles of democratic republicanism and communism
began to marginalize nationalism. American pluralist ideology sought to convert all immigrant
nationalities into ‘American’; communism would simply eliminate national identity altogether.
The polarity of these views led to the decline of the primordialist interpretation. Decolonization in
the late 1950s and 1960s brought a confluence of multinational states and instrumentalists argued
that their creations were a product of power manipulation and resource consolidation by elitist
groups. By the 1980s, modernists had largely discredited primordialism and absorbed
instrumentalism. They developed a more eclectic approach to the study of national identity.
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Still, the end of the Cold War compelled academic scholarship to revisit primordialism to
explain how the Soviet Union had crumbled into fifteen separate republics and why Yugoslavia
had, in fact, several nations within its boundaries. Authors such as Smith, Kaufmann, Connor, and
Armstrong have revitalized primordialism and relabeled it as ethno-symbolism or neotraditionalism. While ethno-symbolism agrees with the modernist analysis of nations as “active,
purposive sociological communities embedded in particular historical epochs,” it tends to reemphasize the bond that ethnic identity and community has to the “formation” and “persistence”
of nations (Smith 2009, 21). Smith, the scholar who developed ethno-symbolism, states that,
“although nations may be partly forged by political institutions, over the long term they require
ethno-cultural resources to create a solidary community… We need to understand the oftencomplex interplay between elites and various sections of the wider population whom they may
seek to mobilize in terms of symbols, myths and memories that resonate with them” (ibid.).
Despite these labels, I will continue to use the term primordialism, as it tends to reinvigorate old
arguments, but in a new light. There is need, therefore, to pursue Sahrawi symbols, myths, and
memories, rather than to rely only on first-degree explanations for primordialism, such as
language, territory, and history. As noted above, there have been no real primordialist accounts of
the Sahrawi national identity question, and this perspective needs to be examined for a proper
interpretation of the rise of the Sahrawi nation.
The primordial line of thinking has largely been neglected in delineating Sahrawi
mobilization. POLISARIO and Sahrawi activists contend that Sahrawi identity is more essential
than has been recognized. It originates from much earlier in history and can be traced through
genealogy, ancient territorial affiliation, and tradition. Certain Sahrawi poets and writers-turned
activists are utilizing literature to argue implicitly for a more primordial origin of Sahrawi
identity. Furthermore, over the last two decades, a re-fashioning of primordialism by scholars
such as Smith, Connor, Spear, and Huntington and revolutionary events such as the end of the
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Cold War have reinvigorated their arguments and warrant a renewed look at the case of the
Western Sahara. Primordialism may have as much value for the case as either instrumentalism or
constructivism. Despite the claims, I question the degree to which Sahrawi activism relies on
primordial justification. Still, the lack of a primordialist interpretation of Sahrawi identity leaves
their case incomplete and in need of a more complete review of its origins.

Instrumentalism
Within the field of political science, instrumentalism began with discussions of ethnicity rather
than over national identity, and primarily as a critique to primordialism. Primordialism was
criticized for being too broad an approach to nation-building due to the complexities and
dynamics of political, economic, and social hybridization. In addition, the ethnic characteristics of
a nation described above were being viewed as subjective features and not ‘givens,’ or objective
cultural attributes. In the 1960s and 1970s, the debates arose in the context of how best to order
society with the rise of multinational states in Africa and Asia after decolonization. Smith
describes how, even in the United States, a debate had emerged between Glazer/Moynihan and
Herberg over the role that ethnic identity had played in the formation of American society.18
While Herberg wrote about the creation of an American melting pot via Protestant, Catholic, and
Jewish groups, Glazer and Moynihan showed how “the various ethnic groups of New York
adapted to an American lifestyle” (Smith 2000, 55). This discussion fueled debate about what
degree ethnic groups forge the formation of local communities, and whether these groups “should
be seen as interest or pressure groups behaving instrumentally in the marketplace” (Smith 2000,
55).
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See Will Herberg, Protestant, Catholic, Jew: An Essay in American Religious Sociology, (University of Chicago
Press: Chicago), 1955 and Nathan Glazer and Daniel Moynihan, Beyond the Melting Pot: The Negroes, Puerto Ricans,
Jews, Italians, and Irish of New York City Second Edition (The MIT Press: Harvard, 1963).
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These issues later became prominent among academic discussions of the ‘genesis of
nations.’ In an often referenced debate, in 1979, Brass and Robinson applied this approach in
attempting to explain the formation of Pakistan. Brass wrote that the creation of nations is a type
of identity formation “defined as the process of identifying the subjective meanings of a
multiplicity of symbols…to give subjective and symbolic meanings to merely objective
distinctions between peoples”19 (Brass 1991, 20). He believed that these elements, language,
religion, kinship, and homeland, are variable, can be multiple, or irrelevant and therefore
subjective.20 Brass concluded that, “nation formation is the process by which elites and counterelites within ethnic groups select aspects of the group’s culture, attach new value and meaning to
them, and use them as symbols to mobilize the group, to defend its interest, and to compete with
other groups” (1991, 75). Brass disagreed with the assumption “that distinct primordial groups in
society are sufficient to predict the future development of ethnic communities or nations” and
may be of no use “in predicting either the development or the form of ethnic movements” (1991,
72-73). Robinson generally agreed with Brass’ view, but in reverse, by arguing that Muslim
elites in north India and the Bengal region drew from select cultural distinctions and the ideology
of the umma by applying to them symbolic meaning in order to safeguard their Islamic heritage,
resulting in the independent state of Pakistan (Smith 2000, 22).
Instrumentalists also argue that the elements noted above are given non-rational or even
irrational meanings. Thus, instrumentalists seek more rational explanations to nationalist
mobilization. They seek the roots of national identity from its political and economic
environment. Ethnic leaders and elites will use “their cultural groups as sites of mass mobilization
and as constituencies in their competition for power and resources” (Smith 2010, 59). Hence,
19

The full quote includes, “and of striving to achieve multi-symbol congruence among a group of people defined
initially by one or more central symbols, whether these symbols are ethnic attributes or loyalty to a particular state,” but
has been purposely omitted for reasons of space. Brass 1991, 20.
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For instance, an individual can speak more than one language or convert from one faith to another.
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“the political process determines the character of ethnicity and its role in the polity” (Robertson
1997, 267). This led to Brass’ conclusion that “a nation therefore is an ethnic community
politicized” (Brass 1991, 20). Furthermore, this politicization follows Barrington’s definition
associating a nation with its belief in the right to territorial self-determination (Barrington 1997,
73). In brief, instrumentalism treats national identity primarily as an ad hoc element of political
strategy, used as a resource for interest groups or one created “for elites in competition” for
achieving secondary goals, for instance, an increase in political power and economic advantage
(Brass 1991, 15). In this sense, Brass regards nationality, in large part, as the study of politically
induced cultural change (ibid., 75). Breuilly expands on this view by declaring that nationalism
can only be understood as a ‘form of politics,’ “as the expression of national consciousness, as a
political doctrine elaborated by intellectuals” (Breuilly 1994, 1).
Instrumentalists critique primordialism for its objectification of cultural attributes for
group identification, and in contrast, interpret them to be more subjective than objective in nature.
Thus, instrumentalists will seek more rational or objective criteria for explaining the rise of
nations. In this case, instrumentalism, which has been only informally used, suffers from a lack of
in-depth application, or has been poorly articulated in explaining Sahrawi mobilization. For
example, Moroccan authorities often state that the POLISARIO has manufactured Sahrawi
national identity out of whole cloth and fully reject the notion of a Sahrawi nation. At the other
extreme, it is doubtful that all Sahrawi still continue to regard POLISARIO leaders as their chief
spokesmen for independence. Even if these claims were true, accepting the argument that such an
elite group (or other such interest groups) has ‘managed’ the movement (for its own political
reasons) may not alone answer the central question. Instrumentalist arguments are neither clear,
nor fully explored.
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Constructivism
Constructivism rejects that nationality or even ethnicity is the essential human condition but
rather approaches the study of nationalities as products of human social interaction, that is,
socialization and historical forces. Smith writes that nations are viewed as a combination of
cultural artifacts and social constructs. Elites fashion these artifacts by representing the past,
upholding the importance of identity, and promoting them through cultural media and social
ritual, a method of social engineering (Smith in 2000, 52 and 2001, 79). This socialization is
realized by way of political processes, normally labeled as ethnopolitics. However, ethnopolitics
can vary in degree and depth because of “the structure of societies, and the political and economic
institutions embedded in them, which limit and empower individual human agents who act to
create ethnopolitics” (Robertson 1997, 268). Consequently, constructivism is regarded as the
“conjunction of [these] social processes and political action that creates opportunities for leaders
to use nationalism and the incentives for followers to support nationalism” (Robertson 1997,
274). Ultimately then, one of the primary tenets of social constructivism is the assumption “that
nationalism created and continues to create nations, rather than the opposite” (Smith 2000, 52.)
Alexander Wendt introduced constructivism in the field of international relations and
advocated that rather than explaining world politics through its epistemological assumptions, one
should understand it through ontological eyes by asking, “what is it made up of or how is it
structured” (Wendt 1999, 370). Wendt summarized his “ontology of international life…[as]
‘social’ in the sense that it is through ideas that states ultimately relate to one another, and
‘constructionist’ in the sense that these ideas help define who and what states are” (Wendt 1999,
372). In the subfield of national identity, his approach has been extended to the question of
nations. Although modern scholarship has largely been credited for elaborating and articulating
the constructivist approach, the origins of constructivism can be traced to the works of Herder,
Renan, and Max Weber. Though Herder was previously mentioned when describing
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primordialism, Ergang explains that he also saw “nationality as a product of nature and its growth
as regulated by the laws of nature,” where nature “was the great architect who planned and
constructed the group” (Ergang 1966, 95). Herder believed that certain social (as opposed to
natural) factors (education, physical environment, intermarriage, and tradition) influenced the
national soul (Ergang, 112). Weber wrote that “naked prestige of ‘power’” transforms direct and
material imperialist and ideological interests into the idea of the nation (Gerth and Mills 1946,
172). Although Weber mentions that language is the primary cultural element in the formation of
national sentiment, he states that it is not a sufficient criterion for the creation of a nation. Instead,
Weber treats nation as those “groups of men” exacting “a specific sentiment of solidarity in the
face of other groups (ibid.). National identity may be connected with ethnic elements but it may
also, “above all, “be linked to the memories of a common political destiny” (ibid., 173). Here
then, one finds early writings attributing national identity to the product of both primordial
(linguistic and natural) and instrumental (interests and power) elements.
Thus, constructivism can be viewed as a hybrid approach to the study of national identity
because it seeks its origins in both objective and subjective features. Renan had stated that a
nation consisted on the one hand of, “the possession in common of a rich legacy of memories; the
other [one] is the actual consent, the desire to live together, the will to continue to value the
heritage which all hold in common”21 (Conference at the Sorbonne, March 11, 1882). Scholars
such as Hobsbawm (in his later writings) and Robertson have concluded that this approach is a
fusion of the primordial and instrumental theories of national identity. Hobsbawm wrote that
nations are “constructed essentially from above” but they “cannot be understood” without being
21

Ernest Renan, “Qu’est-ce qu’Une Nation?,” Conférence Fait en Sorbonne, Le 11 Mars 1882, Deuxième Edition,
(Paris: Calmann Levy, 1882), 23. “L'une est la possession en commun d'un riche legs de souvenirs; l'autre est le
consentement actuel, le désir de vivre ensemble, la volonté de continuer à faire valoir l'héritage qu'on a reçu indivis.”
Taken from John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith, Nationalism, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 17,
trans. Ida Mae Snyder. Original English translation used ‘remembrances’ instead of memories. Here, I will use
memories as an easier, more palatable term. Memories are understood as an objective (or rational) feature while the
will or consent to live together is a group characteristic that is dependent on subjective and non-- or irrational ones.
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“analyzed from below” (Hobsbawm 1990, 10).

Robertson concurs, arguing that national

mobilization is a “combination of a top-down political movement with the process of bottom-up
social mobility”22 (Robertson 1997, 274). Anderson, in his most quoted of phrases, declared that a
nation is imagined as a limited (because it has finite boundaries) sovereign (born in the Age of
Enlightenment and revolution) community (conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship): “it is
an imagined political community” (1983, 17, 19). According to constructivists, the roots of
national identity lie with the instruments of social control and they emphasize that nations are
culturally engineered, constructed from ‘invented traditions’ (Hobsbawm) or are ‘imagined
communities’ (Anderson). In general, then, constructivists search for such ‘inventions’ among the
social instruments of ‘national’ education (and the retelling of its national history), in public
ceremonies, monuments, and speeches, and religious iconography (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983).
If constructivism is a fusion of primordialism and instrumentalism, why then pursue any
other framework for seeking the origins of Sahrawi national identity? Preliminary research has
found that concentration on constructivism, as defined above, used often to explain the origins of
Sahrawi national identity, has marginalized, with heavy critique, the other two approaches to
national identity. Scholarship of the Western Sahara problem is dominated by this very
contemporary view. It is rooted in the works of Kedourie, Gellner, Anderson, and Eriksen. If such
a theoretical merger is sufficient, why have bottom-up and top-down examples of this fusion not
been more readily evident in the literature? Even though there are several competing authors
within the constructivist line of thinking, many only refer to this notion via popular constructivist
terminology without adequately elaborating these “traditions,” “imaginations,” or social
constructions. Sahrawi national identity and its origins, if it is rooted upon such social
constructions, is certainly in need of a clearer understanding of these indications of synthesis.

22

Robertson is actually describing nationalism with this quote.
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In summary, it is necessary to employ all these approaches to understand the origins of
Sahrawi national identity. Since most explanations for the rise of the Sahrawi nation rely on
constructivist ideas, it is apparent that such predominance is a weakness in the literature on the
subject of the Western Sahara. Croucher wrote, at the beginning of her review of the ethnic
conglomeration of Miami, that she would use all of the available tools in order to explain the
“origins and processes that construct competing narratives and show how they change over time”
(1997, 21). I will follow this same route, not because these explanatory tools are available, but
because academic study concerning the origins of Sahrawi national identity suffers from an
inherently one-sided theoretical approach. Although constructivist notions of national identity
will be applied, instrumentalist and ‘rekindled’ primordialist explanations are also employed to
make the Sahrawi socio-cultural and geo-political past and present more clear. Utilizing all three
approaches will explain when Sahrawi national identity originated and equip us with a better
understanding of the Sahrawi and their pursuit of independence for the Western Sahara.
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW
This chapter will evaluate sources that deal first with the history of the region and its
early inhabitants. This section will include subheadings that deal with ancient, medieval, and the
colonial period of the region touching upon how these sources viewed the population in the
northwest Sahara. Next, it will review the literature that outlines how scholars view the Sahrawi
as a nation. This includes the varying interpretations on how the Sahrawi have come to be, in
terms of achieving a distinct national identity. A smaller subsection will attempt to divide such
interpretations by the various scholars into the three approaches of national identity:
primordialism, instrumentalism, and constructivism. The study will not include other material that
involves the current political situation that speaks of current foreign (i.e., UN, AU, U.S., and
France) or domestic (Morocco, Polisario) policies taken by the various actors on the Western
Sahara unless it is directly related to the study.
One of the weaknesses of Sahrawi scholarship has been the surprisingly small number of
studies surrounding the problem, especially from American scholars. Most scholars that write
about the Maghreb will not cross Arab political sensitivities. The Arab world, for the most part,
has treated its minorities, not as co-equals, but as second-class citizens. Also, much of the
academic discussion about the Arab world has been dwarfed by the Israeli-Palestinian issue and
the surrounding security concerns stemming from the conflict for its neighbors. The recent and
current Iraqi Wars, the present civil conflicts in Syria, Yemen, and Libya dominate Near East
news media and scholarly research. Moreover, these conflicts, largely as a result of the 2011 Arab
uprisings across the Middle East and North Africa have diverted attention from the Sahrawi
problem and channeled it toward the domestic and political group divisions among Arab states.
Despite the marginalization of the Western Sahara issue and the plight of the Sahrawi, these
conflicts across the Middle East have highlighted the ethnic, religious, and racial divisions that
plague the region. These groupings are present in Syria among Alawi, Kurd, Sunni, and even
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Christian faiths; in Libya as territorial and tribal divisions among the areas of the Fezzan,
Cyrenaica, Tripolitania and the Tuaregs; and in Algeria between Kabylie (Berber) and Arab. In
addition, as this study will show, Arab predominance in northwest North Africa is also subject to
ethno-linguistic divides between Arab, Berber, and Sahrawi23. However, the mere mention of
another possible ‘nation’ arising within Morocco’s historical territory is contrary to Moroccan
mentality.
The subject of the Western Sahara is one that has not captivated many scholars for
several reasons. Academic study about the region is weak; acquiring previous studies is
challenging. In fact, North Africa as a region, with the Sahara to its south and the Sahel even
further to the south, creates a geographic barrier that divides the ‘black’ or sub-Saharan Africa
and its north. This divide not only separates Africa socio-culturally, but also geo-politically, and
leaves North Africa desolate, minimally populated, insignificant for study. The same can be said
of northwest Africa the location of Western Sahara. Moreover, there has been very little
archaeological investigation due to the conflict between Morocco and the POLISARIO and
bureaucratic impediments for scientific study by both Algeria and Morocco. The inhospitable and
barren nature of the land, not just in Western Sahara, but also further inland, across the whole of
the Sahara, has stifled geo-political relevance for the region.24 There is very little protection for
military basing (extreme temperature fluctuations and sandstorms can quickly destroy armament
and weaponry. Camouflage is difficult. Accommodating soldiers in an inhospitable land is
difficult). In addition, this area has no significant value since it is neither (at the moment) rich in
valuable resources nor is it ideal for long-term investments of any kind—commercial,
agricultural, or military.
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Sahrawi is actually translated as Saharan in Arabic
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An exception would be entry and maintenance of the Straits of Gibraltar, which is an important waterway for
navigation and commerce.
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The conflict between Morocco and the POLISARIO has become so polarized that it is
increasingly difficult to conduct an objective investigation. The Kingdom of Morocco is opposed
to any ‘homeland’ for the Sahrawi because it does believe that an argument exists for such an
entity. Moreover, it characterizes those who oppose to the Kingdom and support the POLISARIO
as ‘separatists’ rather than as nationalists. Morocco and the U.S. Department of State characterize
the conflict as a political problem rather than an ethno-nationalist issue25. On the other hand, the
POLISARIO claims that the Western Sahara is the rightful territory of the ‘Sahrawi’ and
therefore continues to struggle for its independence. A small amount of compromise between the
two parties has resulted in a stalemate that has lasted at least twenty-five years. Disagreement
arises from the identification of a ‘true’ Sahrawi. Thus, most of the literature either supports one
side or the other. Academic study that advances a middle ground is difficult to find unless it is
documenting plans for the long awaited (and possibly never-to-be determined) Western Sahara
referendum.
The conflict has exacerbated Western Saharan isolation, limiting thorough studies of any
kind after Spanish colonization. First, the POLISARIO insists there will be no oil exploration off
the coast of the Western Sahara (or inland) pending resolution of the territory. Second, the
Kingdom of Morocco has placed obstacles, both physical (Kingdom of Morocco’s length-wide
sand berm) and procedural (requests to visit for research bog down into lengthy periods of
‘review’)26. Foreign visitor movements require ‘monitoring.’ These impediments have dissuaded
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Based on discussions with the U.S. Deputy Chief of Mission and other local nationals working inside the U.S.
Embassy in Rabat during my time as a U.S. State Department political intern in October—December of 2012.
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The author initially requested a visit to the Kingdom of Morocco in order to conduct research on the topic of Sahrawi
national identity 02 January 2014. This request was sent twice. A reply arrived 20 January 2014. Email communication
continued through February, including notification that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and Cooperation
would provide the author with an itinerary that would include a trip to the Western Sahara and interviews with NGOs,
academics, and ministers of government. However, via email on 24 March 2014, the Deputy Delegate to H.M. M’barka
Bouaida, Khaoula El-Kasmi, stated that a few formalities were needed in order to have the research request approved.
These formalities included a formal request to the Moroccan Embassy in Washington, DC, thesis statement, and a letter
of reference from the university. All documents were sent via email two days later. A reply, on June 6, stated that “a
request to establish a program of your visit to Morocco has been sent to our Ministry and we are waiting for their reply”
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scholars and investigative journalists alike.27 Literature written about Western Sahara includes
such topics as the women in the SADR camps, the refugee status of the Sahrawi, the structure of
the SADR, the history of the region, the issue over the referendum, and of course, since 1975,
descriptions of the most recent events in the conflict. Yet, despite these accounts, English
language study of the situation has been overtaken by other, more prominent issues in the Middle
East or on the continent of Africa28. A third problem with study of the conflict over Western
Sahara has been the low level of interest among American scholars compared to European
academic research. European scholarship tends to be predominately written in Spanish or French,
leaving the unilingual American or British researcher at a disadvantage. There is literature about
the subject in Arabic but even the author cannot identify how much has been written because of
his inadequate and very basic understanding of Arabic.
Yet, despite the limitations to the study of the subject, the author has uncovered an
abundance of (hard-to-find) literature. Although there have been significant writings about
Sahrawi nationalism and the origins of their national identity, this kind of information will
occupy less than a half a bookcase shelf in any library. English-only researchers need not be
disappointed at the relatively low numbers of books on the Sahrawi or the Western Sahara. This
dissertation will provide an impetus to widening and enhancing not only the study of the Sahrawi,
but also other such groups, who identify themselves as autonomous nationalities. In fact, the
author feels that there is much more information about the Western Sahara and Sahrawi national

(However, this reply was prompted by another email sent to the MOFA two days prior asking for one last opportunity
for a research visit). Today, 26 August 2016, there has still been no reply.
27

In fact, the author has been dissuaded from applying for certain fellowships because of the politically sensitive nature
of the conflict.
28

A recent Amazon search of new, in stock, twenty-first century titles in English produced 262 books on the ‘Arab
Spring,’ while the same criteria applied for the Western Sahara that began forty years ago resulted in only 107 books.
Another comparison can be made at the Library of Congress, where an online catalog search with the words ‘Arab
Spring’ and ‘Western Sahara’ as a phrase gave 137 for the former and 119 for the latter. 40 years of conflict has been
surpassed by the study of the five-year-old ‘Arab Spring.’
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identity, which can be found through un-translated Arabic sources and may be in other untapped
African or European sources. Below, I will introduce several of the most important works about
Sahrawi national identity and classify each under one of the three main approaches to
nationalism.

Theoretical Research
Not only has the terminological use of “nation” evolved, but the methodological approaches to
the study of nationalism have also changed over time. These approaches have created
substantially more ideas as to how nationalism is interpreted. These approaches can be
categorized into three main branches: 1) primordialism, 2) instrumentalism, and 3)
constructivism. This triangular approach is not one that is readily accepted among academic
scholars. For example, Phillip Khoury, has written that the “[u]nderstandings of a nation
generally adhere to one of two schools: ‘primordialist’ and ‘modernist’” (2011, 13). In fact, he
further states that, “the primordialist approach is little adhered to anymore in scholarship or
intellectual circles” (ibid., 13). Khoury, in his comparison of Palestinian and Sahrawi nationalism
states that the “modernist, or ‘constructivist’ approach…is both accepted and important for
contextualizing the UN’s legitimation of nationalisms” (ibid., 13). He believes that these types of
theories are ‘concurrent’ with “understanding nationalism as a modern political project in which
nations are constructed, not given a priori.” (ibid.). For example, he prefers to follow the line of
thinking by Ernest Renan in describing nation building as a ‘spiritual’ project rather than one
based on common features such as race, language, religion, or even geography (ibid.). For the
most part, this statement is true.
However, despite Khoury’s interpretation of Anthony Smith’s reformulation of
primordialism into a more constructivist approach, academic scholarship usually slights the
beliefs of those who are actually in the process of establishing their national identity. Those
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members, who compose a ‘polis’ or political community, rarely, if ever, question how they have
‘become’ a nation, how their claims to a national identity were “based upon certain shared ethnic
and cultural characteristics” (ibid., 14). Instead, these groups understand that their origins are tied
to features that they believe are inviolable, have been eternally theirs, and reach deep in the
past—a set known, perhaps not to others (in academia), but made absolute by observation unto
them. Thus, despite Khoury’s misgivings about primordialism, it still clarifies a very important
component of national identity. It is imperative to include these primordial works in such a
literature review. Khoury does provide for a very good discussion of the modernist
(constructivist) ‘conception’ of statehood of Sahrawi and Moroccan identity.
One interesting West Saharan-Moroccan issue that exemplifies the primordial—
constructivist debate concerns the current stalemate over who is a Sahrawi. Perhaps the biggest
matter of contention is deciding who is eligible for voting in this yet-to-be determined
referendum. For instance, the Kingdom of Morocco has supported a policy of jus sanguinis (right
of blood) in addition to “members of Sahrawi tribes with links to the territory (of the Western
Sahara)” (Jensen 2012, 1). According to the POLISARIO, eligibility should be limited to jus soli
(right of the soil) and closely parallel the Spanish national census of 1974. In 1991, after several
broken cease-fires and informal talks, Morocco and the POLISARIO approved a UN settlement
plan. At this time, an informal cease-fire has become permanent and both sides have sought a
non-violent resolution. The POLISARIO, in a surprise move meant to isolate and pressure
Morocco, accepted James Baker’s 2003 Peace Plan, but Morocco rejected it.29 Thereafter,
consensus to resolve the problem has been difficult. Consequently, Morocco has brought forth its
own initiative of autonomy for the Western Sahara.30
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Peace Plan for Self-Determination of the People of Western Sahara, May 23 2003. Pazzanita, s.v., “Chronology,” xl.
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This initiative brought forth by the Kingdom of Morocco as the Autonomy Plan for the Western Sahara was
presented to the UN in April 2007.
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The Primordial Literature
The works classified under this heading will be those who have theorized or through the
empirical research, either explicitly or implicitly, that Sahrawi national identity is found through
primordial arguments. To reiterate, primordialism states that national identity is rooted or can be
found in the past, through kinship and biological heritage. Members perceive to have an ethnic
tie, either from others (externally) or from the in-group (coercively), and in this sense form a
distinct group—even a distinct nation. These affective ties are generated from ethnic
characteristics, such as language (Johann Herder) and territory. Although the post-modern
worldview would argue that the socio-political environment and other interests have created these
nationalities, Anthony D. Smith emphasizes that these groups still necessitate ethno-cultural
assets to create unitary communities.
In Shil’s study on primary groups, he found that, “modern society…is held together by an
affinity of personal attachments, moral obligations in concrete contexts, professional and creative
pride, individual ambition, primordial affinities and a civil sense which is low in many, high in
some, and moderate in most persons” (1957, 131). He concludes that these primordial affinities
or attachments to “another member of one’s kinship group is…because [of] a certain ineffable
significance is attributed to the tie of blood” (Shils 1957, 142). Clifford Geertz attributes this tie
to one that “stems from the ‘givens’…of social existence: immediate contiguity and kin
connection...These congruities of blood, speech, custom, and so on seem to have an
ineffable…coerciveness in and of themselves” (Geertz 1973, 259). The primordial givens or
‘objects’ of “family, the locality, and one’s own people,” are considered sacred because they
“bear, transmit, and protect life” (Grosby, 1996, 56). This is one of the reasons why Steven
Grosby states, “human beings sacrifice their lives and continue to sacrifice their lives for their
own family and for their own nation” (1996, 54). These essential objects — “common territory
of origin and residence, and biological connection” — entail beliefs about these objects that
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transform them into (primordial) attachments (Grosby 1996, 54)]. These attachments or ties are
the “ready-made set of endowments and identifications that every individual shares with others
from the moment of birth by the chance of the family into which he is born” that Harold Isaacs
calls basic group identity (Isaacs 1975, 38). Primordialism then is that concept that qualifies
specific and essential objects (birth, place, language) that bind one to another—forming the group
and, in this sense, extending these principal items to a nation.
Another form of primordialism, ‘soft primordialism,’ advanced by Anthony D. Smith,
suggests that in order to understand ethnicity, one must “pay more attention to the subjective
elements [ethnic memories, values, symbols, myths and traditions] in ethnic survival” (Smith
1999, 130).

Moreover, these ethno-symbols “unite and inspire the members of an ethnic

community over several generations” (Smith 1999, 130). Yet, such a formulation of an ethnic
nation is not natural but ever changing. This leads to a subset of primordialism described as
“perennialism.” This modified primordial view holds that those groups that have been able to
‘cultivate’ a mythic election via these national symbols “succeed” in “prolonging the specific
collective life of their members over many generations” (Smith 1999, 130).
Within nomadic groups, the primary attachment to the leading clans or families, even
after they became sedentary, would be retained through ‘genealogical myth’ (Armstrong 1982,
51). The bonds of clan or family and territory via symbols (nostalgia, myth) were reinforced by
“ancient polities and ecclesiastical” structures, which defined ethnic boundaries and thereby left
an indelible mark on a (national) identity consciousness. John Armstrong explains that among
sedentary populations, nostalgia became a “strong symbolic device” that transmitted attitudes,
which were directed toward territorial attachments (1982, 50-51). These ethnic formulations
transcend time, extend over centuries or even millennia (continuous perennialism) but may
fluctuate with importance and dominance or perhaps even disappear altogether (recurrent
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perennialism31) but the “phenomenon itself is universal” (Smith 2000, 34-35). There are certain
Sahrawi symbols or objects, such as poetry, ancient historical stories or myths, and ties to old
lineages promote the ethnic nationalist argument. In one sense, the question of Western Sahara
identity suffers from an almost complete disregard of the primordialist application because of its
decline in academia. Primordialism had been resurrected due to the past geo-political
environment but continues to wane in this new century. In another sense, primordialism has not
been relevant among North African scholars because of the biases in French and Arab
scholarship, which take the side of Morocco and reflect their political and Arab nationalistic
sensitivities. Those authors who have supported the Sahrawi right to independence usually have
writings grounded in legalistic, political, and human rights terms.
Only a certain few scholars, for instance Faten Aggad and Pierre du Toit Botha, have
recorded some sort of perennial affinity, a subset of primordialism, within the Sahrawi narrative
by pointing to territorial treaties32 that linked Western Saharan lands, and legitimized its
sovereignty33. Still, few connections have been made about Sahrawi early history. The ancient
history of a nation should indicate that the group in question had a certain beginning and therefore
could be recounted from sources found through archaeological excavation and exploration. This
is quite certain with groups such as the Assyrian, Sumerian, ancient Egyptian because of
discoveries in art, script, and architecture. Others, for example, Greek, Roman, Inca, Berber, and
Mongol also have very well documented sources, and more continue to be discovered in the
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Continuous perennialism sees nations in earnest existing for centuries, if not millennia, even if they do not exist
under the same name or ruler.
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Treaties signed in 1727, 1799, and 1885 by Spain for the specific purpose of protecting these Saharan areas or
presides that had been historically claimed by Spain.
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Such arguments may lead to recurrent perennialism, a more historically verifiable subset of perennialism that sees
nationalism as a dynamic political force that changes constantly to serve varying needs for ethnic groups. Perennialism
explains that nations and nationalism survive because they have always existed as a means to protect ethnic groups but
it is not an organic process. Smith and others seem to attach ethnic identity with the historical survival of nations but
nationalism is merely an expression of short-term goals for a certain generation of ethnic and social forces.
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twenty-first century. However, there are several that, according to some scholars, transcend
antiquity and are presented as nations that have had a perennial existence. The Jews are presented
as one of the best examples of a perennial nation. Other such nations include northern European
and Scandinavian groups, namely, the Anglo-Saxons, German, and Rus. It is in this latter
category that some pro-independence supporters for the Western Sahara claim that the Sahrawi
nation should be viewed because of its ‘ties’ to the Sanhaja Berber. The origins of the Sanhaja
Berber date back to the Bafour. Still, much of this history is disputed because direct evidence has
not been thoroughly examined to prove these links. The claim of a continuous or perennial
national identity for the Sahrawi is based on certain assumptions and circumstantial hypotheses.
Thus, the following sources for Sahrawi national identity are placed in the context of a still to be
determined and verified Saharan history.

Sahrawi History
The ancient history of northwest Africa has not been studied as thoroughly as perhaps other areas
across the globe because of the nature of the Sahara Desert. In fact, there is still much to be
explored and examined. The attacks of September 11 and afterward have placed limitations on
tourists traveling for pleasure as well as for researchers conducting field work. Currently, the
inhospitable landscape of the Sahara does not lend itself to long-term research and the threat to
known foreigners discourages many from attempting research even under the auspices of
government protection.34 For instance, the only country in the politically-defined region of the
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While the author of this work was conducting interviews with the leaders and elites of the Sahrawi in the camps near
Tindouf, Algeria, I recall questioning my interpreter/guide during my time in ‘Rabouni Camp’ about an incident in
October 2011 of three foreign aid workers who were abducted from their camps. Mohammed Omar, my guide,
responded and stated that those three individuals (2 Spaniards and an Italian), who were taken by the Movement for
Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), an AQIM splinter group, actually stayed in the same compound as I was
being lodged. It came as a complete shock when he informed me only days after I had arrived. Despite my nervous
apprehension, the feeling of utter isolation, and the decision to ‘think’ through how to escape the room I was given, in
case I needed to flee those first few days, I remained calm and felt at ease by the following week. Still, these types of
incidents are an inescapable part of risk and reality involved in choosing to investigate this topic. The trio was held in
Mali and released July 2012.
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Maghreb (excluding Egypt) that does not have a travel warning published by the U.S. State
Department is Morocco.35 In addition, Americans wishing to investigate sources of information
about the history of the northwestern Sahara will largely find most of the scholarly literature,
specifically of the Western Sahara, in European depositories and libraries, and only in certain
languages such as French, Arabic, or Spanish. The following should inform and guide the reader
to some of these sources.
The search for the origins of Sahrawi national identity led the author to sources that did
not actually focus on the Sahrawi. Sources that cover the ancient history of the region or trace the
Sahrawi to a period in antiquity are scarce. These sources were used to explore arguments derived
from primordialism—that these ancient groups are associated to the Sahrawi. Many of these
sources of information were difficult to find and obscure. For information deep in antiquity, the
author relied on sources that were primarily about the history of northwest Africa. For example,
Michael Brent and Elizabeth Fentress (1997) document the origins of civilization in North
African but do not associate the Bafour or even the Berber to later groups. However, they wrote a
history primarily of the Berbers and not about the Sahrawi. Encyclopedic sources were utilized
for documentation of the group but these were primarily historical in scope. Other authors briefly
commented about the Bafour such as János Besenyo (2009), Pierre Bonte (1981), Geneviève
Désiré-Vuillemin (1962), Tara Duebel (2010), Zahra Hasnaui (2007), Pasqual del Riquelme
(1991), and James L. Webb (1995). Although the majority viewed them as ancient inhabitants of
northwest Africa, none directly linked the Bafour to the Sahrawi. In fact, Bonte, Pasqual del
Riqulme and Webb place the Bafour in the sixteenth and seventeenth century. Lucas (1931)
writes of the Bafour extensively but mainly to draw out their ancient and mixed ethnic
composition.
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There are travel warnings for all or parts of the following countries: Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Mali, and Mauritania.
U.S. Department of State—Bureau of Consular Affairs, “U.S. Passports & International Travel,” travel.state.gov,
accessed June 07, 2016, https://travel.state.gov/content/passports/en/alertswarnings.html .
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Several Spanish authors detail the ancient history of the region as one that has been
contested among the Berber and Arab dynasties with no concrete sense of limiting frontiers or
agreements delimiting territory. Enrique D’Almonte describes the medieval period of the region
as one of conquest, expulsion, retreat, and incessant movement of tribes (nomadism). For
example, he describes in brief that the lineage of the Oulad Delim (one of the oldest tribes of the
Western Sahara) can be traced back to those who were expelled by the followers of the Mahdi
(divinely guided one) and ‘Abd al-Mu’min ibn ‘Ali (founder of the Almohad Dynasty), and fled
to the Sahara. Those refugees included Arabs and Berbers who were marked as partisans of the
dethroned Almoravid Dynasty. These people mixed, settled, formed the ed-Dala tribe, and
became what is now the Oulad Delim tribe (sons of the delinquents). Chronicling the history of
an area long mired in the ebb and flow of tribal affiliation and fragmentation (1914, 155).
D’Almonte subsequently writes of another instance of historical significance in 1590-1591: an
expedition led by Moulay Ahmad al-Mansur to take Timbuktu. “This warlike expedition, that
momentarily was able to attract the attention of the Saharan tribes, left little permanent mark
among those indomitable nomads, who promptly returned to their mutual and regular raids and
quarrels”36 (D’Almonte 1914, 156). Here, he briefly mentions the short-lived union of Saharan
tribes for the purposes of defense, only to later continue their nomadic and “kleptomaniac”
lifestyle (ibid., 155).
Abadallah Laroui (2001), Jamil Abun-Nasr (1971), and Charles-André Julien (1970) all
document early periods of North Africa but do not place the Sahrawi in any historical context and
only served to document early groups in the general region of northwest Africa. Those who did
make mention of specific groups that provided for some connection to Sahrawi lineage were
obscure and relatively unknown in American academic circles. E.G. Bullard (2001), Steven
36

From the Spanish and translated by the author: “Esta expedición guerrera, que momentáneamente pudo atraer la
atención de las tribus saháricas, no dejó huella permanente entre aquellos indómitos nómadas, que volvieron
prontamente á sus habituales y mutuas razzias y rencillas,” in Enrique D’Almonte, Ensayo de una Breve Descripción
del Sáhara Español, Boletín de La Real Sociedad Geográfica: Madrid, 1914.
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Danver (2014), Angelo Ghirelli (1942), William Smith (1854), Soler Subils (2007), and A. J.
Lucas (1931) are all contributors to northwestern Africa or greater western Saharan history.
Despite Laroui, Abun-Nasr, and Julien’s volumes of methodical research of the Maghrib, they do
not make connections to the Sahrawi. However, they do provide important contextualization of
the early period of the Maghrib.

Instrumentalism
Critics of primordial objectification (and perennialism) counter that these ethnic attachments to
objects or ideas are not rational and do not explain why people become attached to certain groups
and not others (Smith 2001, 54). It fails to explain why nationalist fervor fluctuates at certain
instances and why these core essentials—blood, kin, symbols or myth—produce mass
mobilization. To answer some of these questions, instrumentalist arguments were provided
primarily to shed light on the intensity and scope of national mobilization. Not only do
primordialists incorrectly treat cultural attributes as objective criteria for explaining national
consciousness but they are also given irrational explanations to nationalist mobilization.
Instrumentalism is an approach that focuses on rational explanations to nationalist mobilization.
Thus, considerations are presented that describe how ideas, artifacts or objects—such as land and
poetry—history, and resources are manipulated by past and current interest groups either
unknowingly or with direct intent. These instrumentalist considerations touch on geopolitical
consequences, socio-institutional practicality, and the economic feasibility of such an
(independent or nationalist) enterprise.
Instrumentalism views nationalism as a “form of political behavior” (Breuilly, 1994, 1).
It is “a political doctrine elaborated by intellectuals” or “a process created in the dynamics of elite
competition within the boundaries determined by political and economic realities” (Breuilly 1994,
1; Brass 1991, 16). Ethnic leaders and elites will use “their cultural groups as sites of mass
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mobilization and as constituencies in their competition for power and resources” (Smith 2001,
55). This approach regards nationalism as a concept that becomes manipulated or politicized “for
elites in competition for political power and economic advantage” (Brass 1991, 15). More explicit
instrumentalist lines of approach arise from Claude Bontems and Pablo San Martin. Bontems
describes the creation of the SADR (Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic)37 constitution as one
that would avoid the extermination of Sahrawi cultural identity and “reassert their independence”
(Bontems 1987, 172). This statement highlights what the POLISARIO has understood to be true
all along—that at one point the people of the Western Sahara were once free.
The POLISARIO example suggests that in one move both created and appropriated the
anti-colonial struggle, and expanded it to include full independence ever since 197538. Others,
such as Randa Farah, Greg Noakes and Janet McMahon39, including David Seddon, agree that
what may have been considered as small glimpses of identity differentiation were transformed
into certain ‘political realities,’ namely ethnonationalism, due to elitist group manipulation. They
have argued that groups such as the Harakat Tahrir40 and the POLISARIO developed much of the
Sahrawi consciousness. Other more extreme suggestions indicate that from the mid to late-1960s,
international governmental organizations such as the UN and the AU were pushing for selfdetermination of the Spanish Sahara (San Martin 2010, 61 and 64). Exaggerated as these ideas
are, they have played a part in the push for Western Sahara sovereignty. What they do not show,
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The SADR is the government-in-exile of the Western Sahara proclaimed on February 27, 1976 by the Provisional
Sahrawi National Council of the POLISARIO Front.
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This was the year that Morocco initiated the Green March and invaded the Western Sahara.
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Greg Noakes and Janet McMahon, “Sahrawi Broadcaster Describes Western Sahara Freedom Struggle,” The
Washington Report on Middle East Affairs 11 (1993), 44.
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Anthony Pazzanita, Harakat Tahrir Saguia El-Hamra wa Oued Ed-Dahab (Movement for the Liberation of Rio de
Oro and the Oued Ed-Dahab), Historical Dictionary of the Western Sahara, (Scarecrow Press: Lanham, MD): 2006,
186. This was the first serious group to challenge the Spanish colonial presence since the Army of Liberation in 1958.
It was created in December 1967 but lasted only through mid-1970 with the death of its leader, Mohammed Sidi
Ibrahim Bassiri.
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however, is that there have been a small number of elites before the nineteenth century that
brought together the tribes of the Western Sahara. This study focuses on searching for those
elites, group leaders that may have united ancestral tribes of the Sahrawi. Thus, instrumentalism
encourages us to consider a group’s hold on Sahrawi national identity.
The challenge for this study was locating specific works that wrote about the region and
whose focus was on a particular leader or group of elites. There is work on the early Almoravid
and Almohad dynasties recording their conquest in the greater Western Sahara. These works,
however, do not make any association with the modern Sahrawi. Apart from the Cambridge
History of Africa Volumes, Abun –Nasr, Julien, and Laroui, most of this history is found in
reference or encyclopedic works that are mainly general in nature. The works that do refer to
populations groups comment on tribes and their relationships with each other, emirates and with
the Sultan of Morocco. Some of the history that refers to specific instances of leaders attempting
to unite tribes is about the struggles of the Sultans. The Sultans of northern Morocco ventured
from their bases in the capital cities of Fes and Marrakesh mostly to consolidate territory based on
religious (conversions), economic (securing the trade routes) (Lydon 2009; McDougall 2012),
and blocking foreign intrusion (European colonization). Little is mentioned about the unification
of tribes.
The nature of leadership, especially about the Sultan’s power, will be discussed. These
details represent the limitations of power of the Sultan over the greater Western Sahara. The
literature provides examples of historical territorial autonomy the POLISARIO claim make them
distinct from Morocco. They provide elements of separateness from Morocco but little to the
search for the origins of Sahrawi identity. The most important figure, claimed by both Morocco
and the POLISARIO, that lends itself to instrumentalist arguments, is Ma’ al-‘Aynayn. He is
perhaps the only personality that comes close to leading a diverse set of tribes. Although he
figures prominently in Western Saharan history in the early twentieth century, he does receive
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wide study. Only a handful of scholars (Mahmud Awa 2015; Ould Mohamed 2010; Pham 2010;
Mundy 2008; Bank and Van Heur) comment on Ma’ al-‘Aynayn. These works, however, give
few details of his exploits or briefly mention him as evidence in the 1975 Advisory Ruling of the
ICJ in support of the Sahrawi. Apart from these few works, little else has been added supporting
Sahrawi identity through instrumentalist arguments until the creation of smaller groups after
Moroccan independence.

Constructivism
Constructivism, based on earlier ideas of J.G. Herder, Renan, and Weber, rejected that nationality
or even ethnicity was the essential human condition but rather believed that nations were products
of socialization and historical forces. Herder believed that certain outstanding factors (education,
physical environment, intermarriage, and tradition) influenced the national soul (Ergang 1966,
112). Ergang explains that Herder saw “nationality as a product of nature and its growth as
regulated by the laws of nature,” where nature “was the great architect who planned and
constructed the group” (95). Renan held that “un nation est un âme [soul], un principe spirituel.”
(1882, 8) Two things constitute this soul, the spiritual principle “one is the possession in common
of a rich legacy of memories and the other is the actual consent, the desire to live together, the
will to continue to emphasize the heritage we have received undivided" (1882, 8).41
Gellner extends Ernest Renan’s statement and writes that a nation can “be defined in
terms both of will and of culture” only “when general social conditions make for standardized,
homogeneous, centrally sustained high cultures, pervading entire populations and not just elite
minorities” (1983, 54). Anderson in his most quoted of phrases declared that a nation is imagined
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Direct translation of Ernest Renan’s quote: “L’une est la possession en commun d’un riche legs de souvenirs; l’autre
est le consentement actuel, le désir de vivre ensemble, la volonté de continuer a faire valoir l’héritage qu’on a reçu
indivis” from Qu’est-ce qu’une Nation?, Conférence faite en Sorbonne, March 11 1882 in E. Renan, (Textes de Barrès,
Daudet, R. de Gourmont, Céline), chapitre 2, 12-48. Paris: Pierre Bordas et fils, Éditeur, 1991, 128 pp. Collection:
Littérature vivante, 50.
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as limited (because it has finite boundaries), sovereign (born in the Age of Enlightenment and
revolution), and as a community, (conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship): “it is an
imagined political community” (1983, 17, 19). This approach should help determine if sociohistorical conditions have constructed a Sahrawi movement that has been able to produce, if not,
forge such a national soul—a Sahrawi nation. Eric Hobsbawm contended that nations should be
analyzed not only from above “in terms of political, technical, administrative, economic, and
other conditions,” but also from below “in [subjective] terms of the assumptions, hopes, needs,
longings and interests of ordinary people” (1990, 10).
Hobsbawm also tended to believe that nationalism produced nations in contrast to John
Armstrong’s Nations before Nationalism hypothesis. This approach is the most difficult for
evaluating Sahrawi identity. Scholarship over the issue of the Western Sahara and Sahrawi
nationalism is most often depicted as an outgrowth of modernity, and it is usually characterized as
a product of anti-colonialism. Most authors account for the rise of Sahrawi nationalism only as
late as the 1960s or 1970s. Very few have noted any earlier periods of national mobility. John
Mercer had written a study describing how cycles of invasion and unification had forged the
Sahrawi nation. For example, David Seddon wrote that strong ultra-nationalism in the northwest
region of the Maghreb began in 1944 with the Istiqlal (Independence) Party of Morocco (1987,
39). This later evolved into the 1956 ALS (Army of Liberation for the Sahara), which was a
small group of ultra-nationalists who sought other “occupied” areas — Tangiers, the Spanish
deserts of the South — “the Sahara from Tindouf and Atar and the Algerian-Moroccan
borderlands” (Hodges 1984, 88).

Tony Hodges described the rise of Sahrawi insurrection

stemming from Morocco’s independence movement in 1956, “which first inspired the ahel essahel to rise in revolt—against the French in southern Mauritania and southwest Algeria as well
as the Spanish in the Western Sahara” (ibid., 85). These implicit notions indicate that they are
more constructivist in nature.
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In a relatively lesser-known work, Ramón Criado writing in 1977, designated the criteria
of history, geography, and the structures of society as elements of differentiation of the Sahrawi
from their supposed Moroccan or Mauritanian origins (67). Criado develops the distinctiveness
of the Sahrawi by tracing tribal affiliation to the territory approximating the area of Sequiet elHamra y Río de Oro. By the sixteenth century, he states that there arose not only a certain
hierarchy among the tribes, but also a strict territorial localization that is respected even today by
the tribes of the SARIO42. He believes this proves that an independent and coherent nucleus
existed both before Morocco constituted itself as a Kingdom, and before Mauritania splintered
into emirates (due to the decline of the Negro empires) (Criado 1977, 78). In contrast, within this
historical context, Osama Abi-Mershed and Adam Farrar write that the lands, which constitute
modern-day Western Sahara, have been under intermittent Sharifian (spiritual) authority that
began in the eleventh century (Abi-Mershed and Farrar 2014, 7-9). These writers attribute geopolitical and socio-cultural command of the region due to the ‘spiritual’ authoritative attachments
given by the inhabitants to the Alawite Dynasty (ibid., 10).
Joshua Castellino and Elvira Dominguez-Redondo state that Sahrawi national identity is
difficult to establish because the distinctive claims of territoriality and spiritual authority by either
side are blurred when faced with pinpointing the variable tribal allegiances throughout the long
history of the area. The authors tend to lend credence to the ‘general’ idea of a monarchical
division of rule between “a domain of sovereignty (Bled el-Makhzen) and a domain of suzerainty
(Bled as-siba)” within the empire (2014, 32). Castellino and Dominguez-Redondo state that the
most controversial issue that surrounds the Western Sahara conflict involves the territorial limits
of the Sharifian Empire. They write that the differences are not only territorial but also perhaps
ethnic: The mostly Arab makhzen always struggled to maintain order in the mainly Berber as-siba
42

From the Spanish and translated by the author: “proviene la localización territorial estricta que respetan hasta hoy las
tribus del Sario.” The designation, ‘the tribes of Sario’ (Sp. tribus del SARIO) by Ramón Criado refers to the area of
Saguía el Hamra and Rio de Oro. This is also the suffix abbreviation taken by the POLISARIO. Ramón Criado,
Sáhara: Pasión y Muerte de un Sueño Colonial, Ruedo Ibérico: 1977, 77.
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lands. Thus, the author encountered not only literature that mentioned physical boundaries (ICJ,
1975) but also literature that documents certain concepts of differentiation. Scholars in this area
(Lopez Bargados 2003; Ould Mohamed 2010; Hodges 1983; Norris 1986; Criado 1977; Moya
Fernández 2009) write about boundaries of governance: bilad as-siba, bilad al-makhzen, trab albidan, and ‘Jat al-Jaof.’ These notions are historical distinctions of identity that soon became part
of the debate over territorial autonomy in the Western Sahara.
Others take a more legal approach to the construction of Sahrawi arguing on the basis of
treaties. Of these, most mention the Treaty of Alcaçovas (1479) and the Treaty of Tordesillas
(1494), where one finds the first documented evidence of recognition of dominion by the
crown(s) of Spain and Portugal over territory in both the Americas and Africa. These offer little
demonstrable proof of control over the areas inland from the coast of the Western Sahara. Other
authors assert that the treaties of Marrakesh (1767), Meknes (1799), and Tetuan (1860) are key
markers for identifying the possession or non-possession of areas now considered to be Western
Sahara proper. Even though the early treaties that were presented to the International Court of
Justice, there were still contentious issues over the interpretation of these written documents, after
the ICJ ruling. Authors such as Zunes and Mundy (2010), Rézette (1975), Criado (1977), Alguero
Cuervo (2006) all comment about these treaties in their respective works. With the exception of
Rézette, the rest favor POLISARIO claims.
Some authors have made the explicit argument that the origins of Sahrawi national
identity are socially constructed. For example, Zunes and Mundy who have written a
comprehensive analysis of the Western Sahara state that, “the ‘idea’ of a Sahrawi people…is
recent” and “is the outgrowth of the colonial dialectic” (2010, 91). In fact, they state that their
book was written on “the premise that identities are made” and “not found” (ibid., 95). They
posit very strongly that all identities, speaking of Algerian, Moroccan, Mauritanian, as well as
Sahrawi “are not given; they are the outcome of the historical interaction of dominant and
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subordinate social forces” (ibid., 111). Hodges much earlier had written that the “Western
Saharans never constituted a nation in pre-colonial times, and their present-day nationalism is a
very recent phenomenon, which took root only in the latter part of the Spanish colonial period”
(1983, 28). He declared that the Sahrawi had “no historical antecedent” but did raise a curious
point by stating that they, “in a broad cultural sense, have a common identity vis-a-vis the
predominantly Berber sedentary or semi-nomadic populations to their immediate north, in
southern Morocco, beyond the Ouarkziz and Bani mountains and the Oued Draa” (Hodges 1983,
28 and 30).
Pablo San Martin has written along constructivist lines as well by attributing Sahrawi
national development to Spanish colonial policy. The 1960s and 1970s brought about many
economic and administrative changes to the Western Sahara. The discovery of phosphates, the
change in governance, and the subsequent social status of the inhabitants of the Western Sahara
were all due to Spanish colonization. San Martin concluded that it was not the change of the
asabiya43 to a more urban, individualized, capitalist society that allowed for more collective
action among the Sahrawi but “new forms of collective solidarity and action” that had emerged
from formal colonization (San Martin 2010, 56). For example, Martin stated that the new system
of: “Representation of the native population of the Spanish Sahara was designed based on the
assumptions that the tribes were still the main social institutions organizing the social life in the
province and delineating the identities of its indigenous inhabitants (ibid., 61). The tribal
institution as the primary social structure utilized toward some cohesive action, had been
debilitated because of these above changes. San Martin described these colonial attempts at
administering the Spanish Sahara as “Francoist strategies of control” (ibid., 65).
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Asabiya, in the modern period, the term is generally analogous to solidarity. However, the term is often negatively
associated because it can sometimes suggest loyalty to one's group regardless of circumstances, or partisanship.
Shelagh Weir, A Tribal Order: A Tribal Order: Politics and Law in the Mountains of Yemen (Austin: University of
Texas Press, 2007), 191.
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One of the few authors who assessed Sahrawi ‘nationality’ within any theoretical blend—
primordialism within the context of constructivism—was Sidi Mohamed Omar. He expressed
that, “there is much evidence that prior to Spanish colonization there was a widespread sense of
belonging to the Western Sahara as a distinctive territory with a distinct population” (Mohamed
Omar 2008, 44). Yet, in the very next sentence he stated that “the majority of the inhabitants
‘imagined’ themselves as a sociopolitical community” and added later that the formative phases
of Sahrawi national identity were forged in constructed or ‘performative acts’” (ibid., 44). His
comments are well placed within the constructivist notion, but they did not serve the primordial
approach well with only one reference. In general, most modern scholars tend to contextualize
Sahrawi identity through constructivist arguments.
This literature review is in need of more scholarly work in the area of national identity,
especially in the case of the Sahrawi. Most pro-POLISARIO or pro-Sahrawi scholars who claim
that the origins of the Sahrawi are found in the past and are tied to distinctive features of their
identity, place primordial arguments above all others to justify Sahrawi claims. However, they
face an uphill battle because the theory has been absorbed in the popular approach of
constructivism. A resurgence of energy surrounding primordialism did gain traction with the fall
of communism but it has since begun to dissipate once again. Scholars pursuing instrumentalist
arguments are few and of these, most will discuss the POLISARIO’s management of Saharawi
identity. More research is needed. I hope to add to the academic field of identity politics and
bring Sahrawi identity to more prominence with this study. I apply equal importance to all three
approaches. I may, however, be labeled a proponent of primordialism because I agree with
Anthony Smith’s notion that a nation may be constructed from socio-historical forces but founded
upon ethno-cultural resources that have been developing for some time.
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III. ARE THE SAHRAWI OF ANCIENT ORIGIN? INVESTIGATING THEIR ‘NATIONAL’
IDENTITY UNTIL 1524
This chapter analyzes the possible ancient Sahrawi origins (assuming that Sahrawi
history can be traced to its original inhabitants) in North Africa until the takeover of the Spanish
fort at Santa Cruz de Mar Pequeña (located in southwestern Morocco) by the Arab army of the
Sa’adian Dynasty in 1524. Most, if not, all of this part of the analysis will be based on historical
research of the period in the western and southwestern Maghrib region. It will trace the lineage
of the Western Saharan population and provide insight to the claims of cohesion and group
development throughout this early period. The hypothesis that the origins of Sahrawi identity can
be traced to antiquity derives primarily from a primordial approach to the creation of nations and
nationalism and is rooted in a connection to the past. Leaders of the POLISARIO44 movement
and certain scholars who investigate Sahrawi identity have claimed that they are a distinct group
of people separated by identifiable cultural markers. They conclude that the national identity of
the Sahrawi is linked to the past and has distinctions that set them apart from present-day
Moroccans. This chapter seeks evidence that sustains the argument that the Sahrawi have had a
distinctive and continuous historical record. The search will include late antiquity, the beginning
of the Roman period, the Arab incursion into North Africa, and later the medieval period.
First, an extensive section will chronicle important events and information that discuss
the markers of Sahrawi national identity and the arguments that sustain Sahrawi claims about the
past. A second section centers on the deficiencies that emanate from primordial explanations and
will focus on each historical period to provide some insight and criticism of the primordialist
approach. This will link the primordialist discussion toward other considerations that resonate
with instrumental and constructivist theories of Sahrawi national identity. Despite the paucity of

44

Spanish acronym for the Frente Popular de Liberación para Saquiat el-Hamra y Río de Oro (Popular Front for the
Liberation of Saquiat el-Hamra and Rio de Oro [River of Gold]). The POLISARIO are the liberation group seeking the
independence of the region claimed and administered by the Kingdom of Morocco called the Western Sahara.
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evidence for the primordial origins of the Sahrawi in this case, it is the objective of the author, not
to discount Sahrawi links to the past, but to highlight these claims in order to understand their
national origins. In essence, even if the primordial theory does not fully explain this case, it is
important to look at the evidence, since political actors try to use this approach.

The Lybico-Berbers: Proto-Sahrawi Nation? Ancient Origins — 1000 BCE
It is difficult to pinpoint with historical accuracy the origins of any nation or national identity of a
specific group. In general, it is easier to determine the establishment of a nation-state in our
modern world with the criteria that are attributed to such an entity than to trace the lineage of an
ethnic group. However, this study explores the origins of a putative national people, not of the
political entity that claims to represent them.45 Although several scholars mention that the
Sahrawi are the direct descendants of the Sanhaja Berber, most of the anthropological,
ethnological, and geographical scholarship has not been able to agree on the point of departure for
the settlers of North Africa. Some scholars believe these settlers were the product of migration
patterns from the East, others from the South due to increasingly arid conditions, and still others
from across the Mediterranean (Laroui 1977, 17). These migration patterns are theorized to have
originated from Asia through two routes. One route developed from the northeast via Europe and
the other stemming from the southeast, which traversed East Africa. Scholars from the colonial
period have theorized that their ancestors are of immigrant waves from the Mediterranean that
included Celtic-Iberians and Semitic peoples [i.e., Phoenicians]46 (Bullard 2001, 184). Bullard
states there is yet another theory that posits that the Berbers together with the Egyptians formed
the ‘white African race’ (Ibid., 184). However, according to modern scholarship, the tendency
45

In fact, the establishment of such an independent entity, in this case the Western Sahara, cannot be appropriately
discussed here because not only is its status unclear, but it also continues to suffer from the problem of qualitative and
quantitative recognition by other nation-states.
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Reuben G. Bullard, “The Berbers of the Maghreb and Ancient Carthage,” in Africa and Africans in Antiquity, ed.
Edwin A. Yamauchi (East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press, 2001), 184.
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now is to attribute the Berber to a composite of races where the distinct characteristic features of
the Mediterranean-type predominate. These findings indicate that origins of the Berber are
diverse, but nevertheless, maintain that they are indigenous to North Africa after settling those
areas during 8000 and 7000 BC (Laroui 1977, 17; Bullard 2001, 184; Ilahiane 2006, xxxi;
Ghirelli 1942, 8).
Evidence for the rise of a proto-Sahrawi nation usually begins at the beginning of the first
millennium (AD) and traces the forerunners of the Sahrawi to Sanhaja affiliation. These scholars
believe that the ancestors of the Sanhaja were a branch of an ancient group of people known as
Berber47 (or Imazighen48 ). By 1000 BCE, the Berbers, who most agree are the direct ancestors to
the Sahrawi, had successfully settled across North Africa and pushed another group termed the
Bafour (or Bafots) to the south. According to these authors, the Berbers can be traced from before
the Bronze Age (≈3300 BCE). However, a few authors locate ‘Berber ancestry’ much earlier in
antiquity, deep into the Paleolithic period (>10,000 BCE). Mundy has written that the culture
believed to “represent the direct ancestors of the Imazighen, the Capsians,” appeared 10,000 years
ago during the ‘Wet Phase,’ which “allowed humans to return to the Sahara” after a long arid four
thousand-year period (Mundy 2007, 305). For instance, Ilahiane writes that the historical record
demonstrates a group called the Siwa, who are of Berber origin, have been in existence since
10,000 BCE (Ilahiane 2006, 112).
Yet, Munene suggests that the “hierarchic identity of the Western Sahara” can be traced
much earlier to the Bafour but around 5500 BCE (Munene 2010, 84). Almost a century ago,
47

The use of the word ‘Berber’ is one that has been applied externally and is not actually used by Berbers themselves.
The actual denomination of ‘Berber’ is generally attributed to the Latin plural form of barbari (sing. barbarus) and the
Greek use of barabaroi. Hsaine Ilahiane, introduction to Historical Dictionary of the Berbers (Imazighen), Historical
Dictionaries of Peoples and Cultures, no. 5 (Lanham, Maryland: Scarecrow Press, 2006), xxx. Also see Angelo
Ghirelli, El País Berebere: Contribución al Estudio de los Orígenes, Formación y Evolución de las Poblaciones del
África Septentrional (Madrid: Editora Nacional, 1942), 6.
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In the Berber language of Tamazight, “Berbers use the name ‘Imazighen’ to describe themselves (singular masculine
is Amazigh; singular feminine is Tamazight).” “Today, Berbers use the collective designation ‘Imazighen,’ and
Imazighen is the word that embodies the Amazigh sense of being the real and essentially human beings of their
homeland, called Tamazgha.” Ilahiane, Historical Dictionary of the Berbers (Imazighen), xxx.
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Lucas wrote: “One must admit that the base of the apparent Arab and Berber population had been
preceded by Bafour elements, of [later] vanquished groups…”49 (Lucas 1931, 152). Others, such
as Mercer (1976a, 498), Hodges (1983, 3), and Jensen (2005, 21) attribute the existence of the
Bafour to oral history at this time in the region. Legal scholars, Castellino and DominguezRedondo (2014, 39), Mwalimu (2010, 952-953), historical sources such as Webb50 (1995, 28) and
Jensen (ibid.) suggest the Bafour were a group of people that migrated or ‘gravitated’ south into
the Sahara. Yet, Pazzanita writes that the “black-skinned” Bafour apparently had emerged from
sub-Saharan Africa, mixed with a northern (Rif and Atlas) mountain-living group moving south,
and produced the ‘Amaziah’ (Imazighen) or, as mentioned above, Berber. (Pazzanita 2006, 383)
There are conflicting views about the migratory patterns of the probable Sahrawi
ancestors, but most scholars agree that over time a ‘Neolithic’ (≈10,200 – 3000 BCE) group from
the eastern Maghrib or western Mediterranean began moving south and southwest, encroaching
on the desert. Western Sahara scholars cite archaeological evidence of the Bafours moving and
living in this area between 5500 and 2000 BCE. The depiction of domesticated animals began to
appear in cave paintings51 5500 years ago throughout the Neolithic Age (an era that is marked by
abundant wildlife, domesticated animals, and a complex culture) in the Sahara. Despite the
contradictions in academic and archeological literature over the migratory patterns of the Bafour,
most agree that they settled in the region now considered greater northwest Africa (including
modern Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, the Western Sahara, and Algeria). By the second millennium,
49

Taken from the French: “On doit admettre que le fond de la population apparente arabe et berbère a été précédé
d'éléments Bafours, de groupes vaincus…” A.J. Lucas, “Considérations sur l'Ethnique Maure et en Particulier sur Une
Race Ancienne: Les Bafours,” Journal de la Société des Africanistes, Tome 1 Fascicule 2 (1931), 152.
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Yet, Webb, in both his accounts on the Bafour describe them as a group who were still in existence only centuries
before 1600-1850. How many centuries before then is not made clear. He speaks of the Bafour as surviving as villagers
≈1450 – 1600 AD in the Gibla region (southwestern Mauritania near the Senegal River) but later “absorbed into the
ethnic categories of Wolof, Berber, and Peul… and thus remains somewhat mysterious.” James L. A. Webb, Jr.,
Desert Frontier: Ecological and Economic Change along the Western Sahel, 1600-1850 (Madison, WI: University of
Wisconsin Press, 1955), 15, 28.
51

The most notable found in Tassili n’Ajjer (Plateau of the Chasms) in southeastern Algeria.
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the available artifacts depict a Negroid people who were largely pastoral but later frescoes “begin
to show elongated white men with characteristic long hair and pointed beards” (Brent and
Fentress 1997, 19). These and other groups from both the east and west of the Sahara came to be
called the ‘Berbers,’ overwhelmingly agreed upon by scholars and through archeological
evidence as the original inhabitants of North Africa.
Unfortunately, there is very little written about Berber culture for the northwestern
Sahara. Most accounts provide proof from frescoes, rock carvings, paintings, and settlement sites
in the ‘highlands’ of North Africa in modern-day Algeria (Tibesti, Tassili, the Hoggar)52 to the
Atlantic coast and into the Saharan Atlas Mountains. (Ilahiane 2006, 17) Beyond these areas,
much remains to be explored, assessed, and recorded. There is a rich and diverse archeological
record in the Western Saharan both in the administered areas by Morocco and in the ‘Free’ or
‘Liberated Zone’ now under POLISARIO control. For instance, several stone structures (Tifariti,
Bir Lehlou in POLISARIO-controlled Western Sahara, Bir Lemuesat in northern Mauritania),53
rock paintings and engravings (Sluguilla,54 Bou Dheir and Erqueyez55 near Tifariti, Zug on the
POLISARIO side of southern Western Sahara, and Wadi Zenta in the Zemmur of northeastern
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Tibesti are a set of mountains located in northern Chad well-known for rock and parietal art. Tassili n’Ajjer is listed
as a World Heritage Site because “of its geological formations including ‘forests of stone’, biological diversity,
archaeological importance and prehistoric rock art (24)…The art itself comprises paintings and engravings on exposed
rock faces, and includes pictures of wild and domestic animals, humans, geometric designs, Libyc and Tifinagh
inscriptions (ancient and recent Tuareg/Berber script) and a very few plants and trees (29)…Tassili n Ajjer is a
Tamahaq name meaning ‘plateau’ of the Ajjer people, the name of the Kel Ajjer group of tribes whose traditional
territory was here” (24). David Coulson and Alec Campbell, “Rock Art of the Tassili n Ajjer, Algeria,” Adoranten,
Scandinavian Society for Prehistoric Art, 2010, Underslös Museum Tanum Rock Art Research Centre, accessed July 5,
2016, http://www.rockartscandinavia.com/rock-art-of-the-tassili-n-ajjer-algeria-by-david-coulson-and-alec-campbellaa11.php. The Hoggar or Ahoggar is a mountain range in central southern Algeria where, along with Tassili, are found
the richest concentration of prehistoric rock art.
53

Many of these stone structures have been characterized as funerary monuments, comprising “tumuli, linear stone
arrangements, and stone enclosures…isolated menhirs or standing stones” and others “with apparent astronomical
functions.” Nick Brooks, “Cultural Heritage and Conflict: The Threatened Archaeology of Western Sahara,” in The
Sahara: Past, Present and Future, ed. Jeremy Keenan (New York: Routledge, 2007), 285-291, Google Play Books.
54

Sluguilla is located in a zone situated in the Hamada, a stony desert that extends along the Northern part of RASD
and to the West of Algeria.
55

Erqueyez has also been transcribed as Rekeiz Lemgasem or Erquiez.
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Western Sahara), pottery, and tools have been found depicting domestication of animals, cattlegrazing, and preoccupations “with astronomy” (Brooks et al 2003, 3-4; Keenan 2007, 285-291).
These and many other forms of Saharan rock art investigated in the ‘southern provinces’ and
High Atlas Mountains of Morocco as well as in sites in Mauritania (Tagant, Adrar) are dated
2500-500 BCE based on its depictions of chariots, horses, saddled horsemen, dromedaries, and
the appearance of the Lybico-Berber (or Tifinagh) alphabet (Soler Subils 2007, 16-18; Le Quellec
2008, 72-73; 2016, 55-56).
Most scholars of identity politics will agree that the major distinguishing features of an
ethnic community are language, attachment to territory and a common culture. However, these
ethnic distinctions are perhaps the most challenging in establishing a cohesive Berber identity.
For example, according to Marçais, the principal difference between Arabs and Berbers is
language. (Marçais 1955, 22) Yet, Berber scholarship in the area of deciphering ancient scripts
used in North Africa is still challenging. McDougal writes that “samples of the ancient language
that contemporary prehistorians and classical scholars term ‘Lybic’ or ‘Libyan,’ and which
Berber writers… assert unproblematically to Tamazight [modern Berber] …, are general
untranslated and frequently indecipherable” (McDougall 2003, 69). The Berber script is based
“on the assumption of a coherent social and linguistic continuum of the native population
persisting from pre-Punic times to the present day . . ., [which] though not disprovable, extremely
fragile” (Millar 1968, 128). Millar adds that even though there is concrete evidence of an ancient
‘Libyan’ (Berber) script distinct from Punic (Carthaginian), it “may, or may not, be the, or an,
ancestor of present-day Berber” and “the precise connection between the two may perhaps never
be known” (Ibid., 128-129).
Secondly, the area of early Berber occupation has been difficult to establish—both its
nomadic range and the “homeland” of its sedentary populace. Extensions of their historical
homeland have reached even beyond the Sahara Desert. For instance, there are claims of Berber

59

populations 1) at the time of the Moorish56 invasion (711-719 CE) of the Visigoths and the native
Romans of Hispania on the Iberian Peninsula; 2) as far eastward as Egypt in the Siwa Oases and
the Nile River valley; and 3) off the coast of northwest Africa among the Canary Island
inhabitants. The continual desiccation of the environment and, as a result, the migration toward
the Atlantic coast, closer to water, resulted in the development of more a agro-pastoral lifestyle.
There is evidence not only of irrigated cultivation but also of trade between the Fezzan (Lybia)
and the western Sahara, especially in beads and slaves. Yet, “sedentism” may have been
‘temporary,’ a seasonal symbiosis of nomadism and sedentary life (Challis et al 2007, 286, 290).
Still, debates continue about the nomadic nature of much of the Berber population and thus how
to differentiate them from other invading groups across North Africa.
Third, much of the work that relates to ‘Berber’ culture is ongoing and unfinished. “By
the middle of the second millennium the frescoes show men using horses to pull light war
chariots, armed with spears and wearing kilts similar to those of the Egyptians…perhaps aimed at
a perpetuating the social hierarchy” of a priestly caste. (Brent and Fentress 1997, 19-20) The
domestication of horses seems to have taken place giving these groups more mobility, increasing
“nomadic pastoralism” in “the now arid steppe areas of the Sahara” (Ibid., 20). Brent and
Fentress add that the depictions of wall art and evidence from physical anthropology represented
a more mobile, ‘whiter’ Berber populace that acquired new technology and a more stratified
society which “enabled them to subjugate their existing black population” (Ibid., 20). This ‘white
invasion’ of the Sahara was the beginning of Berber domination, displacing the Negroid race57.
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The invasion of the Moors was led by an African Berber general named Tariq ibn Ziyad who after an eight-year
campaign brought most of the Iberian Peninsula under Islamic rule. New World Encyclopedia, s.v., “Moors,” accessed
June 23, 2016, http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Moors.
57

However, the rise of the Berber did not entirely eliminate blacks from North Africa. In fact, Brown adds that “there
have always been blacks in Northern Africa. The blacks have never, however, really represented a group or nation and,
consequently, they have never constituted a threat to the non-Saharan Northern Africans.” For instance, Brown includes
a quote from Raymond Mauny from “Tableau Geographique de L’Ouest Africain au Moyen Age,” Memoire IFAN, no.
61 (Dakar, 1961), 397, who estimated that during the Middle Ages at least twenty thousand black were sent each year
from West Africa into North Africa, or at least two million per century. Additionally, Brown adds that blacks ’returned’
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Nevertheless, Soler Subils concludes that because “very few archaeological excavations have
been done in the Western Sahara, we still have no clear and safe sequence of the prehistoric
cultures that occupied the region. As a consequence, it is difficult to link any of the rock art
remains with a prehistoric culture” (Soler Subils 2006).
Today, there are still many questions about Berber origins. Anthropologists and
ethnologists differ on the exact genealogical identification and characteristic quality of Berber
ethnicity. Brent and Fentress stated that “the only certainty is the [Berber] population by the
second millennium was extremely heterogeneous, with a range of Mediterranean types mixed
with some descendants of the original, possibly indigenous ‘Meka’ type” (1997, 17). Marçais
stressed that “[t]he few clues so far obtained from prehistory lead one to believe that the Berbers
do not constitute a homogeneous race…From an anthropological point of view, therefore, North
Africa shows great diversity, which has been further accentuated by numerous interminglings
between different types of Berbers as well as of Berbers with many other racial elements”
(Marçais 1955, 22). Ilahiane added that there has been an “ethnocultural symbioses [of the
Berbers] with the conquerors” over the centuries (Ilahiane 2006, xxxii). What is more than
certain is that the Berber had been tribal “from the earliest known periods of their history” and
that “their final allegiance was to a tribe, or to a real or imagined ethnic bond uniting the
individual to a part of the race but never to the whole. Thus a Berber consciousness [had] never
existed” (Abun-Nasr 1971, 8, 58). Nevertheless, anthropological and historical scholars have
consented that a composite group of Lybico-Berbers had established themselves across North
Africa from the Red Sea, across the vast Saharan interior, stretching to the Atlantic Ocean and
into the Western Sahara.

to “Northern Africa as detribalized individuals, usually as slaves” in great numbers and “as random individuals soon
scattered over Northern Africa” that were easily absorbed or ignored. Leon Carl Brown, “Color in Northern Africa,”
Daedalus 96, No. 2 Color and Race (Spring 1967): 466-467.
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The Gaetulian Berbers of Northwest Africa — 500 BCE to the Arab Invasion
Modern scholarship, at this stage in history, agrees that the Berbers, labeled as ancestors of the
Sahrawi, begin to divide into separate social and political entities. The natural course of
discussion about Sahrawi history moves to identify these North African groups that can be used
as reliable sources for tracing their own national identity. In addition, the discussion now begins
to narrow its geographical scope from the huge region of North Africa to the more specific areas
of modern-day southeastern Morocco and Western Sahara proper, including parts of Mauritania.
Still a relatively pastoral people, the eastern (from the relative domains of present-day eastern
Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya) Berbers of littoral North Africa mimicked the agricultural
and politico-military status of the Roman Empire. Most information about the western and
southwestern Berbers include the Mauri and the Numidae58, who despite gravitating toward a
more sedentary existence, retained a thriving nomadic lifestyle, and established kingdoms to the
west of Carthage (mentioned briefly in the previous section). These groups (mentioned below),
unlike those farther east, did not rush to emulate the flourishing Roman and Carthaginian
civilizations
The peak of the Carthaginian Empire took place in the fifth century BCE and for the next
400 years, became preoccupied with Roman competition. Carthaginian control in the region had
been limited to its vassal city-states along the North African coast, a few inland territories in
northern Tunisia, and (modern-day) northeast Algeria. Carthage59 did not extend its control
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Numidae or Numidia is “the region that stretches west of Carthaginian territory between the Tusca and Ampsaga
rivers, today part of eastern Algeria. The Greeks interpreted the name of the Libyan people of Numidia living in this
area in the sense of nomádes (νοµάδες, ‘people who roam’) and so called this region Nomadía. However, most of the
Numidae had already been settled for a long time. The plateau of Numidia is bordered in the North by the foothills of
the Tell Atlas and in the south by the Sahara Atlas.” Werner (Bamberg) Huß, Brill’s New Pauly, German Version, s.v.
“Numidae, Numidia,” accessed 22 August 2014, in BrillOnline Reference Works, eds. Hubert Cancik and Helmuth
Schneider, (Koninklijke Brill NV, 2012), http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/brill-s-new-pauly/numidaenumidia-e826540.
59

Carthage apparently had a mix of ethnic communities beginning with the founders of the city the Phoenicians and
‘Lybians.’ Since Carthaginian Empire extended itself extensively along the coast and found itself rivaling Greece and
then Rome, many of its colonies, and as a result, subject people were “required to provide troops” such as the

62

beyond these immediate dominions because it preferred to “cultivate friendly relations with the
[Berber60] chiefs, who included intermarriage between them and the Punic aristocracy…[and] for
the purposes of trade and recruiting mercenaries from among their tribesmen” (Abun-Nasr 1971,
320). However, as the Carthaginian Empire grew stronger, three Berber Kingdoms arose to
counter its rise: 1) the Massylii (Tunisia—Algeria), 2) the Masaesyli (northwestern Algeria), and
3) the Mauri (northern Morocco)
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. Massylii and Masaesyli were later incorporated into the

Numidian62 Kingdom under King Massinissa. These Berber Kingdoms flourished “between the
destruction of Carthage and the establishment of effective Roman control over the Maghreb63 ”
(Encyclopedia Britannica, 15th ed., s.v. “North Africa”). The Mauri Kingdom was established in
present-day Morocco and the Western Sahara and was ruled by several Berber kings until it

Numidians, Mauri and Iberian, Celto-Iberians from Spain These latter were comprised of several Berber tribes—
Garamantes, Gaetulian, Nasamones. Encyclopedia Britannica, 24, 15th ed., s.v., “North Africa,” (Chicago:
Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 2010), 956.
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According to Ilahiane, early Greek writers had used barabaroi for those groups that were “non-Phoenicians within the
Carthaginian state” or for those who neither spoke Greek nor Latin. Pazzanita, Historical Dictionary of the Berbers,
2006, xxx. Abun-Nasr writes that the Romans had labeled the non-Greek and non-Latin speakers as barbari. Jamil M.
Abun-Nasr, A History of the Maghreb, 2nd ed., (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 7. Ghirelli states that it
was the Byzantines that had Hellenized the name to barbaroi and fashioned it to such an extent that it became common
among city-dwellers to identify it with non-urban tribes. El País Berebere, 6-7. It is also possible that the connotation
barabaroi came from the Greek for barbaros, which meant ‘foreign’ or ‘strange.’ Bullard, “The Berbers of the Maghreb
and Ancient Carthage,” in Africa and Africans in Antiquity, ed. Yamauchi, 183.
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The Mauri (Latin, Gr. Maurusii, and given by Romans as Mauretani) provided their name to modern Mauritania and
originally lived between the Atlantic Ocean and the Wadi (river or dry river bed/valley) Moulouya (or Muluya) or the
Chelif River. The Moulouya is located in modern-day northeastern Morocco and the source of its waters originate in
the Middle Atlas and empties into the Mediterranean Sea. The Chelif River or Wadi ash-Shalif is the longest and most
important river of Algeria and is located along the northeastern Algerian coast whose source originates in the Saharan
Atlas and also empties into the Mediterranean Sea.
62

Bullard, Ilahiane, and Abun-Nasr all agree that the Greeks employed ‘Libyan’ as another name for the North
Africans or non–Punic peoples and Numidian or “nomad” for the manner in which pastoralism was practiced.
63

The term Maghrib, spelled occasionally as the Maghreb, is Arabic for ‘west’ and is referred to in Arabic as alMaghrib or Tamazgha (‘land of the Berbers’) in the Berber language. It is the region of north and northwestern Africa
between the Atlantic Ocean and Egypt that comprises the coastal plain and Atlas Mountains of Morocco, together with
Algeria and Tunisia and sometimes Tripolitania (Libya). Oxford Dictionaries: Language Matters, 2014 ed., s.v.
“Maghreb,”
Oxford
University
Press,
2014,
accessed
July
24
2014,
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/Maghreb?q=Maghrib . This text will use the
‘Maghreb’ spelling unless there is another spelling from a quote or in a title of a work that was cited or referenced in
this study.
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became a Roman client state in 33 BCE.64 After Rome’s defeat of Carthage in 146 BCE
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, it

maintained nominal control over North Africa. At this time, Roman North Africa was divided
into four provinces: 1) Africa Proconsularis
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(the northern portion of Tunisia), 2) the Kingdom

of Numidia,67 as a Roman client state, 3) “[t]o the west, in Mauretania68…, [and] 4) the
Gaetulians69 ” (Brett and Fentress 1997, 41).
The Berbers had not only founded kingdoms prior to Roman control, but had also
established formal relations (including intermittent alliances) and initiated several revolts against
the Roman Empire. These Berber kingdoms had, in general, transformed most of their nomadic
people into a semi-pastoral or agricultural society. Mercer attests that, beginning in the first
century BCE, the Saharan Berber had “been independent of the Maghreb” (Mercer 1976a, 498).
One of these large Berber groups was, according to the ancient texts of Hanno, Pliny the Elder,
and Ptolemy, called the “Gaetulians,” who resided to the south and east of Roman control. Smith
(who refers to German scholars Ritter et al 1817, 1034; Hornemann and Konig 1802, 223)70
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The Mauri (or Mauretania) Kingdom traditionally was located in present-day Morocco and although literature is
scant surrounding their origins, there is mention of the Mauri and of an early King Baga (≈225 BCE) in Livy’s Ad Urbe
Condita Libri (History of Rome), Book 29.30 and in other ancient texts. The more notable rulers of the Kingdom of
Mauretania were Bocchus I, Bocchus II, Juba I, and Ptolemy.
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Rome conquered the Carthaginian Empire, wiping out the city of Carthage and its inhabitants in the third Punic War
of 146 BCE.
66

Africa Proconsularis or Africa Vetus, governed by a proconsul (Roman provincial governor), was Rome’s first
African colony.
67

This kingdom was previously divided between the ancient eastern and western Numidian monarchical tribes of
Massylii and Massaesylli before uniting under King Massinissa (202 BCE) as a client of Rome with as much autonomy
as possible in order to balance the power of Carthage.
68

Mauretania had largely been an independent tribal Berber Kingdom since the 3rd century BCE but Rome had
indirectly influenced Mauretania’s politics through its neighboring wars with Carthage and Numidia. However,
Mauretania did not come under Roman suzerainty until after the death of Bocchus II in 33 BCE.
69

The Gaetulians were perhaps the largest of the Berber groups that dominated much of the interior of the Sahara. They
were non-urban dwellers, thought to be pastoral-nomadic but archeological research has found they adapted irrigated
cultivation but traveled considerably by horseback across the great Sahara to the Atlantic coast.
70

Carl Ritter and Georg Friedrich Hermann Müller, Die Erdkunde im Verhältnisse zur Natur und zur Geschichte des
Menschen, (1817) Vol. 1 (Berlin: G. Reimer, 1822-1859), 1034. Friedrich Konrad Hornemann and Karl Konig,
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writes that the Gaetulians “appear to be the chief ancient representatives of the great aboriginal
people of modern Africa, who call themselves Amazygh or Amazergt, and to whom belong the
Berbers of M. Atlas” (Smith 1854). Pliny wrote that Gaetulia extended as far west as “the
Atlantic Ocean; and on the S. [sic] to a margin of the great basin of the river NIGIR [sic],” or,
according to Pliny, “to the river Nigir71 [sic] itself” (Smith, 1854).

The Gaetulians were

“primarily nomadic herder”72 tribes, who wandered in an undefined territory on the “southern
slopes of the Atlas Mountains from the Aurés Massif westward as far as the Atlantic; southward it
extended to the oases in the northern part of the Sahara” (Encyclopedia Britannica, 15th ed., s.v.
“Gaetulian”). Mundy states that in the first century of the new Christian millennium: “The
nomadic Gaetulians of the northern pre-desert, distinguished themselves by the fact that they
lived ‘outside the two great [Amazigh] kingdoms of Numidia and Mauritania, and resisted any
attempts to tax or control them’” (Mundy 2007, 306).
According to Pliny, writing in the first century AD, the two most powerful of the
Gaetulian tribes were the Baniurae and the Autololes. The Baniurae occupied a more northerly
area along the coast of then-Mauretania. The Autololes73 were the more powerful Berber tribe and
although their exact dominions are difficult to identify, Idjennaden believes that their control was

Tagebuch seiner Reise von Cairo nach Murzuck, (Weimar: 1802), 223. Bayerische StaatsBibliothek Digital, accessed
November 12, 2014, http://www.mdz-nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn=urn:nbn:de:bvb:12-bsb10467058-2.
71

It is not known with certainty which river basin of the Niger River Pliny was referring to. “As the limits of Gaetulia
have not been settled, either by Ptolemy, or any of the other ancient geographers, it is impossible for us to define
them…but notwithstanding the indefinite terms in which the ancients have laid this region, by comparing their several
accounts and description…and, by consulting the observations of the moderns, conclude, that it could not have reached
to any great distance in the Sahara.” George Sale, et al, An Universal History: From the Earliest Accounts to the
Present Time, Vol XVI, Part I (London: Printed for C. Bathurst [etc.], 1780), 166.
72

Bob Idjennaden, The Forgotten Civilizations of Africa: The Gaetulian Warriors 3 (March 29, 2012), Kindle Edition
for Mac.
73

Translated from the French by the author, “Pliny the Elder describes them as barbarians particularly dangerous and
always ready to pillage and massacre, but also seeking the alliance of less powerful tribes, the Darae and Daratitae of
the Dra Valley, the Pharusi on the western slope of the High Atlas, the Masathi on the banks of the river Masath today
oued Massa.” Gabriel Camps, Les Gétules: Guerriers Nomades dans l’Africa Romaine, July 2002, accessed July 26,
2016 https://www.clio.fr/BIBLIOTHEQUE/les_getules_guerriers_nomades_dans_l_africa_romaine.asp#biblio.
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delimited by the Bou Regreg River in the north, to the south beyond the Sous region and in the
Valley of the Dra’a74 (or sometimes spelled ‘Draa,’ now all areas of present-day Morocco)
(Idjennaden 2012, 3.1). Farther south, in the vicinities of southeastern Morocco and the Western
Sahara, stretching southwest toward modern Mauritania, there were other smaller groups such as
the Canarii, Nigritae, Perorsi or Pharusii (see map 3.1) but they seem to have either disappeared
or intermarried with other Gaetulian groups. Today, scholarly consensus indicates that the Gaetuli
were a confederacy of tribes that included the groups75 mentioned above (Challis et al 2007, 290;
Law 1978,143). Apart from the descriptions above, little else has been extracted about ancient
Saharan Berber culture, history, and their territorial domain.
Any distinguishing characteristics between the Mauretanian (now modern Morocco and
Algeria) and the Gaetulian Berbers is challenging. However, it has been determined that the
kingdoms on the coast were more sedentary than those outside the Carthaginian and Roman
sphere of influence. The Gaetulian Berbers were nomadic or semi-nomadic “part dwelling in
tents… wandering about without settled abodes, and under no settled government” (Dictionary of
Greek

and

Roman

Geography,

s.v.,

“Gaetu’lia,”

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus:text:1999.04.0064:entry=gaetuliageo&highlight=gaetulia ),with evidence of horse-rearing, essential for traveling and trading over
long distances, and depicted as barbarous and warlike by classical writers (Challis et al 2007,
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One source indicates that there was perhaps a legendary Kingdom of the Dra or a people mentioned as the ‘Darae’ or
‘Gaetuli-Darae,’ in the steppes of the Great Atlas [Mountains] and of the ‘Melanogaetuli,’ a black race resulting from
the intermixture of the Gaetuli with their southern neighbors, the Nigritae.” Henry Immanuel Smith, Course of Ancient
Geography, (New York: D Appleton and Co) 1861, 309. Another text describes that this kingdom was perhaps first
populated by the black Koushite, ‘descendants of the Biblical Cushites, but were later invaded by Jewish Palestinian
immigrants, intermarried, or were pushed aside, with some converting to Christianity. D. Jacque-Meunié, Le Maroc
Saharien des Origines a 1670, Vol 1 (Paris: Librarie Klincksieck, 1982), 61.
75

“…les Gétules Autololes pourraient être les ancêtres des Guezoula et des Ilalene – Berbères qui occupent aujourd'hui
l'Anti Atlas occidental et ses environs...Peut-être est-ce dans la même région que vivent … aux temps de Polybe ou
d'Agrippa … les Gétules Dariens et les Éthiopiens Daratites qui pourraient être les uns et les autres les lointains
ancêtres des gens du Dra parmi lesquels se côtoient des Blanc et des Noirs, sans beaucoup se mélanger entre eux en
dépit d'une longue coexistence.” D. Jacques-Meunié, Le Maroc Saharien des Origines a 1670 (Paris: Librarie
Klincksiec, 1982), 167.
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Map 3.1: African Antiqua Showing Ancient Groups in Northwest Africa 76

289). The Berber tribes communicated “with at least four different alphabets found in Libyan
inscriptions” stretching from the Atlantic coast to modern Libya and practiced ancestor worship,
adopting pagan gods, such as the frequently mentioned Libyan god, Ammon (ibid., 289). A few
authors (Smith 1854) and other ancient scholars, the most recognizable ethnic feature was skin
color. The coastal cities along with the interior peripheral lands of the Gaetulian and Garamantes
76

Map from Dr. Samuel Butler, “Africa Antiqua” (1838), An Atlas of Ancient Geography, (Philadelphia: Le and
Blanchard, 1840).
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were associated with white or whiter skin color while those south of these Berber groups were
described as black. For the most part, the essence of the Gaetulian Berber seems to indicate that
they were a diverse set of tribes living and traveling across a vast North African landscape, using
several scripts, and intermarrying with northern (whiter) and southern neighbors (Nigritae),
adopting various gods.
Despite these obstacles of lineage, the Sahrawi concede that they are of mixed blood—
Black, Berber, and Arab. In fact, to the surprise of the author, in most interviews conducted in the
Sahrawi camps outside Tindouf, Algeria, many POLSARIO representatives touched upon this
mixed race idea matter-of-factly. In the words of Brooks, since “it is widely accepted that modern
and historical Berber and proto-Berber populations …are in large part descended from the prehistoric Saharan pastoralist groups” and “the cultural continuity evident between the
archeological records of the central and western Sahara,” extends to the Western Sahara, it gives
the traditionally nomadic Sahrawi “a particular affinity with prehistoric pastoralists,” countering
the claims of a sedentary Moroccan society (Brooks 2007, 249). He also notes how “areas rich in
in prehistoric burials” in the free zones of the Western Sahara have been used by POLISARIO
fighters to bury their dead closely resembling the practices of the pre-historic period—reenforcing their identity with the land and their ‘ancestors’ (ibid., 250). Finally, in the search for
examples of such primordial connections, there is evidence (although small) that the Gaetulians
were the ancestors to a group called the Gudala. Camps wrote that “[i]t seems that the
descendants of the Gétules [Gaetulians] are found in Guedala – also called Godula and Guezzala
–—great Sanhadja confederation in which the reformist movement arose of the Almoravids who
were to conquer Morocco and create an empire stretching from Senegal to Ebro” (Camps, s.v.,
“Les

Gétules,”

https://www.clio.fr/BIBLIOTHEQUE/les_getules_guerriers_nomades_dans_l_africa_romaine.as
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p#biblio ). Still, these statements are based on speculation and they assume that for almost 2500
years (500 BCE – 2000 AD), these tribes have remained in the same location and of pure blood. 77
The idea behind all of this history is to give the reader a unique perspective on the
patterns of migration and cycles of invasion that characterized North Africa, specifically the area
covering Mauritania, Western Sahara, and Morocco, including parts of southeast and southern
Algeria. In order to extract the origins of the Sahrawi from the ancient past, the process
necessitates visiting several periods of demographic change due to cyclical power structures and
climate. It also demonstrates how Berber society had become diffuse as they migrated farther
south. This pattern continued in the period leading up to the seventh century Arab invasions. The
previous section ended with the mention of the Gaetulian-Berbers because they have been
regarded as the most direct ancestors to Sahrawi identity. However, as these Gaetulians absorbed
tribes and then sub-divided into others, a pattern of tribal diversification persisted. This pattern of
change hinders the search for a group, tribe, or socio-political entity that can be tied to the
modern Sahrawi. The following section details further difficulties.

Sanhaja Berber and Early Islamic Dynastic Rule — From the Fourth through the Eleventh
Century
Three huge confederations of Gaetulian-Berber tribes came to dominate the Maghrib in the first
centuries AD: The Sanhaja, Masmuda, and Zenata (Mercer 1976a, 499). According to Pazzanita,
the Sanhaja Berbers are the primary ancestors of the Sahrawi and therefore the study will focus
on tracing their descendants (Pazzanita 2006, 383). They are the forebears of the Berber people of
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Another problem lies with the labeling of these tribes. Norris asserts that two different tribes of similar name existed,
the Gudula and Gazula. He mentions that the ancient Arabic texts confuse both. He distinguishes between the two, but
only nominally, by implying that both survive today, with the Gazula inhabiting “the region between the Wad Nun and
the Anti-Atlas in Morocco” and the Gudala, are “the most westerly and southerly of the mulaththamun [of the veil]
Sanhaja in the Western Sahara.” H. T. Norris, The Arab Conquest of the Arab Western Sahara (Harlow [Essex], UK:
Longman and Librarie du Liban, 1986), 245-246.
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the Rif78 and the Middle Atlas of Morocco, the Kabyles of Algeria and the Tuaregs of Mali,
Algeria, and Niger. The Sanhaja (also known as the Zenaga or Azenaya/Azenaga) held and came
to dominate the triangular desert area of the Western Sahara—from the Moroccan Sous, “the
Trarza, now west Mauritania” to Timbuktu, Mali—between 50 BCE and 400 AD (Mercer 1976a,
499). They were originally an agricultural group “who were forced by the encroaching desert
tobecome nomadic, warlike, caravan raiders” (Munene 2010, 73).

These Berbers became

powerful through their control of the trans-Saharan trade routes that extended south to
Aoudaghost (modern Tedgadawast, Mauritania) through the collection of taxes and tribute, and
“acting as paid guides and sentinels” (Page 2001,187). Their ‘capital’ seems to have been the city
of Aoudaghost (or Awdahgast), which was a flourishing oasis located at the south-western end of
the caravan trade routes used by the nomadic tribes of the Sahara.
At the same time, the Islamized Berbers began to permeate the caravan routes of the
Sahara and spread Islam farther south and west to modern Mali. Between the first and eighth
centuries, the primarily pastoral, nomadic and semi-nomadic, ‘white’ Sanhaja Berbers controlled
the northwest region of Africa and by the eighth century had converted to Islam only
superficially. They came to be characterized by resistance to control, but were confined to the
north by their Berber rivals, the Zenata79, and the black Soninke people of the Ghanian Empire80
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This “geographical notion refers to the northern zone of Morocco formerly under Spanish and international control.”
People of the Rif region recognize three main confederations as well as territorial divisions: Rif, Ghommara, and
Sanhaja.” Ilahiane, Historical Dictionary of the Berbers [Imazighen], s.v., “Rif,” 106.
79

The Zenata were a rival Berber group that contested the domination of the Sanhaja. At one point they had pushed the
Sanhaja “out of the Oued Draa” and Tafilalet and “came into control of the north-south caravan routes,” restricting the
free movement of the Sanhaja between the Sahara and the Atlas Mountains. Pazzanita, s.v., “Sanhaja,” 2006, 383-384.
80

The Kingdom of Ghana was composed of Soninke and Zenata Berbers and located in modern-day southern
Mauritania and northern Mali. In 990 AD, it recaptured Aoudaghost (a city that became a critical trading center in the
Ghanaian kingdom) from the Sanhaja Berbers.
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Map 3.2: Northwest Sahara

81

to the South (Munene 2010, 73). The Zenata pushed the Sanhaja Lamtuna82 Berber tribes to
Atari in the Adrar Mountains (modern Mauritania) and away from the Oued (River) Dra’a and
Tafilalet (now present-day Morocco) (Pazzanita 2006, 383-84). Mercer states that the first Arab
wave did not directly penetrate the desert and the Berbers themselves, from the east, spread Islam
south and to the west across much of North Africa (Mercer 1976b, 72). Perhaps the first to arrive
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Map adapted from T. Lewicki, “The Role of Sahara and Saharians in their Relationships between North and South,”
in General History of Africa III: Africa from the Seventh to the Eleventh Century, 3rd edited by M. El-Fasi and I.
Hrbek (Berkeley: University of California Press,1988), 279.
82

Other spellings include Lemtuna or Lemtouna. Lamtuna was chosen to eliminate confusion from Lemta sub-tribe.
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with his Arab armies, Ogba (or Okba) Ibn Nafi, governor of the province of Ifriqiya and a caliph
from Damascus, arrived in the Sous “as far as the sources of the Seguiet el Hamra” in 681
(Rézette 1975, 37). However, despite the wave of Arab Muslims that engulfed the whole of
North Africa, the Berbers resisted. If there were any conversions, they were nominal at best, even
among the Sanhaja (7th through 9th centuries). The Arabs designated the Sanhaja first as anbiya,
but that was later changed to Sanhaja in the tenth century (Page 2001, 187). By the ninth century,
three of the four leading Sanhaja tribes in the western Sahara were the Lamtuna, Massufa 83, and
the Guddala84 (see map 3.2), who had “inhabited the Sahara from Mauretania to Hoggar and to
the south as far as the Sudan…were joined loosely in a confederacy” (Abun-Nasr 1971, 92).
D’Almonte wrote that among these several fracciones (fractions), the Lamtuna fraction (or subtribe) was not only the most powerful and most important of the Sanhaja tribes but had actually
peopled the Oued Nun85 (Nun River) Valley (which lies north of ‘Wadi Dar’a in Map 3.2)
(D’Almonte 1914, 150). By 990, the Sanhaja had lost their ‘capital’ to the Soninke. Pressure
from the Ghanian Empire, the Arab north, infighting between the Lamtuna and Guddala, two
powerful tribes, had debilitated their once formidable power.
Anti-authoritarian aversion to royal or sovereign control became a more salient
characteristic of the Sanhaja Berber in the Western Saharan regions. The Arab conquests of the
Maghrib did not completely eradicate the strong sense of ethnic identity among the Berbers.
Rezétte writes that the although the Romans had left ‘frontiers’ with their ‘limes,’86

“true

occupation of the country by Arab conquerors who settled in with their families, only dates from
83

Other spellings include Messoufa.

84

Other spellings include Gadala or Juddala.
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Translated from the Spanish, “Son las tribus que actualmente pueblan el Uad Nun,” Enrique D’Almonte, Ensayo de
una Breve Descripción del Sáhara Español, (Madrid: Patronato de Huérfanes de Intendencia é Intervención Militares,
1914) 160. This river is located in present-day Morocco.
86

The ‘Roman Limes’ represented the borderline of the Roman Empire at its greatest extent in the 2nd century AD.
UNESCO, Frontiers of the Roman Empire, accessed October 15, 2014, http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/430.
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the arrival of the Hilalian Bedouins beginning with the XIth century… [and was] bounded by the
Bou Regreg River which empties in to the Atlantic between Rabat and Salé, was for long a real
frontier. Beyond it, the country becomes empty” (Rezétte 1975, 37). The Arab march into North
Africa only superficially converted the indigenous population. Many of the inhabitants fled to the
hills and left the settled countryside. According to Monès, this was true, but later, many Berbers
willingly accepted Islam because of its attractive message (Monès 1988, 243). Several sources
reveal that although Islam was accepted as the new religion, many of those converted males
would be conscripted to the Arab armies in their eventual domination of the entire Maghrib.
However, harsher Arab policies toward the Berber were met with strong resistance. The struggle
was based not on religion, but on the Ummayyad administration of the Berber communities and
their complaints of inequality and discrimination. Grievances were also voiced by those Berber
allies that had cooperated with the Arab armies: especially Arab ‘ungratefulness’ in the aiding
and capture of the Iberian Peninsula (Monès 1988, 244; Abu-Nasr, 1971, 10).
There has been an immense amount of pressure attempting to establish Sahrawi lineage to the
Berber people. Far from being descendants of a pure line of people, specifically in the Western
Sahara, evidence shows the modern Sahrawi are quite the opposite. In fact, if a strict primordial
explanation of nation were to be followed here, one would have to find genealogical (DNA) links,
however small (qualitatively or quantitatively). These links should establish a historical thread
that stretches back to the Bafour. For example, figure 3.3 above depicts a possible genealogical
tree

for

the

Sahrawi

through

the

ninth

and

tenth

centuries

AD.

However,

based on the evidence and literature in this study, including absorption by manner of war, slavery,
intermarriage, and nomadic transhumance, the linkages to the past are subjective and open to
breakages in the genealogical line.
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Figure 3.3: A Possible Sahrawi Genealogical Tree 87
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In reality, the Western Gaetulian Berbers were comprised of more than three tribes pictured above. They were a
diverse set of independent tribes outside the control of the more agricultural, sedentary, coastal, North African
Mauretanian and Numidian Kingdoms that included the Awarba, Berghwata, Houra, Kutama, Masmouda, Sanhaja, and
the Zenata.
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For instance, beginning with the Bafour, the scholarly consensus has determined that they
settled in North Africa but there is no agreement about where they came from. In fact, most of the
scholarship tends to point to the arrival of different sets of Neolithic Berbers from all directions
into North Africa, endangering the hope of a pure continuous connection to the Lybico-Berber.
Second, the Berbers seem to be an amalgam of confederate tribes that stretched all along North
Africa. The semi-nomadic to nomadic lifestyle based on the prehistoric rock art found scattered in
and around the Sahara is very similar and points to parallel cultural features (horse rearing, cattle
herding, ancestor worship, and warrior-like depictions). Still, ancient historians and modern
scholars of today agree the Berbers were composed of dozens of tribes that spoke several dialects
and wrote in at least four different scripts. Some built agricultural kingdoms along the coast while
others preferred to roam the interior. Still other confederations of tribes had a close relationship
with the Carthaginian and later Roman Empire, while others chose to remain aloof or rebel
against their authority.
Third, further southwest along the coastline, Gaetulian Berber tribes of the Western
Sahara “were independent and had the authority to make territorial decisions” (Danver 2015,
643). Thus, despite a narrower regional scope as the study moves forward, the ‘bloodlines’ are so
mixed with disparate tribal history that it is nearly impossible to develop a formative line of
descent to the Sanhaja. Fourth, the Sanhaja historically begin as a mixed collective from among
several tribes (see footnote 61). Any one of these Sanhaja tribes could be a genetic ancestor to the
Sahrawi but more anthropological research needs to be undertaken. Thus, the primordial approach
in this case runs into a huge ontological obstacle. It is difficult to hold to the argument, at this
point, that the Sahrawi are direct descendants of the Bafour, the Lybico-Berber, Gaetulian, or
even the Sanhaja Berber.
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The Great Berber Dynasties –– From the Eleventh to Thirteenth Centuries
The eleventh and twelfth centuries saw the development of two of the Berber’s greatest dynasties,
the Almoravid [≈1061/62-1147]88 and Almohad [1147-1269]. At their height, they encompassed
most of the Maghrib, as far East as Tripoli, northward to southern Spain and the Balearic Islands,
and deep into the southwest commercial routes of Niger and Mauritania, including the Western
Sahara. The Almoravids, a mostly Lamtuna Berber-speaking minority that led a dynasty of
majority Arabs could have been forerunners to the modern Sahrawi. In 1041-42, Yahya Ibn
Ibrahim, chief of the Guddala tribe, on his return from Mecca, lamented at the poor observance of
Islam among the Sanhaja Berbers, and invited “a fierce and austere preacher,” Abdullah Ibn
Yacin, a Sanhaja of the Jazula tribe, to evangelize the people (Pazzanita 2006, 20). Ibn Ibrahim
had hoped that this ‘pure’ form of Islam would improve the fortunes of the inobservant Sanhaja.
The Guddala (sub-tribe of the Sanhaja) rejected Ibn Yacin’s message and expelled him. However,
he traveled with a handful of armed disciples to establish a ribat89 in northern Mauritania (see
Map 3.4). Initially, his following grew among the Saharan nomads and may have numbered from
one to three thousand. Ibn Yacin’s followers were called al-Murabitun90 (“those of the ribat”),
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Dates vary as to the beginning of their dynastic rule. Qantara-med.org states 1056; Ilahiane begins with founding of
Marrakesh but in 1061; Historyworld.net posts 1062; The Encyclopedia Britannica establishes a start date upon the
establishment of Marrakesh as well but in 1062; The author will suggest a general consensus of 1061-1062 based on
the Britannica (Vol 1, 15th Ed.) and Ludwig W. Adamec, Historical Dictionary of Islam, s.v., ‘Almoravid,’ (Lanham,
MD: Scarecrow Press, 2001), 43.
89

Ribat has come to mean either ‘fortified convent,’ ‘religious retreat,’ or ‘military fortress.’ Most scholars tend to
agree that it was a term used for denoting religious fortress. See Pazzanita 2006, 20; Rézette 1975, 40; Abun-Nasr
1971, 95; Mercer 1976b, 72.
90

Al-Murabitun, which may also be stated as al-Murabitin and translated as ‘Those Dwelling in Frontier Fortresses’’ is
the Arabic plural form of al-murabit, which means an ‘inmate’ of the ribat. Encyclopedia Britannica, 10, 15th ed., s.v.,
“Almoravids.”
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Map 3.4: The Almoravid Empire and Environs

91
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Map adapted and translated from the French by author. “The Empire of the Two Shores: The Conquests of the
Almoravids until their Apogee,” http://aworldofmaps.free.fr/, 11 Aug 2009, accessed July 28, 2016,
http://aworldofmaps.free.fr/fr/?showimage=32.
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from where the Spanish corruption ‘Almoravides’92 originates. Eventually, the Murabitun or
Almoravids came to dominate the southwestern Sahara and subject the Guddala, the Lamtuna,
and the Massufa—all tribes that form part of the Sanhaja Berbers—to their strict form of Sunni
Malekite Islam.
It is at this juncture that an interesting socio-political divergence of Sanhaja history takes
place. Ibn Yacin, now allied with Yayha Ibin ‘Umar, succeeding the deceased Ibn Ibrahim as
head of the Lamtuna, led the newly militarized Sanhaja and indoctrinated the rest of the regional
tribes under the Almoravid umbrella. Circa 1043, two militant Sanhaja streams—north and
south—developed as an outgrowth of its strength and extended from its ‘base’ in southern
Mauritania (see map 3.4 above). Abu Bakr Ibn ‘Umar (who assumed control after his brother
Yahya Ibn Umar perished in battle) defeat the Ghana Empire,” take present-day provinces of
Morocco, western Algeria, and “reunify Muslim Spain” (Pazzanita 2006, 384). According to
Mercer, the southern militant stream descended as far south as the Senegal until the death of the
Lamtuna Emir Abu Bakr Ibn ‘Umar in 1087. Under Abu Bakr, the ‘southern’ Sanhaja had chosen
his cousin, Yusuf Ibn Tashfin, to take control of the northern force while he ventured south to
quell the unrest among the Sanhaja. This period initiated the Almoravid93 Dynasty (Mercer 1976,
499). The ‘people of the ribat’ used a more austere and “radical form of Islam to motivate the
Berbers and consolidated Islam (only as an elite religion; the masses remained animist), moved
civilizational focus south, which came “to evolve into the Mali Empire of the mid-thirteenth
century, and [shifted] trans-Sahara trade…eastwards to routes, from Timbuctoo and Gao, through
more stable zones” (Mercer 1976b, 73).
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Almoravid is the transcription of the Arabic al-murabitun, inhabitants of a ribat, a kind of monastery. Abdallah
Laroui, The History of the Maghrib: An Interpretive Essay, trans. Ralph Manheim (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 1977) 158.
93

The Almoravid or Al-Murabitun Dynasty, originating in the mid-eleventh century, encompassed the area of presentday Mauritania and parts of northern Western Sahara.
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The break among the Almoravids into north and south makes the search for origins of
Sahrawi national identity much more difficult. First, the divergent Almoravid streams fracture
considerably the number of Sanhaja Berber tribes that can be followed with any historical
accuracy. Secondly, the nomadic nature of these tribes challenge the social and political scientist
in associating a specific Saharan territory to a specific group. The only identifiable settled
‘nations’ in the proximity of the Western Sahara94 (apart from the Idrissid Dynasty) beginning in
the tenth century were those, according to historical accounts, of the trading mecca and later
principality of Sijilmasa, the Confederacy of Barghawata95, predominantly along the northwest
Atlantic coast (modern Morocco) and then across the Sahara, approaching the mostly black
Sahelian ‘states’ of the Takrur and Ghanaian Empire. The lack of research as a result of yet-to-bediscovered and untranslated literature, inaccessible manuscripts (due to conflict), and the harsh
environment prevent proper study of the historical development of nation building in the Western
Sahara. Finally, the only notion of a cohesive identity was tied to the tribe but there is no
evidence before or as follows for a distinct ‘Sahrawi’ tribe.
The Great Sanhaja Divide
The northern portion of the Sanhaja, along with their marabout96 Islam, retook the important
trading city of Sijilmasa (1056) from the restive Guddala, successfully founded the city of

94

The Idrisid Dynasty (789-921) was founded well north of modern Western Sahara in Fes (Morocco) by the Arab
Idriss I. It did extend southward to the frontiers of the Barghawata tribal confederation but was only able to reach the
pre-desert regions of Sijilmasa and possibly into the Sous River Valley. However, after Idriss II’s death, the ‘Kingdom’
fragmented upon the division of its territories to his sons. The provinces never re-united and “caught in the crossfire of
the conflict between the Fatimid and [Spanish] Umayyad Empires, their territories finally fell” to the Zenata. “The
Umayyad victory over the last Idrisid, al-Hasan ibn Gannun…marked the definitive end of the dynasty in 974.”
Encyclopedia Britannica, 6, 15th ed., s.v., “Idrisid Dynasty,’ 244; “The Idrisids (789-974),” Qantara: Mediterranean
Heritage, accessed July 28, 2016, http://www.qantara-med.org/qantara4/public/show_document.php?do_id=867.,
There are discrepancies over the end date of Idrisid dynastic rule.
95

John Ralph Willis, ed., Studies in West African Islamic History, Vol 1, The Cultivators of Islam, (New York:
Routledge, 2012), 81.
96

Marabout “is the name given, especially in North Africa, to a Muslim saint or to his descendants.” Eds., H.A.R. Gibb
and J. H. Kramers, Shorter Encyclopedia of Islam, s.v., ‘marabout,’ (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1965), 325.
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Marrakesh (1062), captured Fes in 1069, and established the kingdom of Morocco. Ibn Tashfin
had begun construction of the new capital of Morocco Marrakesh (1070), which would become
one of the most beautiful cities in all of Morocco. By 1082, the northern Almoravid forces had
taken control of northern Morocco and northwestern Algeria (as far as Algiers). The northern
parts of the Sanhaja Berber-led Almoravid Dynasty were to emulate Andalusian civilization in
culture—including art, architecture, and construction of buildings and monuments. These
developments were supported by the resources of gold found in the southern regions of Sanhajadominated Senegal and the western Niger. Still, the division, between the northern and southern
areas of the Almoravid Dynasty remained due to the vast desert landmass of the Sahara. These
northern Sanhaja were able to defend the region from the Eastern Fatimites, Hilalian Bedouin,
and the Zenata (another sub-tribe of Sanhaja) who were pushed north earlier by the southern
‘desert Sanhajas.’
These ‘desert’ or southern Sanhaja merit further historical detail because
geographically they may offer a connection to the modern Sahrawi. The southern portion was
beset by ‘internecine warfare’ and preferred to remain independent—maintaining traditional ways
of living (Pazzanita 2006, 384). Despite there being Sanhaja confederations, not all were under
an overriding, governing entity. Moreover, this becomes the constant dynamic among the tribes
— a fluctuation of loyalties and tribal animosities. Even among the ruling elite, certain
distinctions take place. For example, when Abu Bakr, returns from the south after defeating the
Soninké (Ghana) to take his place as ruler of the northern Almoravids, he is told to “return to the
desert,” after negotiating with his cousin via enticements and favors. Pazzanita comments that
Abu Bakr was then detached from the Almoravid’s northern branch that conquered and settled in
present-day Morocco and southern Spain (Pazzanita 2006, 384). Several authors noted that there
was a division, not based on any cultural or ethnic separateness but on the route of conquest and
trade. For example, Mercer briefly states that “the long-established Sahara crossing had been

80

Sijilmasa—Tindouf—Kedia d’Ijil or the Ourane Desert—Aoudaghost but the troubles allowed
Timbuctoo [sic] and Gao (see map 3.5 below) to continue to increase in importance, the former
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Map adapted and taken from F. De Medeiros, “The Peoples of the Sudan: Population Movements” in General
History of Africa III: Africa from the Seventh to the Eleventh Century, 3rd edited by M. El-Fasi and I. Hrbek (Berkeley:
University of California Press,1988), 124.
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for those caravans still going to Morocco and the latter for Tripolitania. This isolated the [desert
or southern] Sanhaja from the Maghreb” (Mercer 1976b, 74).
By 1147, the Almoravid Dynasty was replaced by the Almohad98 Dynasty consisting of
Masmuda Berbers of the High Atlas, controlling much of what is now the Kingdom of Morocco.
The Almohad Dynasty arose in the Sous99 River Valley of southern Morocco. Mohamed Abu
Abd’Allah Ibn Tumart defeated the Wali (governor) of Sous100 in 1132 and began to neutralize
his surrounding Almoravid enemies. After the death of Ibn Tumart, ‘Abdul-Mu’min Ibn ‘Ali, a
Berber from the Zenata tribe, became the successor to the Almohad movement and would later
take the title of khalifa (caliph) and Amir al-Mu’minin (Prince of the believers).101 By March
1147, the Almohads were able to break the weakening northern Sanhaja capital of the Almoravids
in Marrakesh. This conquest relegated the Sanhaja Berbers to the sands of the Sahara once again
(Mercer 1976a, 500). The Almohads ordered a general massacre of the Lamtuna Berber (tribal
power of the Almoravids) and declared Marrakesh (see map 3.6 below) as their new capital. A
great number of the Lamtuna disappeared; some fled to Tuat (Algeria). Many of the Guddala (see
map 3.5 above) were dispersed and ended up in the Sahara. “[T]he forced migration of the
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The Al-Muhawiddun (Unitarians) or Almohad (Sp.) Dynasty (1113-1269) crushed the Almoravid Dynasty and for
more than a century controlled an empire that encompassed the entire Maghreb (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, and
al-Andalus (Islamic Spain). Ilahiane writes that, “by virtue of its religious ideology, military power and political
organization, and economic and cultural development, the state still fires the imagination of contemporary attempts at
North African unity.” Ilahiane, Historical Dictionary of the Berbers, s.v., “Almohads,” 14.
99

The Sous or Souss River valley (also known as the Sus in the Berber dialect of Tashelhiyt) of southern Morocco rises
from several headstreams in the High Atlas Mountains and flows westward for 112 miles (180 km) to the Atlantic
Ocean south of Agadir. Its alluvial basin, protected from the Sahara by the Anti-Atlas Mountains, has been one of
Morocco's most fertile regions. Fruits, cotton, vegetables, sugar, and olives are grown, much of them for export.
Encyclopedia Britannica, 11, 15th ed., s.v.,"Sous Wadi," (Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, 2010), 30.
100

The Almoravid governor of Sous was Abu Bakr Ibn Muhammad al-Lamtuni.
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Amir al-mu’minin is also usually translated as “Commander of the Faithful” or Leader of the Faithful.” ‘Abdul
Mu’min was the first non-Arab to be given this title. Abun-Nasr, A History of the Maghrib, 111.
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nomadic Arabs of the southern Maghreb was almost complete”102 (D’Almonte 1914, 154).
According to Pazzanita (2006, 384), it “left the desert southern peoples as the only surviving
remnant of the once-flourishing [Almoravid] empire.” Consequently, the Sahara Desert became
not only an outlet for escape but also a refuge because of its inhospitable geographic nature.
D’Almonte describes it well when he states that “the Great Desert and its steppe confines
protected them from the fierce Almohads, whose voracity preferably attracted…on the other
hand, the cities and the orchards situated between the Atlas and the Sierra Morena”103 (ibid.).
D’Almonte also mentions, in his interviews with those elders of the Oulad-ed-Delim about the
origins of their tribes, that “[t]he ferocity of the partisans of the Mehdi and Abdul-Mu’min had
launched, to the Sahara, many Berbers and Arabs branded with fondness to the black banner of
the Almoravids” (Ibid., 155). Many, according to the accounts in D’Almonte, were of the
Guddala tribe, “(descendants of the ancient Gaetulians), and not many Arabs, more or less mixed
with the Berbers, and native of Yemen (Qahtanites)”104 (ibid). From this short review of the
Almoravids and Almohads, one finds that inter-tribal conflict and dynastic cleansing of ‘odious’
tribes only undermines the possible relationship theorized by claimants to a Sahrawi past. The
Sanhaja tribes slowly began to change culturally — via Arabization of language and Islamization
of religion — and purged demographically and historically through conquest. The early Gaetulian
Berbers had been dispersed leaving only confederations of tribes along the northwestern Atlantic
littoral and throughout the interior northwestern Sahara. Several groups, such as the Lamtuna,
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Translated from the Spanish by the author: “…la forzosa emigración de los árabes nómadas del Mogreb meridional
fué casi completa…” D’Almonte, Ensayo de una Breve Descripción del Sáhara Español, 154.
103

Translated from the Spanish by the author: “…el Gran Desierto y sus confines esteparios los reguardaron de los
feroces Almohades, cuya voracidad atraían preferentemente, por otra parte, las ciudades y los vergeles situados entre el
Atlas y la Sierra Morena.” The Sierra Morena is a Spanish mountain range that generally marked the extent of the
Almoravid reach into southern (Andalucian) Spain. Ibid.
104

Translated from the Spanish by the author: “… (descendientes de los antiguos getulos), y no pocos árabes, más o
menos mezclados con los berberiscos, y oriundos del Yemen (Kahhthaníes).” Ibid., 155.
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Map 3.6: The Western Maghrib and Northern Sahara 105

Guddala, Arabs, even Blacks106 were killed, expelled, or fled farther south into the Sahara. These
groups were displaced by Zenata and Masmuda Berbers, rival to the Sanhaja from the northeast
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Map from Roland Oliver, “Western Maghrib and the Sudan,” in The Cambridge History of Africa 1050 to 1600,
Volume 3, Cambridge Histories Online (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 332.
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of modern Morocco (the Rif, Fes, and Marrakesh). Thus, possible ancestral candidatessuch as the
Lemtuna, Guddala, and various smaller groups of Sanhaja dispersed or were forced to migrate
deeper into the Sahara (see map 3.5 above) as far as the Senegal River regions. As such,
narrowing any one ancestral tribe or confederation of tribes to the Sahrawi remains elusive.

Arab Dominance and the First Europeans: Thirteenth to Sixteenth Centuries
‘Almohadic’ rule, as interpreted through their puritanical form of Islam, had already begun to
divide both Berber and Arab, settled and nomadic people alike, including those of Sanhaja
extract, from those city-dwellers who became allies of, and benefitted from, the Almohads.
D’Almonte describes how, thereafter, the Maqil Arabs had begun to drive a different, more
geographical, wedge between the Berbers of the Atlas Mountains and the Berbers of the Sahara.
The Banu Maqil are important in this section of the study because they are considered the next
promising tribal forefathers to the Sahrawi. The Maqil were an Arab Bedouin tribe whose origins
were probably from Yemen. They reached the Oued Dra’a (W. Dar’a in Map 3.6 above) in 1281,
assisted in the overthrow of the Almohads in ‘Morocco,’ and helped establish the Merinid
Dynasty of the Zenata. Despite the aid, the Maqil were a warrior class that was a menace to the
Merinids (and at times allies to Merinid adversaries). Moreover, several branches of the Banu
Maqil fragmented even further and would become both allies and enemies of the Merinid,
complicating the geo-political situation for the fledgling dynasty.
The newly found Merinid107 Dynasty (1248-1465) pushed the Banu Maqil southward
toward the desert-dwelling Sanhaja Berbers (Pazzanita 2006, 385). Eventually, the Banu Maqil
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“The Almoravids, and in particular their leader, Abu Bakr b. ‘Umar, are credited by oral traditions in Mauritania
with the final dispossession of the Blacks from their strongholds in the Sahara. In fact, the Almoravids’ exploits marked
a decisive state in a long process in which black sendentaries retreated south to the Sahel as the Berber nomads
advanced.” The Cambridge History of Africa, Vol 2, from c. 50 BCE –AD 1050 (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1978) 665.
107

The Merinid are descendants of the Banu Marin tribes.
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merged with and absorbed the Sanhaja Berbers. On many occasions, expeditions were mounted in
order to push them southward and away from the (Moroccan) Sultanate. Another invasion from
the east comprised of the Beni Hassan or Awlad Hassan,108 a branch of the Maqil Arabs, had
arrived to support the Moroccan Zenata Berbers. They clashed with the Sanhaja in the south and
southwestern Sahara. By the thirteenth century, the Beni Hassan had invaded the Oued Dra’a and
Oued Noun regions, mixing with the Sanhaja Berber. Gradually, the Sanhaja began to disappear.
Their language was replaced by the Hassaniya109 Arabic dialect. This migration gave rise to the
Tekna tribes and the Oulad ed-Delim (one of the purest of Arab nomadic groups).
According to Norton, the Banu Maqil, wedged between the more southerly Berber
Saharans and the northern Merinids based in Fes, Kingdom of Fes, "found the Sus [sic] to their
liking" (Norton 1986, 174). In a very interesting comment taken from Ibn Khaldun in his History
of the Berbers, Norton states that the Maqil "subdued" and levied taxes on the subject people in
the Sous and the Valley of the Nun (ibid.). According to research conducted among the national
archives in Madrid, the Sous River Valley and its adjacent Oued Dra'a Valley, along with the
Atlantic coastal points from Santa Cruz to Cape Nun and further south to Sequiet el-Hamra, was
an area of contention and little governmental structure for the next five hundred years. The
Sahrawi nationalist movement argues that this area, the northern-most part of the Western Sahara,
is not and has never been the domain of the Kingdom of Morocco. Thus, the Banu Maqil,
independent of the Kingdom of Fes, began to establish its own governing entity through the
collection of taxes. Laroui mentions that between the years of 1384 and 1411, the southern part of
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The Beni Hassan (or Awlad Hassan or Banu Maqil) tribes plus the Banu Hilal migrated from Yemen westward.
According to Pazzanita, the Beni Hassan was an Arab warrior caste, 385. These tribes, sent as a punishment from the
Fatimid Caliphate in Egypt, were pushed westward and south into present-day Mauritania and the Western Sahara.
Stephen Zunes and Jacob Mundy, Western Sahara and Conflict Irresolution (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press:
2012), 145.
109

Hassaniya is the Arabic dialect spoken by present-day Sahrawi, which originated from the Arab Bedouin tribes of
the Beni Hassan and later became the dominant language in Northern Mali (Azawad), most of Mauritania, the Western
Sahara, and parts of southern Morocco between the eleventh and fourteenth centuries.
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the Merinid Kingdom (Kingdom of Fes) "had declared its independence..." because "of the
increasing power of the Ma'qil, "who had become the main power on the central Maghrib before
extending their domination southward to the Western Sahara" (Laroui 1977, 231). In fact, in one
instance in 1387, Ahmad al-Mustansir, when he recovered his throne from a rival Merinid vizier,
"with the help of the Maqil who controlled the Sijilmasa region...rewarded the Maqils by
allowing "them access to the Atlantic plains while leaving them their privileges in southern
Morocco" (Laroui, 230).
These domestic squabbles, the rise of small fiefdoms, and the Banu Maqil encroachment
diminished much of the power and influence of the Merinids. The Merinid 'Dynasty' was, in
effect, of nominal influence in the region. The Christian princes of Iberia, aware of the situation
in the Maghrib and the weakness of Fes, began their foray into North Africa, including the
Western Sahara. For example, the Portuguese began to settle in the northern Maghrib in 1415
(Tangier) and by 1458 had conquered al-Qasr al-Kabir. Later in 1472, the Merinids of Fes were
replaced by Muhammad al-Shaykh of the Banu Watta. Still, the power of the Wattasids (1472—
1554), who had replaced the Merinids, “had never extended beyond northern Morocco” and that
“in 1471 the Moroccan state, as founded by the Almoravids, ceased to exist” (Laroui 1977, 238).
The Wattasids ruled Fez and some of its periphery through 1524. By then, however, the
Portuguese (see map 3.7 below) had expanded along the Atlantic coast of 'Morocco' and
established small forts or trading outposts in Santa Cruz do Cabo de Aguer or Agadir (1505), Safi
(1508), Azemmour (1513), and Mazagan (1514, already a protectorate in 1486). By the beginning
of the sixteenth century, Genoese, Spanish and specifically Portuguese traders had created several
small points across the northern coast of Morocco, stretching from Ceuta to Santa Cruz de Aguer.
Santa Cruz de Mar Pequeña (1476) was perhaps the furthest south of the coastal European
outposts. Essentially, the Wattasid's "effective authority...was restricted to Fez and its environs.
They had a limited control over the Atlantic plains, and it was only by force that they could exact
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some tribute from tribes of the Middle Atlas. Marrakesh was virtually autonomous, and the High
Atlas, the Sus, and the pre-Saharan oases were completely outside their authority" (Levtzion
1977, 397).
Further south of the Sous and into the Sahara, the "northern section of the Sahara came
increasingly under domination of Arab nomads. They imposed their 'protection' over the preSaharan oases and extracted tribute from the inhabitants and traders there" (ibid., 451). Oliver
also reveals through Ibn Khaldun who commented that "some of the veiled Sanhaja of the
southern Sahara were 'in subjection to the King of the Sudan, paid him tribute and were recruited
to his armies' " (ibid, 381).

In summary, by the time of the Wattasid Dynasty (from the

geographic periphery of the Kingdom of Fes' dominions southwest across the Atlantic coastline to
the Wolof Kingdom in present-day Senegal, inland east to the Adrar and returning north along the
trade route to Sijilmasa, which had ceased to be the great trading hub), the Western Sahara was
not governed

by

a

single

sovereign

entity. Historical evidence

demonstrates that

acknowledgement or submission to any authority was divided among the several fiefdoms that
sprang up when the Wolof, Mali, Songhai, and Wattasid rule weakened considerably in the
sixteenth century. Moreover, these dynasties or empires hardly had any sort of control over the
wandering, ill-governable, and desolate land-dwellers of the Western Sahara. It was only when a
new Sharifian Dynasty, the Sa'adians, came to power in the Sous River Valley in 1524 (see on
map 3.7 below referenced as “Principauté des Chorfa Saadiens” or the Principality of the
Sharifian Sa’adians) that perhaps a more cohesive phase of nation-building began among the
inhabitants of the Western Saharan region, though these people could hardly be identified as
“Sahrawis.”
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Map 3.7: Political Divisions from 1500 to 1515 of Morocco
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Map adapted from Louis Massignon, “Le Maroc dans les Premières Années du XVI Siècle,” Tableau Géographique
d’Après Léon L’Africain. Mémoires des la Société Historiques Algérienne (Algiers: Adolphe Jourdan, 1906), 149.
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Historical Analysis and Critique
The essence of this section consisted in tracing Sahrawi national identity from its antiquity until
the beginning of the sixteenth century. It highlighted the key events that characterized much of
Sahrawi ancestry. The chronological detail, at times tedious, was necessary so as to place it in the
context of the evolving dynamics of 'Sahrawi' identity. Thus, many details were included so the
reader would understand why none of the above candidates met the test of “true” ancestry to the
Sahrawi from antiquity through the beginning of the modern era. We can see that none could
have begun to be considered a national group, and the origins of Sahrawi nationalism are much
more modern. The following will summarize these results, and by concluding, aid the reader in
understanding national identity through the example of the Sahrawi. This section began with a
highlight of the ancient origins of the indigenous inhabitants of the Maghrib, specifically the
Western Sahara. It has found that Sahrawi ancestry may not be traceable from deep in antiquity.
Some of the problems encountered that could have provided some evidence for Sahrawi origins at
this time: 1) There is scant history of human beings inhabiting the area now known as Western
Sahara going back 10,000 years. 2) Many of the early inhabitants of the region, in North Africa,
southern Europe, and the greater Mediterranean world, can all trace their beginning from
Neolithic peoples; a problem that may deem DNA studies necessary but beyond the scope of this
study; 2) It is a problem of infinite regress. At which historical point does one begin to study the
national identity of any nation? Where does one begin to discuss that 'belonging' to a group of
people, or attachment to the homeland or territory? 3) The nature of Sahrawi ancestry and of any
study of nationhood will certainly come across the inevitable challenge of distinguishing between
those of pure blood and those of mixed origins, but there was not enough stability in this region
for any people to be considered of “pure blood” to evolve.
On the contrary, many scholars affirm the hybrid origins of the people of the Western
Sahara. Many agree that present-day individuals who identify themselves as Sahrawi are
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primarily of Berber descent, though mixed with the Black nations of sub-Saharan Africa, and
finally succumbed to the 'waves' of Arab tribes from the East by the end of the Middle Ages. For
example, Mercer writes that the early roots of the Sahrawi are complex and are a result of: several
hundred years of intermarriage, subjugation by 'foreign' rule, or self-rule via the early Berber or
Arab dynasties, frequent migration patterns, and 'invasions' from those groups emerging from the
eastern and southern Sahara. (Mercer 1976a, 498) Hodges describes the ancestors of the Sahrawi
people as sub-groups “of the beidan,111 or ‘Moors,’ nomads of mixed Berber, Arab, and black
African descent who now speak an Arabic dialect known as Hassaniya” (Hodges 1983, 74). He
describes this fusion as a product of wars, and with Mercer, agrees it is also a result of
subjugation, alliances, and intermarriage of Sanhaja Berbers, Bedouin Arabs, and black African
slaves. Today, there is agreement among several sources that the most visible of the Sahrawi
groups are the “Hassaniya-speaking people who claim membership among at least one of the
social groupings found in and around the area now known as [the] Western Sahara” (Mundy and
Zunes 2012, 140). Thus, an early indication of Sahrawi national identity is difficult to detect.
This mixture of “races” (Black, Arab, and Berber), perhaps not quite unique among the
North African population, is central to perceived Sahrawi identity. Laroui writes “anthropological
studies and archeological finds now tend to prove both the antiquity and diversity of the Maghribi
population” (Laroui 1977, 17). Present scholarship is inclined to recognize “a diversity of origins
and of the essentially fragmented and passive character of the Maghribi past” (Ibid., 19). In the
words of Gabriel Camps, the Maghrib was “a transitional region without distinct characteristics of
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Beidan or bidan (bidthan) is "the name used by the Saharan Moors, both Arab and Berber speakers in order to
distinguish themselves from the negroes. The term, meaning 'the whites,' is found in quite early writings. According to
La Courbe (1685), "The Senegal separates the Azoaghes [Zenagah] Moors or Bazanez [Bidan], from the Blacks; so that
on one side of the river are Moors, rather white than black; and on the other, men perfectly black." Norris, The Arab
Conquest of the Arab Western Sahara, 245.
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its own”

112

(ibid., 20). If there were an argument for a more homogeneous population, the case

may be found much later in North African history, beyond the new ‘Christian’ millennium. Yet,
Hodges has made a more modern socio-cultural distinction between the nomadic and sedentary
Sahrawi. He writes that even today, among the Sahrawi, there are Arabophone nomads, Berber
Tuareg nomads (east), black African farmers (south), and semi-nomadic or sedentary Berbers of
the Sous River Valley and Anti-Atlas region, north of the Sous (Hodges 1983, 74).
A few authors have argued that there is a case for a sense of homogeneity found in the
Sahrawi past. For instance, Ghirelli113 believes that the apparent homogeneity of the remaining
Sanhaja Berber may have been due to the (a) geographic protection afforded to them by the
Sahara Desert to the south, the Mediterranean and the Atlantic Sea to the north and west of the
Maghrib. Secondly, the (b) nomadic lifestyle that is attributed to the ancestors of the Sahrawi
remained intact despite a history of intermarriage and constant fighting among themselves and
with invaders. This may be the result of a unique lifestyle that adapts to the harsh, desert
environment. However, geographic and nomadic factors do not provide evidence of socio-cultural
homogeneity. Nomadism may be a lifestyle marker for a certain collectivity, and geography may
demarcate the boundaries of a group, but it certainly does not indicate that all of those
characterized by these cultural markers are of the same ethnie, or nation. Certainly, the settled
population may better candidates for the descendants of the Western Saharan but there is
difficulty in choosing the correct genealogical group. These factors may indicate that several
mixes of groups, relegated to the harsh landscape over the centuries, were forced to cooperate in
order to survive the desert.
Third, another argument suggests that Islam may have forged Sanhaja Berber
homogenization. Although the overwhelming majority of the population came to adopt the
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Gabriel Camps, “Les Traces D’un Age du Bronze en Afrique du Nord,” La Revue Africaine, Alger, 1er et 2e trim,
1960, 31-56 quoted in Laroui, The History of the Maghrib, 19.
113

Exact period for his Ghirelli’s comment not clear.
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Muslim practice, the Sanhaja have characteristically, jealously protected their culture from
outsiders. In fact, many of the Sanhaja Berber only nominally converted, nominally claiming to
be Muslim but retaining pre-Islamic, pagan beliefs and practices. Moreover, the Berbers
developed particular Islamic sects that arose to challenge the authority of the Baghdad Caliphate.
Recent research about the area has uncovered struggles between tribes and with other foreign
invaders over the control of the prized Trans-Saharan trade routes supplying gold and silver (in
coins) among other valuable items as well as goods for market. The preponderance of tribal or
sub-divisional (fractional) group communities supported a less cohesive, more fractured society
that rarely acknowledged a sovereign power, and at times preferred to remain aloof in the desert.

This section’s efforts focused on evaluating a series of claims about different groups as
the “true” ancestors of the modern Sahrawi. Was there a beginning? This is the second challenge.
The first was to determine at what point to begin tracing the origins of the Sahrawi. Perhaps
another approach to the challenge would be to follow the socio-historical progress of the groups
confined to the Western Sahara instead of searching for definitive origins. In these terms, the
development of Sahrawi ethnic identity may be seen as a “layering” of generations and perhaps
centuries of movement, division, and intermarriage. Their ethnic make-up consists of disparate
tribal conglomerations and a propensity to absorb several different generations of other foreign
groups (i.e., Carthaginians, Romans, and Arabs). Thus, the amalgamation of groups, early periods
of migration, and continuous tribal division make it difficult to acknowledge a nationality based
on a primordial approach. Yet, modern-day Sahrawi nationalism may provide us with an example
of an evolved identity that may be attributable to primordial connections. Smith for example
refers to a "collective cultural identity…not to a uniformity of elements over generations but to a
sense of continuity on the part of successive generations of a given cultural unit of population"
(Smith 1991, 25).
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Smith’s re-formulated version of primordialism is called ethno-symbolism. Ethnosymbolists agree with post-modernists in “the importance of conceiving of nation as ‘real’
sociological communities” (Smith 2009, 13).

Ethno-symbolists agree with modernists that

nations “are conceived of as historical communities, embedded in specific historical and geocultural contexts” (Ibid., 14). In other words, the ‘national’ character and ‘progression’ of a
community is open to formative historical assessment. It absorbs change and aids in explaining
the development of a nation. This flexible version of primordialism allows for a variable nationbuilding process. Thus, it can help explain the amalgamated dynamic of Sahrawi national
identity. Yet, ethno-symbolism “still regards ethnic identities and communities as crucial for the
formation and the persistence of nations” (ibid., 21). It considers that “although nations may be
partly forged by political institutions” or as “elite projects,” they also necessitate “over the long
term… ethno-cultural resources to create a solidary community” (Smith 1991, 21).
‘Historical ethno-symbolism’ tries to bridge primordialism to instrumentalism and
constructivism. Instrumentalism can explain how each individual or small group of individuals
gathered together their adherents to develop an ideology and then as a consequence, mobilized
their followers to advance more regional ambitions—establishing rule and dominance, political
power. However, according to Robertson, constructivism combines both primordialist and
instrumentalist perspectives and may be a more effective explanation. Despite ethno-symbolism
incorporating the more post-modern theories of nationalism, it still begins with an ethnic base.
Such an approach will encounter problems in trying to locate the origins of Sahrawi identity. This
section has illustrated that even if allowances were to be made in order to highlight an ethnic
sense of homogenization, it still would be challenging to pinpoint within this period of history.
Constructivism, on the other hand, does not necessitate an ethnic starting point and may be able to
better explain the slow progression of ideas producing a Sahrawi national identity in this
historical segment. Constructivism, by its approach will absorb these historical events and will
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provide for a more comprehensive perspective of identity change. It also grants the possibility of
an outright manufacture of nationhood by the elites or those who are vested with the power
directing the population (ethnic entrepreneurs), a top-down view of forces that can give rise to
national identity. It also consents to a criterion that establishes national identity among those links
attached to ‘natural’ givens, including those ethnic symbols developing over time.
The primordialist approach is severely handicapped seeking the origins of Sahrawi
identity in this period. The challenges of mixed races, diverse interaction, and distinguishing
between sedentary or nomadic groups hinder primordialist arguments. If placed in an
ethnosymbolic context, a primordialist approach may help argue for gradations of development.
Yet, these still do not solidify an identity. Instrumentalist arguments are limited to arguments that
include dynastical leaders. However, the Almoravid and Almohad dynasties were marred by
divisions, both geographical and tribal, and finally falling, reducing their influence to a small
segment of northern Morocco, leaving the rest of the Western Sahara region free. The
constructivist would absorb the layering of qualities that developed over time, add the dynastic
experiences of the region, and begin to create an identity; a proto-Sahrawi is being built upon
these features of identity. Still, the third (constructivist) hypothesis cannot precisely state that the
Sahrawi were born at this time.
This historical investigation suggests that an innate awareness, especially among a
distinct group of people (sub-tribe, fraction or tribe, federation of tribes) that desires to
consolidate and remain in one single area is difficult to ascertain because the expansionist and
unifying aspirations were most commonly directed and controlled by elites. These elites usually
had the support of clerics or fringe movements that co-opted the population of the immediate
area. It is also very challenging to provide concrete evidence connecting present-day Sahrawi
identity to Sanhaja Berber identity. As has been noted, as one reads this socio-historical account,
the migratory patterns, infighting among local tribes, larger gradual incursions of foreign tribes—
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including Arabs from the East—subsequent intermarriages, death through loss of patronage
(death of a leader) or extermination of one's people through loss in battle, and slavery, highlights
the immense difficulty in forging a direct blood line or pattern of traditional ancestry. The
premise “that nations were around from ‘the first time’ and were inherent in the human condition,
if not in nature itself” (Smith 2009, 8) may, in fact, be true. It is not evident in the Sahrawi case.
The question will continue to be when was the ‘first time’ for the Sahrawi? The answer may not
be clear in this section. However, it may be that the development of the socio-historical character
of the region may have been constructing Sahrawi identity all along. In this case, the results can
only be historically measured much later in time. This leads to the next chapter, which will
attempt to discover such an answer after 1524.
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IV. SAHARAN IDENTITY: DYNASTIC OR TRIBAL (1524 – 1757)
This section will focus on the roots of Sahrawi identity from the period beginning in 1524
until 1757. This period was not chosen arbitrarily. 1524 is the year Santa Cruz de Mar Pequeña114,
the Portuguese trading outpost and small fort, was overrun by the Sa'adian Dynasty. 1757 was the
year Mohammed Ben Abdellah al-Khatib, or Muhammad III, came to power in Morocco and
achieved moderate stability after almost a quarter century of fraternal infighting for power. This
section will continue the socio-historical analysis of the period in the western and southwestern
Maghrib region (including Mauritania, Western Sahara proper, and Morocco). It will provide
insight to claims of distinctiveness by the Sahrawi and their possible links to this historical
period.
Here, the first hypothesis will be examined: that Sahrawi origins are rooted to a historical
past but only to this period, instead of the previous era. Another hypothesis is derived from the
constructivist approach: 1) the encroachment of colonial powers into west and northwestern
Africa generated resistance from those long-since established inhabitants leading to a protonational identity (see map 4.1 below); or 2) a more organized political society among the Western
Saharans developed because the sovereign entities ruling the area became stronger and expanded
their territory. This chapter seeks evidence that sustains these arguments: The origins of Sahrawi
national identity was due to the developments of the socio-political environment in this period.
On the other hand, a combination of these two arguments may provide a better explanation for the
coalescence of Sahrawi identity.
The first hypothesis continues to be relevant to this chapter even though it begins in the
sixteenth century because the more traditional approach has no limitations to how far back one
can begin the study of nationality. Its flexibility may be one of its deficiencies because in the case
of the Sahrawi there is no natural point of departure. Primordialist studies begin in the present,
114

This literally means ‘Holy Cross of the Small Sea’ in Spanish.
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move backward seeking a point of origin, and then work their way forward to the modern. The
second hypothesis and its three derived explanations rely on a more diverse understanding of
nationalities and allow for an identity to be approached from below—arguing for given attributes
that can only be described as affinities or attachments to family or tribe, the land, and cultural
links (custom, ancient myths). It also seeks explanations from above—either from geo-political
dynamics and circumstances that have influenced the population or the manipulation direct or
indirect from elites and 'ethnic entrepreneurs.’ After the socio-historical description and
commentary of the Sahrawi during this period, a critique follows of both hypotheses.
Several socio-political changes began to influence the dynamic of the Moroccan social
landscape in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries and of both the northern and southern
stream of Sanhaja Berber. First, the northern stream became subdivided into smaller tribes that
began to mix and thereby diffuse power in the southernmost parts of Morocco. These groups,
including the Berber tribes from the Gudala, Lemta (Sanhaja), the Lamtuna (Sanhaja) and the
Arab Hassani groups had already begun intermarrying.115 The number of nomads increased from
both the Berber and Arab populations throughout the region and south into the Sahara because of
the influx of goods and the Trans-Saharan trade routes. However, many of these nomads lived
mostly by foraging for date palms, hunting desert game, raising livestock, and caravanning the
salt (Norris 1986, 176). Second, "the northern section of the Sahara came increasingly under the
domination of Arab nomads" who "imposed their 'protection' over the pre-Saharan oases and
extracted tribute from the inhabitants and traders there" (Levtzion 2008b, 449). Norris comments
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Lydon comments that these ancient tribes, the Gazula (or Gazulah/Jazula), Lemta (also known as the Lamtah or
Lemta), Lamtuna (or Lamtunah), Masufa, and Gudala, are considered of “Berber” origin. However, in terms of Sahrawi
ancestry, only the Lemta, who were “a learned Sanhaja clan of the northwestern desert edge—a region geographers
named the southern extremity of the Maghrib (Maghrib al-aqsa),” and Lamtuna are said to be from the Sanhaja—the
true ancestors of modern-day Sahrawi. He also suggests that the Gazula are the “forefathers of the Tikna” (or Tekna)
Confederation of tribes that still survive today in southern Morocco and northern Western Sahara. Ghislaine Lydon, On
Trans-Saharan Trails: Islamic Law, Trade Networks, and Cross-Cultural Exchange in Nineteenth-Century Western
Africa, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009) 60-61, 174. Norris also suggests that the Gazula are present
today as “distant ancestors of those people whom we now call Tiknah.” H. T. Norris, The Arab Conquest of the Arab
Western Sahara (Harlow, UK: Longman and Libraire du Liban, 1986), 142, 246.
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that several of the subject Berber tribes in the Sous Valley became soldiers for the Banu Maqil,
Awlad Hassan, and Banu Hassan (Norris 1986, 174).

Map 4.1: Early Colonization of Morocco in Sixteenth Century 116

Third, the “Portuguese raided nomad encampments of the ‘Azenegues’ (Sanahja) on the
coast and took prisoners” (Levtzion 2008b, 451). The Banu Maqil formed auxiliary forces with
the nomad Berbers, subdued the Fazula, which furnished “the model for later recruitment an
116

Map taken from Charles-André Julien in History of North Africa—Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco: From the Arab
Conquest to 1830, trans. John Petrie, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul), 1970, 214.
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service, bondage even of the Zenagah117to the Awlad Hassan in Mauritania” (Norris 1986, 174).
Hodges remarks that in the sixteenth century, Leo Africanus118 and Luis de Mármol y Carvajal
who both traveled “into the Western Sahara from Morocco in 1512 and 1556 respectively,
reported the presence of both Sanhaja and an Arab tribe, the Oulad Delim” (Hodges 1983, 9). In
Brown’s edited notes on John Pory’s translation of Leo Africanus’ work, he comments that the
“Zenega seem to have extended from the Atlantic to the Salt marshes of Trarza, from Western
Sus and the Wad Draa on the north to Timbuktu in the south” (Brown 1896, 198). Gradually
though, the Sanhaja name disappears through intermarriage with the Arab tribes, capture and
enslavement by the Portuguese and rival tribesmen, and migration south toward the less
populated Sahara. Fourth, the Wattasids (1472—1554) from their principal city of Fes (see map
4.2 below), instead of checking the incursions of the Portuguese and the Spanish, began to redirect their focus against another upstart rival—the southern sharifs119. Thereafter, Wattasid

117

Zenagah (also spelled Zenaga or Znaga) before the invasion of the Arab Banu Hassan or Hassani tribes was a
designation to that part of society associated with caretakers of livestock. Ahmed Mahmu'd wull Mudi, in “Genèse de
la Hiérarchie Sociale et du Pouvoir Politique ‘bidân’,” by Mariella Villasante-De Beauvais, Cahiers d'Études
Africaines, 37, Cahier 147 (1997): 594; It was also the name of a Sanhaja tribal confederation that later became a
tributary tribe to the Arab Hassani after the war of Char Bubba. However, academic literature has used the term
synonymously with Sanhaja. Encyclopedia Britannica, 11th Edition, s.v. “Zenága,” (1911), Google Play Books. Today,
however, it is viewed as the corrupted (or derivative), Arabic form of Sanhaja. John Mercer, “The Cycle of Invasion
and Unification in the Western Sahara,” African Affairs, 75 No.301, (October 1976): 499; “Sanhaja,” Anthony
Pazzanita, Historical Dictionary of Western Sahara, (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 2006) 383-384.
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Leo Africanus, whose original name in Arabic is al-Hasan ibn Muhammad al-Wazzan al-Fasi (but later christened as
the Italian Giovanni Leone) was born c. 1485 in the Kingdom of Granada, Spain and died c. 1554 in Tunis, Tunisia. He
was a traveler whose writings remained for some 400 years one of Europe’s principal sources of information
about Islam. “Around 1526, he completed his greatest work, Descrittione dell’Africa (1550; A Geographical Historie
of Africa, 1600).” Encyclopedia Britannica, Online Edition, s.v. “Leo Africanus,” accessed February 16, 2015,
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/336304/Leo-Africanus. See also Leo Africanus, The History and
Description of Africa and of the Notable Things Therein Contained Vol. 1, trans. John Pory, edited by Dr. Robert
Brown, (London: Bedford Press, 1896) 130-131, 146, 205.
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Sharif is a term denoting a nobleman descended from Fatima and Ali and therefore of sharifian descent, direct
descendants of the Prophet Muhammad. Despite the problems with these claims, much of the population supported the
sharifs. Today it is a term applied to an Islamic ruler or clergy.
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Map 4.2: Morocco during the Wattasid Dynasty 120

power deteriorated and “the governors of Safi

121

” who “were making a great effort to gain

possession of Marrakesh” allowed the emergence, “in the Sous, [of] the Beni S’ad or Sa’adians”
(Julien 1970, 215). Subsequently, by the end of the fifteenth century, Marrakesh had ceased to
recognize the Wattasid authority of Fes (Laroui 1977, 238).
As early as 1455, the southern Sanhaja had been in contact with, and reached the
population across the Senegal River (see map 4.3 below). A letter dated from 1455 about the
voyage of Luis de Cadamosto and Pedro de Sintra recounts that fifty miles beyond the Senegal
River, de Cadamosto met the Damel (ruler) of Cayor122 for the purpose of trading horses and
other items for the King’s return payment of black slaves (Newitt 2010, 67-71). De Cadamosto
writes that only a select few could visit and enter to see the King in his vast residence of
enclosures. One such group included “the Christians who are allowed to go freely whenever they
are met with and the Azenegi who are those who teach the law of Mohamet” (Ibid., 70). Newitt,
who translated Caddeo’s account of de Cadamosto’s voyage to the Senegal, asserts in an endnote
that these Azenegi were actually migrant Sanhaja traders, who inhabited the southwestern
territory of the Sahara, observed Islam and practiced medicine (Ibid., 70-71). Additionally, when
the Zenata-based dynasties of the Merinids and the Wattasids were ousted from their strongholds
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Taken from Dahiru Yahya, Morocco in the Sixteenth Century: Problems and Patterns in African Foreign Policy,
(Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press), 1981, xv.
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It was a ribat (a type of fortified monastery) “in the 13th century and was mentioned by the historian Ibn Khaldūn.
The Portuguese occupied Safi (1508–41) and built a citadel, which now surrounds the 18th-century Keshla ([military
enclave or] Casba). Safi prospered under the late 16th- and early 17th-century Saʿdī sultans.” Encyclopedia Britannica,
Online Edition, s.v. “Safi,” accessed February 11, 2015, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/516146/Safi.
122
Cayor was an independent satellite controlled by the Wolof Empire “that dominated what is now inland Senegal
during the early period of European contact with West Africa…In 1556 the nobles of Cayor threw off Wolof
domination and established an independent state of their own on the Senegal coast. Encyclopedia Britannica, Online
Edition, s.v. “Wolof Empire,” accessed July 22, 2015, http://www.britannica.com/place/Wolof-empire#ref221633.
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in Fes, many fled to the northern fringes of the Sahara. They, along with the Tadjakant (or
Tajakant), are the modern descendants of Berber who now are found either in the “many
sedentary centers of the northern half of the desert or “scattered all along the western edge of the
desert, from southern Morocco southward through [what was once considered] the Spanish and
western French Sahara” (Cabot Briggs 1960, 81). Apart from these subtle descriptions about the
area and its history, little is known about the inhabitants prior to the middle of the seventeenth
century. Only a little more has become known in the last two hundred years (Ibid., 211). The only
remarkable note of the period is the increasing difficulty to choose and follow a specific tribe (or
tribal confederation) that would lead to the present day Sahrawi. The general mixing of tribes
among Arab and Berber along the Atlantic coast southwest into the Sous and Dra’a River Valleys
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Map 4.3: The Greater Western Sahara123
(see map 4.3) only impedes in ascertaining a line of succession to the modern Sahrawi. The
constant movement from one area to another because of conflict, pressure from the encroaching
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Map taken from Thomas Whitcomb, “New Evidence on the Origins of the Kunta,” Bulletin of the School of Oriental
and African Studies,” Vol 38 (1), 1975, 104.
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Arab tribes, and nomadism further dampens specific evidence for Sahrawi origins. Moreover,
many, if not most, of the Saharan tribes, both Berber and Arab, acted independently of each other.
The only active association among tribes was as through alliances (in a confederation for
protection or for raiding another tribe) and trade. However, these relationships did not produce
any notion of Saharan identity. Identification was primarily tied to the tribe.

The Rise of the Sa’adians and Ouster of the Europeans (1494-1668)
In 1494 the Treaty of Tordesillas, between Spain and Portugal, traced a line of demarcation that
divided the New World and other possessions in West Africa. Even though Portugal had won the
possession of Melilla (in northern Morocco) according to the lines of demarcation provided at
Tordesillas, John II of Portugal waived this right. Spanish incursions into the Maghreb began at
the command of Archbishop Cisneros of Toledo (1499). However, the geo-political objective of
establishing the Spanish Kingdom in the Mediterranean rather than in the Maghreb resulted in the
“establishment of garrison posts (presidios) on strategic points on the coast, while leaving the
interior to be held by indigenous rulers” (Abun-Nasr 1987, 147). The Portuguese reached the
height of expansion during the Wattasid reign of Abu Abd Allah al-Shaykh Muhammad Ibn
Yahya (or Muhammad al-Shaykh) (1472-1505) in what is now Morocco. A peace treaty between
the Portuguese and al-Shaykh in 1489 led the Portuguese to ‘abandon’ the conquest of interior
lands and concentrate on the southern periphery of ‘Morocco.’ The Sufi sharifs of the Sa’adians
in the south “came forward to lead the Moroccan Muslims against the Portuguese” (Ibid., 208).
The Sa’adians lived in the Valley of the Dra’a, came to prominence with the support of the
leaders of the Sous, which led to the expulsion of the Portuguese from Santa Cruz de Mar
Pequeña in 1524 and to the capture of Marrakesh in 1525.
The Sa’adians become the next potential ancestors to the Sahrawi in view of their move
from the northern region of the Western Sahara into southern ‘Morocco.’ Also, their
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incorporation of these areas to their rule may provide, for the first time, the possible foundation
for a Sahrawi nation. Beginning in 1524, the area south of the thirtieth parallel in latitude, the
Sous and Dra'a River Valley and beyond into the Sequiet el-Hamra (see Map 4.3 above), was
being overpowered by the rise of the Sa'adian sharifs supported by some of the surrounding
tribes. These groups began to organize themselves politically for three distinct reasons. First,
European, especially Portuguese, encroachment into the interior lands of southern and northern
'Morocco' alarmed some of the religious leaders of the region and despite the advantages of trade
caused them to seek redress against these non-believers. Second, the centuries-old trade routes,
which had been an important part of the Trans-Saharan economy were being challenged by
European privateers and supported by their ruling monarchs at home. The Trans-Saharan caravan
routes travelled between the mouth of the Senegal River valley, from Timbuktu and Gao, Mali
across the Sahara to present-day Tindouf, Algeria. The Europeans attempted to monopolize trade
by establishing trading posts not only on the Senegal River but also along the northwestern shores
of modern Morocco. The substitution of the desert overland route for the faster sea voyages along
the Atlantic coastline became a considerable European advantage. Consequently, one of the
objectives for the sharif became the protection of this trade from European interference. Third,
Sa'adi sharifian leaders also feared ‘the Turkish peril.’ The Ottomans had intervened to help the
Banu Watta (Wattasids) remain in power and would not tolerate another group claiming religiopolitical leadership in the Maghrib. However, the Sa'adian leaders opposed the Ottomans because
of Sa’adi claim to prophetic lineage. Thus, 'Christian' incursions, an already weak or passive
Wattasid government, an Ottoman threat to southern Morocco, and a chaotic Western Sahara
compelled some of the population and religious (Sufi) leaders to seek new leadership under the
guise
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holy

war:

The

Sa’adians
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Map 4.4: The Wattasid and Sa'adian Quest for Control of Morocco 124

Map titled ‘Morocco between the beginning of the 16th century and the second storming of Fes (1554)’ was taken
from Mohamed El Mazouni, “Political and Religious Institutions under the Saadians,” in Dominique Avon, ed., Politics
Religion and State Building (11th – 16/19th Centuries), 2011-2012, http://hemed.univ-lemans.fr, accessed November 30,
2015, http://hemed.univ-lemans.fr/cours2011/en/co/grain2_2_1.html .
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The Wattasids, the last Berber dynasty that controlled the nexus of ‘Morocco’ (Meknes, Fes and
its northwest coast) whose populations still spoke Berber dialects perhaps with some mix of
Arabic, do not figure prominently as ancestors to the Sahrawi. They did extend their power south
of Marrakesh but these territories were vassal principalities and would later be lost to the
Saadians (see map 4.4 below). Geographically, the Wattasids held Berber lands, especially in the
Atlas Mountains but are far removed from consideration as forerunners to the Sahrawi. The
Sa’adian, mostly of Arab origin and Arab-speaking were also composed of Berber tribes. They
rose from what is now parts of the modern Western Sahara and attempted to consolidate power
north and southeast. By virtue of geography, at this point in history, they are considered one of
better contenders that may be linked to Sahrawi identity. However, several problems arose that
mitigated Sa’adian consolidation of modern southern Morocco and contemporary Western
Sahara.

The Saadians: The First Links to the Sahrawi?
The desert dwellers of the Western Sahara, who were not subject to the Banu Watta or the Sa'adi,
the local tribes of the periphery and most of the southern regions of the southwest Sahara were
under no sovereign entity. They ruled themselves and maintained their nomadic lifestyle. Yahya
mentions, “the authority of the Marini-Wattasi sultans was acknowledged only in the capital of
Fez and the immediate surrounding regions” (Yahya 1981, 2). Julien writes that:
It was a period when anarchy was gaining ground despite the efforts of the
Wattasids to assert their authority. Southern Morocco was almost completely out
of their control. The Hintata amirs, reigning at Marrakesh, were not capable of
exacting obedience beyond the Atlas. The plain of the Sous, the anti-Atlas and
the Dra’ oases were de facto independent. But the people were concerned about
Portuguese inroads, and their piety moved them to take up arms against the
infidel (1970, 222).
Jacques-Meunié adds that:
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In the beginning of the 16th century the whole of Saharan Morocco is outside the
control of the dynasty that rules the north of the Atlas and has Fez as its capital.
The major provinces in the South (…) are disintegrated into numerous
independent districts of which some have only a village as capital (…) The
temporal power is thus broken up into multiple authorities, [sic] which are—
being independent or enemies of one another—factors of insecurity and anarchy.
(1982, 424-425)
Leo Africanus, Yahya, and Abu-Nasr mention that the region surrounding the Sous was rife with
tribal infighting led by Sufi orders. These Sufi leaders were angered at the Wattasid for not
resisting Portuguese assaults.
The area was devoid of any overriding leadership that could counter the foreign intrusion.
In fact, cohesive resistance may have been the result of the Portuguese themselves insisting on a
representative from southern Morocco to negotiate terms to stop the fighting in the region. AbunNasr adds “[t]he ascent to power began when the leaders of Sus, divided amongst themselves and
unable to agree upon one from their midst to represent them in their dealings with the Europeans,
were prepared to accept a sharif as their head” (Abu-Nasr 1987, 209). It seems very probable that
southern ‘Morocco’ was considered a contested geographical area rather than a cohesive, unitary
state or kingdom. There were other tribal powers in the wider Western Sahara region. One group,
noted by Criado, were the Reguibayt125 tribe (of Berber origin), whose creation and “subsequent
development [would] make it one of the most important in the Sahara, is produced in the
sixteenth century by Sidi Ahmed Erguibí126, at the approximate period of other tribes specifically
Sahrawi, the Arosien [of Arab origin], descendants of Sid Ahmed Arosi, and the Ould Tidrarim
by Sid Ahmed Bo Gambor [emphasis added]”127 (Criado 1977, 76). Other tribes included the the
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There a variety of spellings found throughout the literature: Rguibait, Reguibait, Reguibayt, or even Erguibat,
however, here I will use Reguibayt because of its phonetic proximity to English.
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Caratini does not refute Sidi Ahmed Erguibi’s existence but explains the difficulty of dating his actual birth and life
as she attempts to corroborate whether he is a myth or an actual historical figure. Sophie Caratini, Les Rgaybat (16101934) Tome 1: Des Chameliers a la Conquête d’un Territoire (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1989), 42-43.
127

Translated from the Spanish: “La fundación de la tribu Erguibat, cuyo “posterior desarrollo va a hacer de ella una de
las más importantes del Sahara, se produce en el siglo XVI por Sidi Ahmed Erguibí, en la época aproximada que las

109

Barabish (or Berabich, of Arab origin), Awlad Bu Sba (Arab and Berber mix), Kunta (of Arab
origin with a Berber name), Tadjakant (Berber), and the Tekna (whose ethnic origins are debated
between Arab and Berber). These groups spoke either a Berber (Znaga128 dialect) or that of
Hassaniya (from the Banu Hassan). As Whitcomb summarized, it was “apparent from the
accounts of the Portuguese explorations of the area during the ninth/fifteenth century, that the
[Banu] Hassan were by that time numerous, widespread, and powerful, although the Znaga and
Hassan were clearly still distinct peoples, each with its own language, customs, and dress”
(Whitcomb 1975, 103).
Based on the sources above, the consolidation of power (even by the Sa’adians) would be
challenging. The evidence also suggests that there was no overarching ‘national’ entity. For
reasons stated above and because of the environmental dynamics of the region, some authors
infer that Western Saharan society had already possessed a certain socio-political organization
before the creation of the Kingdom of Morocco or Mauritania. (Africanus 1896, 145-149; Cabot
Briggs 1960); Criado 1977, 76; Ensel 1999, 48; McDougall 2012, 84-85). These sources speak of
an independent nuclei of inhabitants that, although they did not have a regional governor or ruler,
was not controlled by a single principality or an absolute sultan. The evolution of power rested on
a tribal hierarchy at the beginning of the 16th century. Criado asserts that this hierarchy is still
respected among the tribes of the SARIO (Saguia el-Hamra y Rio de Oro) today. (1977, 77)
These tribal groups were a mix of Arab, Berber, even Black ethnicities. They communicated in
different languages. Some tribes had actually become divided between sedentary and nomadic
branches, such as the Tekna. Therefore, any notion of a proto-Sahrawi identity at this time is
contestable. The only common feature that would serve as a foundation for a Sahrawi nation in
otras tribus específicamente Saharauis, los Arosien, descendientes de Sid Ahmed Arosi, y los Uld Tidrarim por Sid
Ahmed Bo Gambor” in Ramón Criado, Pasión y Muerte de un Sueño Colonial, Versión Ruedo Ibérico, (ChatillonSous-Bagneux: SEG), 1977, 76.
128
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this period would be the diverse set of tribal attributes—nomadic and sedentary; Berber, Black,
and Arab; Hassaniya and Berber speaking. However, none of these groups ‘imagined’ themselves
as such a huge conglomerate nation but as independent entities whose loyalty was first tied to
clan and then tribe.
Abu Abdallah (or Muhammad) al-Qaim, representative of the Sa’adian House, was to
pursue the ouster of the Portuguese. They continued to take advantage of trade with European
merchants through the 1530s. In addition, the Sa’adian leadership was preoccupied with the geopolitical problems to their north with the Merinids and later with the Wattasids. In exchange for
local goods, especially sugar, Europeans would barter away “war materials including arms,
copper, iron, sulfur, and even saltpetre” (Abun-Nasr, 210). Ahmad al-‘A‘raj, who later became
the leader of the Sa’adians, captured Marrakesh in 1525129 and agreed, after failed attempts by the
Wattasid Dynasty based in Fes, to recognize him, to become ruler of Morocco—south of Tadla130
—in 1536. Jealous, his brother Muhammad al-Shaykh131, governor of Sous, moved to counteract
al-Araj’s power in 1540. By 1554, al-Shaykh had neutralized his brother, captured Agadir from
the Portuguese, eliminated the Wattasids, taken Fes, and essentially had become the ruler of much
of central Morocco.
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Although other accounts state that the Hintata of Marrakesh actually invited the Sous sharifs to establish their capital
there. Thus, over the years of 1523-1524, Ahmad al-Araj, named as successor of the sharifians and who “was
acknowledged from the Atlantic coast to Dra’a and from Agadir to Tensift,” along with his brother Muhammad alShaykh as leader at Tarudant in the Sous, came to settle in Marrakesh. Yahya, Morocco in the Sixteenth Century, 7.
130

Tadla is a flat central plain in the middle of Morocco situated northeast of Marrakesh, west of the Middle Atlas
Mountains, and directly south of its present-day capital, Rabat.
131

This Muhammad al-Shaykh is not to be confused with the one that was previously mentioned. The first ‘Muhammad
al-Shaykh’ was the founder of the Wattasid state of Fes in 1472 and ruled as Sultan until 1505. The ‘Muhammad alShaykh’ mentioned on this page was the acting governor of the Sous in the late 1520s—1536 and after neutralizing all
his enemies became the Sa’adian sharif of Marrakesh (1544) and ruler of all Morocco (1554—1557). Abu-Nasr, 207.
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Prior to 1580 and the victory by al-Mansur, Laroui depicts North Africa as those lands
divided among the Arabs, Berbers, and Moors132 but “confined to the middle Maghrib” (Laroui
1977, 242). For example, the great trading city hub of Sijilmasa133 (757≈1390s AD) was no
longer functioning and the cities on the coast had already been taken by the Portuguese or
Spanish monarchy. In 1578, after the ‘Battle of the Three Kings’ on the field of al-Kasr alKabir,134 Ahmad al-Mansur succeeded his brother Abd al-Malik (who defeated the Portuguese
King Sebastian and Muhammad al-Mutawakkil, a usurper to his reign and collaborator of the
Ottoman Turks) to the Sa’adian throne. Upon the death of King Sebastian, Spain was allowed to
annex the Portuguese presidios because Portugal had no heir. By 1580, Spain had appropriated
Portugal; unlike the Portuguese, the Spanish would administer the colonies by preserving the
status quo (Abun-Nasr, 215). In 1591, the forces of the Moroccan Sultan, Ahmad al-Mansur,
moved southward to take the salt mines of Taghaza (see Map 4.3). Because of his ambition to
unite the Muslims of West Africa and rival the power of the Ottomans, he chose to invade the
Songhay Empire in Timbuktu. Despite guerilla revolts by the Songhay, the Sultan's forces were
able to assert partial control of the Empire by 1594.
Prior to al-Mansur (1578), the Sa’adians were hard-pressed to dominate the southern
regions of the Western Sahara. The heart of Morocco, now located in Marrakesh and Fes was
intermittently difficult to manage. The restive Arab and Berber tribes south and southeast were
also very restive. The abundance of these groups, the formation of smaller principalities, and

132

The Moors were “members of the Muslim population of Spain, of mixed Arab, Spanish, and Berber origins, who
created Arab Andalusian civilization and subsequently settled as refugees in North Africa between the 11th and 17th
centuries.” Encyclopedia Britannica, 8, 15th ed., s.v., “Moor,” (Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 2010), 301.
133

Sijilmasa is located (its ruins) “at the beginning of the Maghrib in the Tafilalt oasis at the northern edge of the
Sahara Desert.” James A. Miller, “Trading Through Islam: The Interconnection of Sijilmasa, Ghana and the Almoravid
Movement,” in ed., Julia-Clancy Smith, North Africa, Islam and the Mediterranean World: From the Almoravids to the
Algerian War (Portland: Frank Cass Publishers, 2001), 29.
134

It is known as Alcazar in Spanish. All three kings were either killed or died during the battle although his own guard
poisoned Al-Malik.
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European coastal encroachments make it difficult to state with certainty which group—Sa’adians,
a vassal tribe of the Sa’adians, or one of peripheral tribes—is directly tied to the modern Sahrawi
of today. There is no viable proto-Sahrawi groups at this stage. These are the more prominent
difficulties, while others in the following point to the cosmopolitan nature of identity during and
after al-Mansur’s reign.

Group Identity during the Sa’adian Dynasty
One of the problems that has not been addressed is the close historical relationship that the
successive leadership and identity groups that occupied the territory currently identified as the
Western Sahara and the Kingdom of Morocco have shared. Some historians begin Moroccan
history with the Berber dynasties mentioned in the previous chapter and indelibly complicate the
matter of historical delineation. There is no satisfactory manner to identify at what point these
shared histories diverge, especially in the region from the Sous River Valley southwest through
the River Dra’a southwest to the Sequiet el-Hamra (see map 4.5 below). The term ‘Morocco’ has
been used in historical accounts and on old maps as a designation for the modern city of
Marrakesh. The designation of a ‘kingdom’ of Morocco began in the early eighteenth century.
Earlier historical accounts describe how sultans, not kings, led ‘Morocco.’ Morocco seems to
describe a geographic area in North Africa rather than a sovereign, independent political entity. In
fact, the fourteenth to the sixteenth centuries, the region of Morocco was divided among the
sultanate based in Fes and led by the Wattasids; the Sharifian Sultan based in Marrakesh; and the
more southerly tribal confederations in the Kingdom of Sous.
This problem is directly tied to the origins of Moroccan population groups as well as the
establishment of Morocco itself. For instance, al-Mansur’s army that crossed the Sahara (1591)
south to defeat the Songhay Empire consisted of Andalusian mercenaries, renegades (“captured
Europeans who had converted to Islam”), “negroes, Kabyles and Ottoman deserters,” even eight
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Christian bodyguards for the leader, Pasha Judar of Granada, of the invasion force, who himself
was not ‘Moroccan.’ (Julien 1970, 233; Michel 1995). Despite Julien’s Kabyle categorization,
these Kabyle were ethnic Berber. Roughly half of Judar’s force was not from Morocco proper.
Additionally, Sa’adian controlled territory was a mix of Arab and Berber and so there must have
been non-Moorish or Maghrebi Arabs but they may have been the minority contingent of the
invasion force. Generally, there were distinctions made among Maghrebi Arab, Maghrebi Berber,
Moorish Arab and Berber, and Black based on language, skin color, and region of origin.
However, the population groups of the Maghreb held to their family of tribes. Not only was there
no “Sahrawi” identity group during these centuries, but also not even a “Moroccan” identity
group. Rather, there were only ruling dynasties over “population groups” whose identity appears
to be very fluid.
A contemporary issue in areas of southern Morocco,135 but one which began much earlier
in history, is that of racial identity. Today, Moroccans are generally regarded to be of either
Berber or Arab descent. However, Morocco typically describes its original inhabitants as those
who were not only of Arab (from the Arabian Peninsula), but also of sharifian (see footnote
seven) descent.

’Shurfas’ (or Sharifians) claim “in the eighth century, Sharif Idriss bin

Abdallah…migrated from the Arabian Peninsula to Morocco and founded the first national
dynasty” (Ensel 1999, 21). Ensel states that this is the myth of the origin of the Moroccan nation.
Today, Morocco is still led by a Sharifian dynastic monarch, “albeit from a different genealogical
branch (Alawi) than the Idriss” (Ensel 1999, 21). Monarchical discourse, for the most part, does
not allude to Berbers as the original inhabitants. In fact, Pazzanita (2006, 385) writes that, over
the period of 1550-1640, the encroaching Arab tribes, especially the Banu Hassan,
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The geographical designation of ‘southern Morocco’ is describing the area from the Sous region southwest to the
Sequiet el-Hamra in Western Sahara, but does not include the whole of Western Sahara proper.
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Map 4.5: Greater Western Sahara in the Sixteenth Century136

136

Map taken, adapted, and titles ‘du Maroc au Sudan,’ from D. Jacques-Meunié, Le Maroc Saharien, des Origines à
1670, 2 Volumes (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1982), 573.
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“gradually vanquished and vassalized increasing numbers of Sanhaja,” who were direct
descendants of the Berbers. Thus, in identity-contested regions of Morocco, such as the Dra’a
River Valley (labeled ‘O. Dra’ in map 4.5), where the Arab (Ahrar)137, Berber, and black African
cohabitate, a kind of semi-caste or class has developed. These socio-ethnic categories are usually
organized with the Sharifian Arab above the Berber, Haratin138 (free Black), and finally the ‘Abid
(descendants of slaves).139
Upon the death of Ahmad al-Mansur (1578-1603), the Sa’adian Dynasty was already
losing its hold on power. By the end of the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, Ottoman
encroachment and the internecine conflict among the kingdoms and tribes in North Africa had
weakened Sa’adian power in the region. Al-Mansur had claimed sovereignty over the whole
width of the northern belt of the Sudan, from Wolof to Bornu, from the lower Senegal river to
Lake Chad but from conquest and “nominal allegiance” (Levtzion 2008b, 415). His power
resided in a compromise with the marabouts140 or sharifs and alliances with the English against
the Spanish. His army was also composed of various tribes, Turks, Moors, and foreigners (at
times even Christian exiles). The Trans-Saharan trade with ‘Sudan’ was also overtaken by
competition from Brazilian sugar. Gold from the Sudan dried up. Europeans no longer needed
137

Freemen
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“Scholars speculate that the Haratin came into being as a result of ancient interbreeding between indigenous blacks
and Indo-Europeans, possibly Berbers.” Encyclopedia Britannica, 5, 15th, s.v., “Haratin,” 694. In other literature, the
Haratin are described as ‘former slaves,’ or ‘Black Moors.’ “Mauritania-Haratin,” Minority Rights Group International,
April 2013, accessed August 03, 2016, http://minorityrights.org/minorities/haratin/ . Toyin Falol, The African
Diaspora: Slavery, Modernity, and Globalization (Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press, 2013), 42. However,
today the ‘Haratines,’ especially in countries such as modern Mauritania, are considered former slaves. Despite passed
legislation in Mauretania, criminalization of slavery is still tolerated by society.
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Remco Ensel’s anthropological/ethnological fieldwork among the population of the Ktawa Oasis in the Dra’a River
Region indicated that at the time there were clear distinctions among Arab of Sharifian descent or Ahrar, Black African
who were never slaves, categorized as Haratin black, and Black ‘Abid (actual descendants of slaves). Saints and
Servants in Southern Morocco, 1999, ix-x and 2-3.
140

“Marabout is the name given, especially in North Africa, to a Muslim saint or to his descendants.” The term is
“derived from the Arabic murabit through the Portuguese marabuto (Spa. Morabito).” H.A.R. Gibb and J. H. Kramers,
Shorter Encyclopedia of Islam, s.v., “marabout,” (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1965), 325. See chap. 3,
footnote no. 65.
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alliances with Morocco. Al-Mansur’s sons divided his Empire again and led their smaller
positions from Marrakesh and Fes. Local powers, including the religious chiefs—sharifs,
maintained their territories. Levtzion adds that “continuous warfare” after Al-Mansur’s death
“introduced a period of anarchy, one of the darkest in Moroccan history” which led to “insecurity
on the Saharan routes,” and thereby diminished “the flow of gold from the Sudan” (1975, 148).
Laroui recounts this fragmentation of history: “West of the Maghrib, …under the Sharifs, the
state was strong only when it was independent of society and maintained its power only by
recognizing the legitimacy of the local powers…it was a mere shadow of a state, because it was
not rooted in the soil of the Maghrib” (Laroui 1977, 259).
This appeal to soil evokes the primordial approach to national identity. However, Saharan
society was characterized by a balance of power among the local chieftains, a more palatable
view for constructivism. Despite creating a cohesive state enterprise, there is still a surprisingly
interesting debate about Al-Mansur’s political entity. Identity groups can exist without a having
to form, or existing in, a state structure. This example only demonstrates how contentious
national identity can become. Conventional Moroccan history formally begins with the Sa’adian
Empire, but an argument for the existence of a state based on the notion of the “pure Moroccan”
is untenable in view of the socio-political environment. At this time in the region, it is undeniable
that Morocco had little control before and after Al-Mansur’s reign over the area now called the
‘Western Sahara’ or its environs. This fact also questions the type of cohesiveness that al-Mansur
created during his reign and why it disintegrated so quickly.
Al-Mansur did rule over a considerable part of Morocco for a quarter century. However,
his sovereignty extended in name only outside the confines of central Morocco and at times for a
very short period (i.e., three years governing the former Songhay Empire). His reign, as well as
for the whole of the Sa’adian Dynasty, was characterized by several identity groups mentioned
above. There were also distinct categories of races, even mixes of races among the population in

117

‘Morocco’ and across the southwestern and southern regions of the Sahara. This suggests that if
Morocco in the sixteenth century was not based on a coherent ‘Moroccan’ identity, it is difficult
to expect to find a ‘Sahrawi’ or proto-Sahrawi group in the area to the southwest of Morocco
proper. Any form of cohesion established was monarchical but weakened by a heterogeneous
population that was exemplified in the composition of the Sa’adian armies. The population
remained tribal and segmented, undermining the sense of a national identity—in this case, a
proto-Sahrawi identity.

Sanhaja Identity after the War of Shar Bouba
The history of the greater Western Sahara, especially in modern-day Mauritania, from the 1500s
to the late 1600s has been far less documented than that of Morocco. This region of the world
lacks prominent empire-builders, dynamic religious leaders, or a record of key historical events.
Documentation has to be uncovered reading Mauritanian history. However, chronological history
of Mauritania for this period is insufficient because many of the volumes that describe it leave
huge historical gaps. The period from 1524 to 1758 is one of them. There is one major historical
event that sheds light on the resulting Arab dominance leading up to 1668. It also highlights the
last historical moment of the southern Sanhaja tribes who could possibly be the ancestral link to
the Sahrawi. This was the Mauritanian Thirty-Year War, also called the Shar Bouba War(s),141
which took place between 1644 and 1674. This section asks whether the southern Sanhaja of this
period are the rightful ancestors of contemporary Sahrawis.
By 1664, the southern Sanhaja had already been weakened and had relegated their status
as warriors becoming “devoted to Islamic learning and piety, being known as Zawáyá or
maraboutic tribes” (Levtzion 2008a, 199). By the fifteenth century, the Arab Hassani warrior
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Different spellings have been found among the various sources, including Shurbubba, Shar Buba, Char Bobha, or
Char Bouba. However, it is also referred to as the Mauritanian Thirty Year’s War. Mulero Clemente 1945, Gray 1975,
Norris 1986, and Pazzanita 2008. Here, I will compromise and will label it as the Shar Bouba War.
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tribes had penetrated the southwestern Sahara and subjugated the Sanhaja. This pressure against
the Zawáyá resulted in an ongoing battle that pitted the last bastion of Sanhaja Berbers against the
Hassani Arabs. The Hassani rulers had extracted tribute or horma142 from the more maraboutic
tribes in exchange for protection. However, protection was inadequate and led to insecurity,
especially along the trade routes. One crusading spirit from among the Lamtuna Berber, later
named Nasr al-Din al-Daymani (Tashumsha143 Confederation) began to proselytize and advocate
for a more devout following of Islam (Webb Jr. 1995b, 458; Hall 2007, 134). Nasr al-Din
“appointed a vizier and four qadis144, and was determined to establish order and political stability
in the Qibla (the southern Sahara). Fighting against warriors who 'cut roads', neglected Islam and
oppressed the believers; creating a supra-tribal community to overcome fragmentation;
establishing a new divinely guided order: these were the goals” of al-Din (Levtzion 2008a, 200).
Many of the remaining Sanhaja, who were most numerous in the deep southwest of
Western Sahara proper and, present-day southern Mauritania, had extended themselves farther
south to the northern fringes of the Senegal River region and protested against Hassani
absorption. Many of these Zawaya immediately heeded the call of Nasr al-Din (whose original
name was Awbek bin Ashfaga) for several reasons. They faced discrimination from the Hassani
tribes by way of the unjust tribute imposed on them. As a tributary tribe, they were relegated to
secondary status in the contemporary tribal hierarchies. This was difficult for the Zawaya to
accept since the Banu Hassan were not invited and thus were seen as ‘invaders.’ Nasr al-Din
might have also had economic reasons for his pursuit of power. At the mouth of the Senegal
River, the French had already established a trading post. Soon much of the trade that was
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Horma, hurmah, or ghorma was “a payment to Hassani protectors, on demand, of annual sheep, or two calves, or a
piece of guinée cloth.” Norris, The Arab Conquest of the Arab Western Sahara, 37.
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A confederation of five tribes that spoke the Berber Zenaga dialect.
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A Qadi or Qadhi is a judge. “A per son of good reputation who is versed in Islamic jurisprudence and acts as a judge
in civil and criminal matters. Adamec, Historical Dictionary of Islam, s.v., “Judge,” 152.
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flourishing along the Senegal River and north along the trans-Saharan trade route was
monopolized by European traders. This economic consideration was “associated with the growth
of French trade on the Senegal since the first half of the seventeenth century. By controlling the
entrepôts for the gum trade on the Senegal he could offset the control of the Hassan over the trade
to the ports of the Saharan coast” (Levtzion 2008a, 200). If trade in the north was disrupted and
security was lacking due to the fragmentary nature of the northwestern Atlantic Sahara, Nasr alDin’s goal was to gain control and impose social order. Additionally, Nasr a-Din not only
“wanted the Black riverine and savanna peoples to embrace a stricter, more rigorous adherence to
Islamic principles” but also sought a more pious order among the Hassani population who were
not considered faithful to Islam (Webb Jr. 1995a, 32).
Norris, in his impressive The Arab Conquest of the Western Sahara, writes that many of
the stories, especially those of the War of Shar Bouba War were derived from hagiographical
sources. He describes some of the accounts by ancient Arabic historiographers of the Western
Sahara as common folk tales because there are no external historical sources to confirm or deny
them. These accounts are frequently written in commemoration of saintly figures.

In his book

Norris relates that even before the age of Al-Mansur and the Alawite Dynasty, the Banu Hassan
(as a giant sub-tribe of the Maqil Arabs) had begun their conquest of the Western Sahara as they
marched west toward the coast. Commenting on the 1506 work of Valentin Fernandes145, Norris
states that the “Mountain of Kedyet Ijjel, near Tiris and close to a salt mine that [sic] was later
controlled by the Kuntah146, was a bastion of the Saharan Lamtunah147. ‘The kings of this
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Valentin Fernandes, a German printer who worked in Lisbon from 1495 to 1513 compiled several works on Africa
and published them in 1506.
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“The Kunta were probably formed in the ninth/fifteenth or tenth/sixteenth century, in the north-western Sahara
between the Adrar and the Sagiya al-Hamra… the Kunta divided into two branches, one of which remained in the west,
eventually moving to the central western Sahara and the south-western Sahara, while the other moved to the east
towards the central Sahara, and then south to the Azawad, north of the Niger bend, early in the twelfth/eighteenth
century.” Whitcomb, “New Evidence on the Origins of the Kunta,” 1975,105.
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mountain, as all the population, are Aznages. They are the great enemies of the Arabs” (Norris
1986, 35). Norris suggests that these ‘Arabs’ effectively subjugated the Lamtuna, who had “little
choice but to go south or to make peace with the Hassanis” and were the Awlad Hassan (Ibid.,
35).
Nasr al-Din began his jihad in the southern fringes of modern-day Mauritania in 1664.
His forces were able to gain the upper hand at first and defeat the black forces of the Senegal.
From the Senegal, al-Din moved northeast against the Hassani tribe. He met the Hassani warriors
in three battles for control of key commercial centers. However, Babba,148 one of the tributaries,
called upon the aid of Hadi,149 chief of the Trarza, one of the Hassani tribes, to counter the al-Din
threat. Tradition would characterize these engagements as the Shar Bouba War. Mulero Clemente
writes that the Hassani invaders had “finally triumphed” over the Zawaya Berbers because the
former “were supported by the Sultans of the Maghreb and ended up founding the Takuler150
Empire”151 (1945, 79). This account has been described in one of Shaykh Baba’s poems but
Norris speculates that the 30-year war probably refers to al-Din’s lifetime and the “the imposition
of the Hassani” over “other groups in the south-west of Mauritania” (Norris 1986, 36). The battle
of 1674 at Tin Yedfad proved disastrous for the Lamtuna and Tashumsha Berbers.
These southern Sanhaja Berbers were decisively defeated in this third battle at the hands
of a more experienced group of nomadic Arab warriors. The remnants of the Sanhaja were no
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Written here as Lamtuna are a Sanhaja sub-tribe. See Chapter 3, page 4, footnote 61.
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The name of the tributary tribe of the Tashidbit Lamtuna
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Shaykh al-Qadi Muhammad ibn Mahmud Babba (or Baba) had asked for the help of the Hassani Banu Maghfar
Prince of Trarza (or Trarzah), Hadi Ibn Ahmad Ibn Daman. Norris, The Arab Conquest of the Arab Western Sahara, 35
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The Takuler (Sp.) Empire refers to the founding of the Tukulor (Fr. Toucouleur) Muslim theocracy in 1854 in the
Senegambia.
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Taken from the Spanish and translated by the author, “al fin triunfaron los invasores [Hassan] que estaban apoyados
por los Sultanes del Mogreb y que acabaron fundando el imperio Takuler in Manuel Mulero Clemente, Los Territorios
Españoles del Sahara y Sus Grupos Nómadas (Las Palmas de Gran Canaria, Spain: ‘El Siglo’ de Sánchez Talavera,
1945), 79.
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longer allowed to raise arms. They were forced to pay tribute again for protection, “renounced all
pretensions to…military and political” authority; remained as ulama, which deepened their
spiritual militancy; and were obliged to give the milk from their herds and water from the wells to
the warrior Hassani (Levtzion 2008a, 201). The Berbers became Zenaga (a derivative of Sanhaja),
tributaries of the Arabs by peace treaty (Pazzanita 2006, 385). Even before end of the sixteenth
century, the Awlad Hassan had already permeated much of Berber society in the southwestern
Sahara. Lamtuna remnants had been nominally subject to the Peul152 of the Trarza until 1638 and
were largely repressed by several Hassani tribes—leading to military resistance. “Several of the
Zwaya leaders had married into Hassani families, and even when the conflict was at its most
bitter…certain tribes remained aloof from the war” (Norris 1986, 37-38). At the same time, the
Sultans of Morocco became active in support of the Mauritanian Emirates. Appeals to the Sultan
by the Hassani and the aid that was given to the Arab armies helped forge an alliance in 1678
between Moulay Hassan who “received the submission of many of the tribes of Awlad Hassan in
the entire Western Sahara” (Ibid., 39).
The identity of the southern Sanhaja tribes was transformed from ‘warrior’ to clerical and
lost an essential link to the modern Sahrawi. Much of their population was absorbed by the Arab.
The decline of the Sanhaja Berber in the deep southwestern Sahara coincided with the rise of the
Alawite Dynasty in southern Morocco. Subsequently, the Banu Hassan merged with the Sanhaja
to form a tribe led by Sidi Ahmad Erguibi. The tribe of the Reguibayt153 is sometimes called
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Lower Senegal in the 14th century” into the Niger River Bend. They established an Empire that is now known as the
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Presently “the most numerous and influential tribe of the Western Sahara,” having “many fractions and subfractions and which is thought to be of predominantly Sanhaja Berber extraction” are found throughout northwest
Africa. Pazzanita describes the Reguibayt as the “largest component of the Sahrawi nationalist movement” assisting the
POLISARIO in the 1970s and well into the early 21st century “by virtue of the sheer numbers as well as their
traditionally independent attitude and warlike history.” Historical Dictionary of the Western Sahara, 363-367.
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Tekna in the Sequiet el-Hamra region. This merger also created and adapted the Arabic
Hassaniya dialect of the present-day Sahrawi people, supplanting the Sanhaja Berber dialect. The
Sanhaja Berber become linguistically disconnected from modern Sahrawi speakers and displaced
geographically from the Western Sahara. The only remnants of the southern Sanhaja (Zenaga)
survive in southwestern Mauritania and the Senegal154. Their connections to the Sahrawi today
remain unconvincing. Thereafter, the Hassani tribes become dominant south of Morocco. Despite
being poor “and thus mobile and with nothing to lose,” these Hassaniya tribes ruled the desert,
possessed a “superior vitality” through desert warfare, adapting to the desert way of life (Mercer
1976, 500). Still, although these Hassaniya Arabo-Berbers (Tekna) of the Sahara were mostly free
along the littoral desert, these primary descendants of the Western Sahara remained divided
among tribal affiliations. The divisions make it difficult to link them directly to the Sahrawi
unless the claims include all tribes of the Western Sahara who at one point or another settled and
traversed the region. However, such claims prove even more daunting.

The Alawite Sultanate 1669 — 1757: Contentious Concepts of Identity and Territoriality
Despite intermittent cohesiveness along the northwestern Atlantic coast of Morocco, many of the
ruling factions were rivals. Until al-Mansur’s reign, all were incapable of fending off European
incursions, Moorish155 exiles from Iberia and the gradual intervention of the Ottoman Turks. In
addition, the research indicates that the socio-political history in this area of the world
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Today, Sanhaja of the northern stream still exist in small pockets of the Rif in northern Morocco and in parts of the
Middle Atlas Mountains in eastern Morocco.
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Moor is the term derived from Latin that denotes the mostly Muslim population that lived on the Iberian Peninsula
before the Spanish Reconquista and then fled across the Mediterranean to present-day Mauritania, the Western Sahara,
and Morocco. According to C.C. Stewart, “the appellation…has been applied at various times to Muslim peoples from
Andalusia to the Senegal basin” where they eventually mixed with Berber, Black, and Arab tribes. “Political Authority
and Social Stratification in Mauritania,” in Ernest Gellner and Charles Micaud, eds., Arabs and Berbers: From Tribe to
Nation in North Africa (London: Duckworth and Co.) 1973, 377.
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Figure 4.6: Morocco in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries
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Charles-André Julien, History of North Africa—Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco: From the Arab Conquest to 1830,
Translated by John Petrie, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul), 1970, 231.
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has been concerned with the nature of trade, alliances, and the power of the Sultans and monarchs
of the Iberian Peninsula. Discoveries made at this time were also prominent in the journals of
these adventurers157 but there is little account of the population in the northwest and western
coasts of North Africa that led into the western Sahara. Much of the region’s history remains in
parchments (i.e., Timbuktu), stored in personal libraries, which have not been thoroughly
investigated. Several stories that have been related here have been documented by sources tied to
oral tradition. The lack of textual history notwithstanding, tradition and documented history have
shown that there is ample evidence to suggest that there was never a controlled group nor one
authoritative dynasty or empire that had control of this area for much more than fifty years.
Additionally, although many of the Arab tribes asked for aid and some submitted to the authority
of the Moroccan Sultanate, these were nominal at best. Evidence suggests that the Saharan tribes
probably recognized the Sultan’s spiritual authority but not his temporal—political and
territorial—authority.
Still, inadequate or incomplete as it may seem, the research still provides some history
that describes the problems associated with recognition of authority by the communities outside
of the purview of the Moroccan Sultanates. In fact, Sufi orders (or zawiyas) competed against
each other for power and influence in sites opposed to the dismembered Sa’adian Empire: “the
Dala’iyya in the Middle Atlas, the Samlaliyya in the Sous valley, and the Arab tribesmen in the
Atlantic littoral led by al-‘Ayyashi” (Bouasria 2015, 54). Moreover, between 1640 and 1686,
there were Sultans all in the principal cities of Marrakesh, Fes, Meknes, Tetuan in the north (see
map 4.7 above), and the Sous Valley in the south vying for the unification of Morocco. Finally, in
1664, Moulay Rashid defeated his brother Muhammad al-Sharif and within ten years was able to
consolidate power throughout most of Morocco. Moulay Rashid is considered the founder of the
second Sharifian reign in Morocco—the Alawite Dynasty. By 1673, his son, Moulay Ismail, had
157
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taken over and established law and order throughout most of Morocco through brutal means. He
implemented a new, systematic manner of militarization; he adopted a Negro army called the
‘Abid or black regiments composed of either formally or soon to be freed slaves.
Throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth ‘Alawite’ centuries, control by the Sultans
was, for the most part, taken by force and almost never by acquiescence of the population or
diplomatic means. For example, Moulay Ismail, “Sultan of Fez…of the Gharb, the Rif, and the
Taza region,” was able to control the Sous, not through any negotiated terms but “at the point of
the sword” (Julien 1970, 248).

Rebellion was common and the Sultan had to campaign

throughout the southern ‘territories’ of Morocco between 1672 and 1687. He not only vanquished
enemy leaders in Marrakesh, Fes, Taruouant, Tadla, in Dila, and other provinces in the north, but
also massacred the population of entire cities such as Taroudant in March 1687. García-Arenal
and De Bunes wrote that although "the policy of Moulay Isma’il [was] aimed at creating stable
borders in his kingdom," especially in the east versus Algiers, he was more capable at 'preaching'
a 'holy war' “against the occupying Christians of the coastal cities of his kingdom" in the south158
(1992, 141). In spite of the relative consolidation of Moroccan lands, Abun-Nasr admits that
even after Moulay Ismail’s death:
Morocco had no stable bureaucracy or recognized representative bodies that
could ensure continuity in the government of the country…the existence of
effective government depended on a new sultan’s ability to develop the military
means of having his authority obeyed…Consequently the discordant tribal
constitutions of the society and the strong local particularisms plunged the
country into continuous political strife and led sometimes to chaos (1987, 231).
It is at this point that a new political concept developed in Morocco: bilad al-siba (the
lands of no authority) and the bilad al-makhzen (the lands of government). This dichotomous
political idea implied that although the sultans were absolute rulers, they still only controlled part
158
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of Morocco. In addition, the ‘Sudanic’ or southern Saharan lands that stretched to Timbuktu had
already reneged on acknowledging the Alawi Sultan. When Moulay Rashid “was proclaimed
sultan in Fez as the first ruler of the ‘Alawi Dynasty,” the bilad al-makhzen was a realm described
by Levtzion as “land effectively controlled by the central authority and, under the influence of the
towns, integrated into the social and economic texture of the sultanate” (2008, 156, 147). The
bilad al-siba were “the lands…in practice, independent, but in theory, part of the sultan’s
dominions temporarily in secession” (Ibid., 147). Hodges, in describing the reign of Moulay
Ismail159 (1672—1727), states that the Moors used the term trab el-beidan, for “the land of the
‘whites’ ” (1983, 9). The Moors, who paradoxically were of mixed origin, designated much of
the ‘western’ Sahara as the trab el-beidan including the territory “from the Dra’a River in the
north to the banks of the Senegal and the bend of the Niger, and from the Atlantic seaboard to a
series of almost impenetrable dune zones…in what is now eastern Mauritania” (ibid., 8-9).
This large territory was actually in flux as the Moroccan Sultan made several attempts to
control these dominions. Moulay Ismail attempted to subdue the tribes outside his influence but
primarily came away with slaves, mostly black that were, in turn, set apart and integrated into his
growing ‘Abid army. He sent forces to Trarza (1672), led an expedition in 1679 south of the
Sous, to the Adrar, and made other incursions to settle disputes among his allies or against
enemies (ibid., 29). However, his allies only nominally accepted the Sultan’s suzerainty in order
to reinforce their own power and his expeditions were relatively short and irregular. Moreover,
the acquisition of so many slaves depleted the southern oases of their agricultural manpower and
decimated the sustenance “in the environs of the cities” (Laroui 1977, 274). The Sultanate seems
to have had no overriding long-term “impact at all on the region now constituting Western
Sahara” (Hodges1983, 30). By 1740, the ruling pashas in Timbuktu were forced to pay tribute to
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“whose mother was a black Saharan slave.” Hodges, Western Sahara: Roots of a Desert War, 29.
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the Tuareg. Consequently, by the time of Moulay Ismail’s death (1727), tribal rivalry renewed
and a state of anarchy reigned in the southern territories of Morocco for the next thirty years.
The inability of the sultans to consolidate power (which was intermittent and based on
force) among the Berbers in the mountains, the Arab tribes of the plains, and the zawaya160
brotherhoods, “whose power had increased in the course of the holy wars against European
aggression on the Moroccan coast in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries,” allowed for “the
decline of central authority” (Levtzion 2008, 147). Hodges wrote that “the sultans’ chances of
maintaining direct contact with the trab el-beidan vanished as the regions to its immediate north,
the Noun, the Anti-Atlas and the southern Souss [Sus], reverted to their old status as part of the
bilad as-siba” (Hodges 1983, 30). Dunn, examining the expansion of a Berber-speaking tribe
called the Ait Atta or “people of Atta,” originating in the “pre-Saharan belt just south of the
central High161 Atlas” in the Tafilalet region, writes that the Sultan ignored this expansion as well
as “populations lying directly in its path” (1973, 99). Dunn also reiterates Hodges’ comments on
the lack of Sultanate military expeditions south of the High Atlas Mountains. He further describes
how “no Sultan succeeded regularly in collecting taxes or calling up military contingents south of
the High Atlas” (ibid.). However, he does contrast this argument by stating that:
Despite the absence of real political authority, the Sultan did claim sovereignty
over the entire western Sahara as amir al-mu’minin, or head of the Muslim
community…by issuing seals and letters of investiture to local leaders and by
mediating…disputes.162 Thus, local leaders sought association with the Sultan
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The High Atlas Mountains compose the highest mountain peaks of the Atlas Mountain range. This section is located
in south central Morocco. Directly south of the westernmost High Atlas lays the Sous River Basin. The southernmost
Atlas section of peaks is labeled as the Anti-Atlas Mountains. The Dra’a River Valley runs parallel to the latter section
and, along with the Sus, had been in continuous dispute for centuries over the control of these regions. South of these
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the Kingdom of Morocco.
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through political investiture… and disputing families, villages, and even tribes
sent their cases to the Sultan or makhzan judges for adjudication (ibid.).
This is a debate that is rooted in the fusion of Islam over both the public and private dimensions
of civil society. The Sahrawi are predominantly Muslim followers even outside the frontiers of
Western Sahara proper in the camps around Tindouf, Algeria. However, based on over 25
interviews conducted in their ‘refugee’ camps in Rabouni, Smara, and Laayoune, the leading
political and intellectual leaders of these communities have expressed openness to other faiths.
They do not seem to center their national aspirations on religious governance but rather in
political or temporal authority based in part on territorial sovereignty—the claim over the
Western Sahara.
This divide has been of such importance that it was addressed at the International Court
of Justice’s (ICJ) proceedings concerning the Western Sahara in 1975. For example, the Alawite
Empire was considered a Sharifian Empire because of its religious ties to the Prophet
Mohammed. In presenting evidence to the ICJ, Morocco actually asked that the Court take into
account the ‘special’ status of the “Sharifian State,” based on the rule of international law that
“requires the structure of a State to follow any particular pattern, as is evident from the diversity
of the forms of State found in the world today” (ICJ 1975, 43-44). Morocco argued that the
Sharifian State “consisted in the fact that it was founded on the common religious bond of Islam
existing among the peoples and on the allegiance of various tribes to the Sultan, through their
caids or sheikhs, rather than on the notion of territory” (ibid., 44). The Moroccan state pressed
for the Advisory Panel to take note of the “special forms in which its exercise of sovereignty
may…have expressed itself” (ibid., 44). This interpretation of national identity associated with
recognition of a supreme authority such as the sultan is difficult to challenge. For instance,
primordialism does allow for such a development because primordial bonds rely on objectified
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points of nationality that include religion, in this case Islam. Moreover, Morocco stated when
presenting their case before the ICJ that:
“bled makhzen and bled siba [sic], merely described two types of relationship
between the Moroccan local authorities and the central power, not a territorial
separation; and that the existence of these different types did not affect the unity
of Morocco. Because of a common cultural heritage, the spiritual authority of the
Sultan was always accepted…Thus the difference…did not reflect a wish to
challenge the existence of the central power so much as the conditions for the
exercise of power” (ibid., 44).
Yet, these interpretations of the bilad al-makhzen and bilad al-siba were made almost
three hundred years later. For despite the Moroccan claim, it would be difficult to ascertain if, in
fact, the sultans of the age and the local caids163 or sheikhs actually agreed with these types of
interpretive arguments. What is certain is that there was such devolution of power that it allowed
for free localized rule. Accordingly, if such claims are to be accepted then nationhood is based on
the influence that was bestowed through others, namely other local chieftains. This might indicate
that the proper approach to understanding this type of nation building is instrumentalism.
Instrumentalism considers national identity through rational means and socio-institutional
practicality. For example, the sultan’s rule, as determined by the Moroccan claim (in 1975), was
of political behavior for governmental expediency. One may argue that the manner in which the
Sultanate took shape was based on economic advantages—the Trans-Saharan trade routes—but it
was primarily focused on spiritual authority—a more cultural explanation of nationhood. The
political reality of the period fused not only an elitist (Sultanic) process of governance—
instrumentalism—but also Islam (already in place at the grass-roots level), a cultural, primordial
characteristic of group cohesion, to produce a distinct mode of power and of course national
identity.
Still, the POLISARIO does not consider this the appropriate interpretation because of the
vagueness of the sultan’s rule at the time. The POLISARIO insists that once they do establish a
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socio-governmental framework in the Western Sahara, their constitution would be open to all
faiths. Yet, from first hand observation, it seems difficult to imagine how a Christian or Jewish
convert would fare in camps where the population is predominantly Muslim. In truth, the
POLISARIO have a point in maintaining that ‘spiritual influence’ is not a valid consideration of
authority because of its subjective connotations. It is one reason why the POLISARIO and
SADR164 have not grounded their social and political objectives in Islam. Currently, religion has
been treated as a private matter, not to be enforced from above (Zunes 1988, 149). The issue of
spiritual sovereignty is usually a topic debated among theologians as it relates to a Creator Being.
However, this issue has become prominent among Middle Eastern states because of the influence
of religious-leaning political parties and terrorist movements desiring to install ‘Islamist States’ or
Caliphates. After all, the Kingdom of Morocco, although one of the more secular-leaning
countries of the Middles East, is still ruled by a King who claims ties of sacred descent to the
Prophet Muhammad. These religious claims necessitate a closer interpretation through the
theoretical approaches of identity, which will be discussed in a later chapter.
The Central Question of this section asked if the origins of Sahrawi identity lie within
this period. And if so, in what form did it materialize? If Sahrawi national identity began here,
then it would still prove difficult to ascertain due to the huge flux of tribal rivalries challenging
the power bases of the imperial cities and their sultans in Fes, Marrakesh and south into the
Tafilalet region. More importantly, the northern part of Western Sahara proper, the Sequiet elHamra, was open to a disparity of cross migration and inconsistent suitors for power. This area
included the northern belt of the Sequiet el-Hamra and the Oued Dra’a and Sous River Valleys,
which currently compose the southern provinces of Morocco. Moreover, the consolidation of
power involved not only politico-tribal dominance supported by physical force but also socio-
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religious influence through the zawiyas led by the sharifs. Of course, the most important region is
the actual territory of what is today the Western Sahara. More constructivist approaches argue
that the encroachment of colonial powers into west and northwestern Africa generated resistance
from those long-since arrived established. Yet, the only evidence of ‘colonial’ resistance was as a
result of the Portuguese crown’s insisting that the sultans send an emissary to conclude
negotiations over commercial outposts along their Moroccan coastline. This produced a staggered
union of tribes joined in the ouster of the Portuguese by 1524. This aggression was inconsistent,
varied, and primarily forged by the use of religious flag-waving against infidels. Monotheistic
Islam did change the faith among Saharan Berbers; however, it did not profoundly change their
lifestyle. Zunes explains, in his serious study of the internal governing structure of the Sahrawis
that Islam did not coalesce religious and civil affairs as it did in almost all Arab countries. His
interviews conducted with Sahrawis across different sectors of society demonstrated that they
emphasized “the difference between true Islam (the message of the Prophet Muhammad) and the
cultural traditions of societies which adopted Islam as an official religion” (Zunes 1988, 149).
According to Zunes, the Sahrawis “have never known an emir or imam…were never under direct
Ottoman rule,” and thus Islam never became their ‘state’ religion (ibid.). In addition, at this time,
Europeans never did gain a proper foothold in the Western Sahara.
This section demonstrates that a more organized political society among the Western
Saharans developed because the sovereign entities ruling the area in this period became stronger
and their control of territory expanded. Although there were many sultans and numerous tribal
fiefdoms sprang up at one time, the geographical scope of the region had already diverged and
produced independent histories north and south of the Western Sahara. In the most crucial of
sectors such as the Sequiet el-Hamra and the Sous River Valley, questions remained until the
emergence of the late Alawite Sultans as to who controlled these areas. Despite the unclear
interpretation of dominion over these disputed areas north of the Western Sahara and the
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inconsistent uprisings against foreign intrusion during this period, no definitive origin for a
Sahrawi nation stands out. In fact, Sahrawi identity remains difficult to establish.
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V. SAHARAN HISTORY: SEARCHING FOR SAHRAWI ORIGINS FROM 1758 –1859
This period from 1758 until 1859 features the diplomatic peak of Moroccan and Spanish
diplomacy over commerce and territory in contested areas of Morocco. This section extends the
socio-historical analysis of the period in the western and southwestern Maghreb region (including
Mauritania, Western Sahara proper, and Morocco), and provides insight to Sahrawi claims of
separateness during this historical period. This chapter seeks evidence that sustains the primordial
argument that the origins of the Sahrawi as a distinctive national people begin in this historical
period. The chapter then examines the possibility that the origins of Sahrawi national
consciousness developed from the social constructs of the region's socio-political environment (a
combined primordial and instrumental approach). The argument proposes that Sahrawi national
identity began to emerge at this historical juncture when local agents began to react to historical
developments in a way that allowed Sahrawi nationalism to emerge. Finally, the chapter
considers pure instrumentalism: A national identity that is created, manipulated, or embellished
directly, subtly, or indirectly by ‘ethnic entrepreneurs’ for solely economic or political objectives.
The continuing central question remains: do the origins of Sahrawi identity lie within this period,
and through what socio-political mechanisms does it materialize?
The primordial notion, continues to be relevant to this chapter even though the analysis
begins in the eighteenth century. Still, problems recur about the modern interpretation of national
identity. Primordialism seeks origins of identity in the historical past but it is not a popular
concept today. It also identifies national characteristics of identity within objective ethnic or
cultural parameters. However, there is no standard point of origin for national identification
because it is contingent upon the group in question. Because one not only lives in the modern
world, but also reads and studies modern scholarship, the more inclusive, constructivist approach
to nationality has prevailed. Constructivists argue that the emergence of national identity is
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arbitrary and subjective in selecting a point of origin, and discuss the interaction of structural
realities and the agency of ambitious politicians or nation-builders to select any point of origin.
Constructivism also conforms to the dictates of our modern age in that it enhances our
understanding of identity politics by fusing instrumentalism and primordialism—two streams of
thought that some suggest are largely dated and unpopular.
Despite its scholarly unpopularity, it is not an easy task to dismiss primordial concepts.
This segment in history is still being studied, revised, and re-told. In addition, countries continue
to form based on nationalities seeking autonomy, secession165 or outright independence. Several
collectivities or minority groups within other countries or territories persist even today in seeking
more autonomy or recognition by other powers as legitimate, independent political entities (the
Palestinians, Kurds, Catalans, and the Naga as examples).

They distinguish themselves by

pointing to what they believe are objective cultural or ethnic markers. They remark on their
history.
In this chapter, the constructivist approach, where the encroachment of foreign powers
into west and northwestern Africa generated resistance and a more organized political society
among the proto-Sahrawis, will become much more significant. Constructivist explanations rely
on a more fluid understanding of the emergence of nationalities, for it allows an identity to be
approached from below. This would be the level of the common citizenry, a grass-roots level,
where arguments are made for given and objective attributes that can only be described as
affinities or attachments to family or tribe, the land, and links to tradition (custom, ancient
myths). It also allows for identity to be studied from above. It seeks explanations of nationhood
either from geo-political dynamics and circumstances that have influenced the citizens or the
manipulation either directly or indirectly from elitist or 'ethnic' entrepreneurs. After the socio-
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Secession is noted as a different category from independence because it involves seceding from a territory and
possible willingly being annexed by another territory— an irredentist form of autonomy. Instead, independence is
actively engaging in an independent country enterprise.
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historical description and commentary of the Sahrawi during this period, a critique concludes this
section.

The Sharifian Age (1758 — 1800)
The chronology below mentions numerous tribes, which only make ancestral arguments even
more convoluted. Independent tribes had taken control of the vast greater Western Sahara, south
and southwest of Morocco. This section, therefore, highlights a more concrete feature of national
identity—territory. The Sahrawi claim they have never historically submitted to any type of
territorial control. This ‘rebellious’ attitude in asserting that the Western Sahara had always
remained outside the influence of any sultan is an important part of Sahrawi national identity.
This section also underscores the precarious position of the sultans and the regional independence
of the many competing tribes not only within the fledgling ‘Moroccan Empire’ but also outside
its frontiers. If direct ancestry to the modern Sahrawi remains elusive perhaps this feature of their
identity is more apparent. In 1757, Sidi Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd Allah (1757—1790), or Sidi
Muhammad III, took the reins of power in Morocco, but had not made incursions deep into
Western Sahara proper. Julien notes in his History of North166Africa, Sidi Muhammad, as with
previous sultans, had trouble extending his power and controlling even the unruly populations
within his ‘Moroccan Empire.’ Several independencies sprang up to the south and east of the
High Atlas ‘domains’ of Morocco. Julien states that the “unsubjected zone remained very
extensive and the sultan spent a great part of his reign in putting down revolts and stemming
encroachments by the Sanhaja in the Middle Atlas” (Julien 1970, 264). These principalities had
already begun falling away from the direct control of Sultan MoulayIsmail in the late seventeenth
and early eighteenth centuries. Sidi Muhammad III’s subsequent
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Moulay is also spelled Mawlay, or Mulay in the Maghreb and Andalucía. In Morocco it refers to descendants of
Muhammad. John L Esposito, Oxford Dictionary of Islam, s.v. “Mawla,” (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).
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Maps 5.1/5.2: Comparison of Modern-Day Morocco (above) with ‘Morocco,’ in 1600 —
1822 167

167

The maps above compare of the modern state of Morocco to its nominal extent of influence in the seventeenth
through early nineteenth centuries. The map below shows its fluid ‘frontiers’ extending until the Oued Dra’a (south of
Iligh stretching northeast and then north) to its south but not to the whole of modern Western Sahara. South of the Oued
Dra’a there remained various independent tribal confederations. The maps do not show other independent tribes in the
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aggressive policies executed by his ‘Abid168 army and his alteration of the trans-Saharan trade
routes for more control dissatisfied many competing groups in the region. Sidi Muhammad had
created a new Atlantic port called Mogador (Al-Sawira)169 to serve as the entry point for trade to
the south, bypassing Sijilmasa170 and the Tafilalet region, controlled by other leaders. The city of
Mogador at the southern fringes of Morocco deprived the Sous (and its inhabitants) “of its former
maritime outlets, grew poor and ceased to be a centre [sic] of rebellion and a threat to the
authority of the makhzan171” (Julien 1970, 266). Nevertheless, the loss of control along these
trade routes172, internal volatility within the ‘Empire’ itself, and the lack of stability in Timbuktu
led to a high level of insecurity “for trans-Saharan traders” (Lydon 2009, 97). The net result of
these policies did not extend his reach south of the Sous River Valley and modern Western
Sahara remained mostly outside of the Sultan’s influence.

deep south into modern Mauritania and northern Mali. Maps adapted from C.R. Pennel, Morocco: From Empire to
Independence, eBook Edition (London: One World Publications, 2013), 14, 55.
168

‘Abid comes from the term ‘abid al-Bukhari, meaning servants of al-Bukhari, which were the Sultan’s army of
Saharan blacks recruited and sent to a special camp at Mechra’ er-Remel to propagate and their children at the age of
10 were then presented to the Sultan and trained to become fighters in his army. Encyclopedia Britannica, 15th ed., s.v.
“al-Bukhari.”
169

Mogador had also replaced the coastal commercial port of Agadir and is known today as Essaouira.

170

Sijilmasa, which had been the primary trans-Saharan trade hub (primarily for gold) for more than 650 years (757
AD to its first abandonment in the 1390s), was a stopping point for caravaners travelling southward, especially to
Timbuktu, had been reconstructed by Moulay Ismail but again was destroyed by the nomadic Ait Atta Berber tribes
moving northwest in to the Tafilalet and Dra’a Oases. James Miller, “Trading Through Islam: The Interconnections of
Sijilmasa, Ghana and the Almoravid Movement,” in Julia Clancy-Smith, ed., North Africa, Islam and the
Mediterranean World: From the Almoravids to the Algerian War, (Portland, OR: Frank Cass Publishers, 2001), 29.
171

Makhzan or Makhzen is defined as the traditional central government and in this case the central administrative
government of the Sultan of Morocco. Ernest Gellner and Charles Micaud, eds., Arabs and Berbers: From Tribe to
Nation in North Africa, London: Gerald Duckworth and Company, 1973), index page 445.
172

Despite much evidence depicting a hard to control, peripheral Morocco under Sidi Muhammad, Lydon states that
Sidi Muhammad III “ushered in a peaceful political climate favoring the expansion of international commerce.”
Ghislaine Lydon, On Trans-Saharan Trails: Islamic Law, Trade Networks, and Cross-Cultural Exchange in Nineteenth
Century Western Africa. (Los Angeles: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 99. Of all the sources used from this
period, Lydon seems to be among the few who portrays Sidi Muhammad positively in terms of improving trade in the
region.
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The infusion by imperial rivals—the Ottoman Empire encroaching from the east and
southeast of Morocco, the Spanish, French, and British infringing on Morocco’s southwestern
coasts then southward parallel to the Senegal River—along with the earlier collapse of the
Songhay Empire, and the loss of reach by Morocco over its outer dominions “increased the
margin of maneuver for regional groups” (McDougall 2012, 86). For example, a “charismatic
Sufi and powerful entrepreneur,” Shaykh Sidi al-Mukhtar bin Ahmad al-Bakkay, represented the
scholarly Kunta173 tribe which formed the main part of the Sufi Qadiriyya brotherhood174 in
western Africa (Lydon 2009, 97). By the late eighteenth century, this group (along with other
branches of the same brotherhood) controlled the main oases and therefore the caravanning traffic
from the Western Sahara to the Adrar, east to Tawdenni and the Azawad region, and south to
Timbuktu (see map 5.3). Aziz Batran labeled this ‘a holy economic empire,’ while Lydon
described the power of the Kunta as one where they “established regional order of a kind that had
not been known since the fall of Songhay” and succeeded “in filling a political vacuum in the
region” (Ibid, 98). Moreover, McDougall asserts that from the:
Late sixteenth through the late eighteenth centuries in the southern Sahara and
the Sahel can be seen as a dynamic period of both fragmentation and
recomposition, with the appearance of new power centers controlled by emerging
social groups and a proliferation of new states: …arma175 viceroyalty of

173

“The Kunta are neither a ‘tribe’ nor a confederation but rather family groupings…who have acquired a great
religious reputation, considerable wealth” … “dispersed throughout” the Sahara between the Atlantic Ocean and Niger.
Aziz A. Batran, “The Kunta, Sidi al-Mukhtar al-Kuntī, and the Office of Shaykh al-Tarīqa ’l-Qādiriyya,” in Studies in
West Islamic History, Vol 1: The Cultivators of Islam, edited by John Ralph Willis (New York: Routledge, 1979), 127.
“The great tribe of the Kunta, who are distinguished by their purer blood and by their learning above almost all the
tribes of the desert.” Heinrich Barth, Travels and Discoveries in North and Central Africa: Being a Journal of an
Expedition Undertaken under the Auspices of H.B.M.'s Government, in the years 1849-1855, Vol III (New York:
Harper and Brother Publishers, 1859), 686.
174

A powerful Sufi movement led by the Bakkay branch of the nomadic Kunta “in the early part of the seventeenth
century” would emerge “in a large region extending from the northern oasis of Tuwat, the regions of Tiris and
Zemmur, over to the Taganit and the Hawd and into present-day Senegal. Eventually, one family came to settle in the
Azawad region, to the north of Timbucktu, in the mid-seventeenth century, and shortly after, Kunta relatives would
follow.” Lydon, On Trans-Saharan Trails, 2009, 97.
175

The arma are a people of traditionally Moroccan descent from the toppling of the Songhay Empire that still survive
today in and around Timbucktu.
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Timbucktu and Jenné and the emergent Tuareg confederations that pressed upon
it from the north” (2012, 86).
This regional order outside the purview of the Moroccan Sultan, moved among the trans-Saharan
trade in salt, tobacco, slaves, camels, gum, and book manuscripts among other items. These
regional power centers would begin to revolve around confederations of tribes such as the Tekna,
Reguibayt, Kunta, Tuareg and other sub-tribes176. In addition, “embryonic supratribal” groups
would produce the independent nomadic Emirates of Trarza, Brakna, and later in the Adrar, in the
deep southwestern Sahara (see map 5.1) and south central regions of Western Sahara proper
respectively (Lydon 10; Hodges 1983, 31).
The late eighteenth century was marked by a high level of independency among several
groups. These groups had forged a tribal identity. These identities had not coalesced with, and
were separate from those of, the ‘Empire of Morocco.’ Muhammad III’s empire also was not a
homogenous political entity that was composed of several tribes and these were associated with
several ‘kingdoms’ that were themselves composed of several tribes: 1) Kingdom of Fes; 2)
Kingdom of Marrakesh (Morocco); 3) Kingdom of the Sous; 4) and at times the Royalty of
Sijilmasa. The southern tribes that were independent of these fiefdoms were composed mostly of
confederations that maintained an identity loyal to the tribe and trickled down to the clan. The
assessment at this juncture makes it difficult to isolate a confederation or tribe associated with
one of Sahrawi descent.
Lydon mentions that “the region of the western Sahara, stretching south of the Wad177 [or
Oued] Nun to the Senegal River, was now dominated by Saharans of mixed ancestry who chose
as their identity marker…the ethnonym bidan,” which will be discussed later (ibid., 10). For
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Other tribes such as the Arosien, Oulad (or Awlad, which is defined as descendants or sons of) Delim, Oulad
Tridrarim, and the Oulad Bu Sbaa also are considered Sahrawi today but are mainly of Arabic extract.
177

Wad or Wadi is a transcription of the word Oued that is used across the Middle East, in general, for the name of a
river valley. However, in the Maghreb, this term Oued is applied to a river or riverbed even if dry for most of the year.
Oued will be utilized in this work because it is more commonly found in the literature as such.
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Map 5.3: Socio-Political Environment of Northwest Africa 178

178

Map titled “Western Africa,” from Lydon, On Trans-Saharan Trails, 2009, xxiii.
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instance, The Tekna are “thought to be a product of a fusion of Lamta [Sanhaja] Berbers” and the
Beni Hassan branch of the Maqil Arab Bedouins. They had arisen to live between the southern
Anti-Atlas Mountains and the Sequiet al-Hamra (see map 5.3 as Saqiya al-Hamra’) (Pazzanita
2006, 406). The Reguibayt, the most known and influential of all tribes in the Western Sahara,
are thought to be of Sanhaja extraction as well. Its founder, Sidi Ahmed Erguibi, travelled from
Fes to the Dra’a River Valley but moved further south, inland, to escape the “depredations” of
both the Europeans, “then present on the coast,” and the Maqil Arabs (ibid, 364). The Reguibayt
became more prominent in the early nineteenth centuries and later had a “series of ghazzis” (or
tribal raids) with the rival Tadjakant tribe for the control of Tindouf179 (now part of modern-day
Algeria) (Ibid).

Moreover, Trout mentions that the Emirates that flourished in southern

Mauritania received no type of investiture from Moroccan authority and the Adrar fell into
internecine warfare in the 1740s. These areas were clearly outside of Moroccan control. Although
these regions remained free of Moroccan control, they also remained independent of each other.
Despite Sahrawi claims of Tekna or Reguibayt ancestry, there is no definitive proof. In fact, the
only possible claim is that the Sahrawi are descendants of a multitude of tribes who, at the time,
did not identify themselves as part of a great Saharan nation but to the local tribe.

Contested Treaties
European encroachment on the northwestern and western coasts of Africa had become
aggressive. By 1757, Sidi Muhammad III had rebuilt the Alawite Empire, but questions were still
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Tindouf is the Algerian city closest to the Sahrawi ‘refugee camp’ communities. It serves as the entrepôt for not
only goods and services for the Sahrawi population today, but also for international visitors such as researchers
(including the author of this work), journalists, and diplomatic officials, on their way to visit with POLISARIO/SADR
representatives. It is approximately 30km from the principal Sahrawi Rabouni ‘city’ (mostly referred to as a camp).
While the POLISARIO receives most of its visitors at this site and its governmental functions operate from this ‘camp,’
the official provisional and administrative capital for the POLISARIO government—the SADR (Sahrawi Arab
Democratic Republic)—is located inside the “liberated zone” of Western Sahara proper in Bir Lehlu. Bir Lehlu (or
Lahlou) was where the POLISARIO first established the government of the SADR. SADR, http://www.arso.org/030.htm, Text of the Proclamation of the First Government of the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic, accessed June 12,
2015, http://www.arso.org/03-1.htm, 27 February 1976.
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unanswered about the actual control of southern and southwestern frontiers. The research of the
area at this time turned to evidence of recognition to established authority either of the Sultan or
of other foreign powers in the Western Sahara. This type of information was sought in the
Spanish national archives. Preliminary research established that the Spanish Monarchy had
arranged and ratified treaties with the Kingdom of Morocco beginning in the late eighteenth
century. Even though Britain, Germany, Italy, and Portugal had begun diplomatic exchanges with
the Sultans in order to pursue commercial enterprises on the west African shores, only France and
Spain had gained enough experience to produce signed treaties. Spain would maintain and begin
colonization of the territory in question as France gained much more influence in Algeria and
south on both side of the Senegal River.
Here, these treaties are explored to establish whether or not the Moroccan sultan
controlled the territory that we now call “Western Sahara” in the late eighteenth century. It will
also verify if POLSARIO claims that the descendants of the Sahrawi were never controlled by a
Sultan are true. One of the first of these documents was the Treaty of Marrakesh, signed by
Sultan Muhammad III and on behalf of -King Charles III of Spain, the Admiral Jorge Juan y
Santacilia180 in 1767. This document, cited in the 1975 International Court of Justice (ICJ)
Advisory Opinion, became a subject of controversy surrounding its interpretation. Its words have
become an item of contention for both the POLISARIO and the Kingdom of Morocco. The
English translation of Article 18 from the Tratado de Paz con Marruecos (or Treaty of Peace with
Morocco)181 originally written in both Arabic and Spanish is as follows:
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Jorge Juan y Santacilia was a famous admiral in the Spanish Navy, who was designated by Charles III of Spain,
ambassador extraordinaire to the court of the Moroccan Sultan Muhammad III in November of 1766. Armando
Alberola Romá and Rosario Die Maculet, “El Autor: Jorge Juan Santacilia—Marino y Científico (Perfil Biográfico),”
Biblioteca
Virtual
Miguel
de
Cervantes,
accessed
June
2
2015.
http://www.cervantesvirtual.com/portales/jorge_juan_santacilia/autor_biografia/.
181

The following quote is taken from the Spanish and translated by the author: “S.M.I. [Su Majestad Imperial] se aparta
de deliverar [deliberar] sobre el establecimiento que S.M.C. [Su Majestad Católica] quiere fundar al Sur del Rio Non,
pues no puede hacerse responsable de los accidentes ò desgracias que sucedieren, à causa de no llegar allà [allá] sus
Dominios, y ser la Gente que Havita [habita] el Pais [País] errante y feròz [feroz], que siempre ha ofendido y
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His Imperial Majesty deviates from discussing on the venture that His Catholic
Majesty wants to start south of the River Non (Nun) [emphasis added], for he
cannot be held responsible for any accidents or misfortune that would occur since
his dominions do not reach there, and because the people who inhabit the
Country are fugitive and fierce, who have always offended and imprisoned the
Canarians182. From north of Santa Cruz183 (emphasis added) [,] His Imperial
Majesty grants to them [the Canary Islanders] and the Spanish fishing, without
allowing any other Nation to conduct [fishing] anywhere on the coast, which will
be left entirely for them (Convenio con Marruecos, 1767).
This passage was debated between the parties to the conflict in 1975 at the ICJ. On the one hand,
Spain has argued that their wording “constitutes a disavowal by the Sultan himself of any
pretensions to authority in that region.”184 On the other hand, Morocco’s Arabic text is worded as
follows:
His Imperial Majesty warns the inhabitants of the Canaries against any fishing
expedition to the coasts of [Oued] Noun [sic] and beyond (emphasis added). He
disclaims any responsibility for the way they may be treated by the Arabs of the
country, to whom it is difficult to apply decisions, since they have no fixed
residence, travel as they wish and pitch their tents where they choose. The
inhabitants of the Canaries are certain to be maltreated by those Arabs (Western
Sahara [ICJ] Advisory Opinion 1975, 50).
Both Morocco and Spain claim that these interpretations are authentic. Morocco insists that their
“Arabic text is the only ‘official text’ and should have preference” (Ibid). The words that I have
italicized are the most contentious of the text. They 1) They imply that the Sultan had little
demonstrable power over these areas, but 2) they indicate beyond what geographical point the
Sultan intended to give the Spaniards permission for commercial fishing. The point here is not to

apricionado [aprisionado] à los Canàrios [Canarios]. De S.ta [Santa] Cruz al Norte S.M.I. concede à estos y a los
Españoles la Pesca, sin permitir que ninguna otra Nacion [Nación] la execute [ejecute] en ninguna parte de la Costa,
que quedarà [quedará] enteramente por aquellos.” Convenio con Marruecos 28 Mayo, 1767, Tratado de Paz con
Marruecos, Estado 3372, Carpeta #11, Número 1 y 2, Archivo Histórico Nacional de España, Madrid. See ICJ English
translation in “Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion of 16 October 1975,” International Court of Justice, Reports of
Judgments, Advisory Opinions and Orders, 1975, 50.
182

Also known as Canary Islanders.

183

Spanish for Holy Cross.

184

“Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion,” 50.
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re-adjudicate a legal issue that has already been methodically treated, but to highlight the problem
of interpretation that both sides use to as markers for identity
The overriding subject of this work is national identity. However, identity or identity
politics is only a portion of the complex series of sub-themes within international affairs. The
communication of ideas, documented or undocumented, is also an important part of global
politics. At this juncture, the case introduces the communication of documentation that concerns
questions of governance. Thus, the communiqués in this chapter combine both the concept of
national identity with publicly written statements on the course of action that may lead to
answering the questions of governance—that is, which entity will govern the Western Sahara.
This is true not only for the 1767 treaty, but also for the long history of agreements
among Spain, Morocco, and other foreign powers. For example, the 1799 Treaty of Meknes
between Spain and Morocco apparently confirms the previous agreement set in the 1767 accord.
Yet, Morocco refers to their original, more ‘official,’ interpretation of the Arabic 1767 text.
Article 29 of the Meknes Treaty makes a background reference to His Moroccan Highness’
previous offer to a certain reduction of commercial tariffs “if this grace will take place, provided
that such port opens,”185 directly referring to the Barbary port of Santa Cruz (Tratado de Paz
1799). Thereafter, article 35 of the same treaty, under the title of ‘Fishing,’ reads186 that “[t]o the
inhabitants of the Canary Islands and to all classes of Spanish His Moroccan Majesty concedes
the right of fishing from the Barbary port of Santa Cruz to the North” (ibid). This reiterates the
fishing opportunities granted by the Sultan to the Spanish from Santa Cruz northward. Yet, article
185

Taken from the Spanish and translated by the author: “Hallándose cerrado en el dia [día] el puerto de Santa Cruz de
Berbería, no puede tener efecto la oferta que S. M. [Su Majestad] Marroquí tiene hecha anteriormente á la España, de
que sus vasallos disfruten la baxa de un treinta por ciento sobre los derechos que satisfacen las demás Naciones; pero sí
tendrá lugar esta gracia siempre que dicho Puerto se llegue á abrir” in “Tratado de Paz, Amistad, Navegación,
Comercio Y Pesca, entre S. M. [Su Majestad] Cat. [Católico] Y S. M. Marroquí concluido y firmado en Mequínez á 1
de Marzo de 1799,” Tratado con Marruecos, Artículo XXIX, Madrid: La Imprenta Real. Archivo Histórico Nacional
de España, Estado, Legajo 4350, No. 1 (Caja No.1).
186

Taken from the Spanish, “Á los habitantes de las islas Canarias y á toda clase de Españoles concede S. M. [Su
Majestad] Marroquí el derecho de la pesca desde el puerto de Santa Cruz de Berbería al Norte.” Ibid., artículo (article)
XXXV.
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35 in 1799 contradicts the passage from 1767. In 1799, they refer to different directions being
conceded from the point of Santa Cruz. Still, the first article of the Treaty of Meknes187 begins:
“[t]he Treaty of 1767, the Convention of 1780, and the 1785 Agreement in all that is not contrary
to the present [1799] Treaty is renewed and confirmed” (Ibid).

Overall, despite the small

contradiction, these documents seem to indicate that the Sultans were willing to give Spain
control over certain territories, either within or outside of their control, for the construction of a
port and fishing rights adjacent to Santa Cruz. These interpretive debates over the wording and
then meaning of terms in public documents stem from the translation of the treaties above.
However, meaning can also be debated over less official documentation and more so over
demographic expressions of the period. For instance, in the previous chapter, the concept of bilad
al-siba was introduced as the region of unruliness. Julien writes that after the reign of Sidi
Muhammad up until 1912, "the country was divided into two sections, the bled-makhzen, more or
less obedient to the ruler if he was a man of energy, and the bled al-siba, itself rent by tribal
rivalries but always obstinately resistant to the sultan's authority" (270). Bilad al-siba, the part of
the desert that did not fully accept the Sultan as supreme ruler, has traditionally also been known
by the expression trab al-bidan. Trab al-bidan or land of the whites, in contrast to al-sudan or land
of the Negroes, was an Arabic term that racially divided the African population. The term has
been associated with the Hassaniyya-speaking population in the Western Sahara region that
includes Mauritania, the Tarfaya Strip188 in southern Morocco, the Tindouf region in Algeria,
.
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Taken from the Spanish and translated by the author: “Se renuevan y confirman el Tratado del año de 1767, el
Convenio de 1780, y el Arreglo de 1785 en todo lo que no sea contrario al presente Tratado.” Ibid., artículo I.
188

Tarfaya Strip – At the end of the 19th century, the Scottish entrepreneur Donald Mackenzie persuaded the Governor
of Sous, Muhammad Bayruk, to cede him a strip of land on which to establish a trading post. Known as Tarfaya strip or
Cape Juby strip, (roughly three km wide and 12 km long), Mackenzie built Port Victoria, a trading post/factory, which
he managed through his own North-West Africa Company, hoping to capture a portion of the caravan trade. "'Casa del
Mar' Fortress," in Sharing History: Arab World—Europe 1815-1918, http://www.museumwnf.org/, Museum With No
Frontiers,
2015,
accessed
June
12,
2015,
http://www.sharinghistory.org/database_item.php?id=monument;AWE;ma;21;en&pageT=N.
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Map 5.4: Morocco in the Eighteenth Century 189

parts of Niger and a small strip of Mali (Lakhal et al 2006, 5; San Martin 2010, 589; Deubel190
2011, 3).
In several of the interviews, the author posed the question to many members of the
POLISARIO if they could describe what is the origin of their identity. The current representative
189

Julien, History of North Africa 1970, 268.

190

Deubel also suggests that only in Mauritania are they called Maures.
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of the SADR in Washington, DC, Yeslem Beisat, stated that they were a mix of people—Berber,
Arab, and Black—and seem to be proud of this fact.191 They also believe that part of their identity
stems from the heterogeneity of tribes and races as well as never submitting to Moroccan Sultanic
rule. For instance, Muhammed Omar, my translator and guide while interviewing the various
members of the SADR vanguard, stated that the Sahrawi knew “ni Satan ni Sultan” (neither Satan
nor Sultan).192 The development of a distinct Arabic Hassaniya dialect adds to these layers of
distinction. These layers of identity: 1) For the first time, Moroccan leaders admitting to outsiders
that they did not really control the area now known as “Western Sahara”; 2) the mixture of tribes
in the Oued Dra’a, south of the Oued Nun into the deep Sahara; 3) the rise of autonomous tribal
entities across the Nun, Sous, and Sequiet al-Hamra River valleys, separate these groups from
those living under the sovereignty of the Sultan. These distinctions seem to be part of modern
Sahrawi identity. Yet, it still proves challenging, even with these distinctions, to derive from any
one tribe, a direct line of ancestry to the Sahrawi even as we approach the nineteenth century.

The Lands of ‘Dissonance’ and of the ‘White Moors’
This section introduces the concepts of ‘bilad as-siba’ and the ‘bidan.’ Bilad as-siba added to the
growing notion that a divide was evident between those territories ruled by Morocco (bilad almakhzen) and those that were not. Bidan characterized those populations who were not of black
African origin but were ‘white.’ Despite their usage in the late eighteenth century, bilad almakhzen and bilad al-siba are still under heavy scrutiny today. Bilad al-makhzen has been
predominantly understood as the areas that were under the full control of the Sultan. What is the
significance of and why stress these groups of words now? First, these expressions have become
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Mohamed Yeslem Beisat, SADR ambassador to the United States, interview by author, Washington DC, November
11, 2013.
192

Mohammed Omar, Deputy Minister of Public Relations, interview by author in Rabouni Camp outside of Tindouf,
Algeria 02 October, 2014.
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even more relevant today as a result of more anthropological and political discussion over the
origins and composition of North African identity. The research, which is still in its infancy,
about the early origins of the Saharan population may contradict the traditional views of many
tribes who claim Arabic ancestry and direct lineage to the Prophet Muhammed. Second, as it
relates to the Western Sahara dispute, usage of the terms has been used to add and dismiss
Sahrawi national identity. Third, these concepts agree with the type of discussion at this juncture
of history because they play an important role when foreign powers begin formal colonial
administration of areas not under the Sultan’s control.
Bilad al-siba is generally accorded the definition of “land of dissonance” or autonomy
(López Bargados 2003, 598; Pazzanita 2006, 56). Despite the agreed upon meaning, Morocco
has applied al-siba to defend the annexation of the Western Sahara. Morocco will argue that
despite being administered by independent caids and where “taxes were not paid,” these
sovereigns of these lands “were appointed by royal decree” (Pazzanita, 56). The caids would be
given ‘authority’ over these peripheral territories on behalf of the Sultan of Morocco. The
Sahrawi argue that these are ambiguous claims because: 1) Many Saharan tribes travelled
between both areas of the makhzen and al-siba making the exercise of proper rule by anyone
difficult; 2) Although several independent tribes acknowledged the sultan’s spiritual authority, he
did not command temporal authority; and finally 3), Due to harsh climatic conditions “in the
territory…along with a near-total lack of” urbanization “in pre-colonial Western Sahara…in
contrast to what is now southern Morocco…a status of bilad [al]-siba, let alone bilad al-makhzen,
never existed in the Western Sahara” (ibid).
Trab al-bidan or the bidan has been described as an ‘imaginary collective’ (Ould
Mohamed 2010, 236), a region that by the turn of the nineteenth century began to take shape
identifying a divide from the ‘white’ Hassaniyya-speaking Arabs “from the neighboring regions
to north and east, where Berber languages…remained dominant” (Hodges 1983, 11). The term is
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traced to early Islamic geographers, conquerors, and European explorers. Norris confirms this
notion by writing that bidan: “Meaning ‘the whites,’ is found in quite early writings. According to
La Courbe (1685), ‘The Senegal [River] separates the Azoaghes (Zenagah), Moors or Bazanez
(Bidan), from the Blacks; so that on one side of the river are Moors, rather white than black; and
on the other, men perfectly black’” (Norris 1986, 245). Still, the term of trab al-bidan has been
discussed by many North African scholars in comparison with several other terminological
references—1) al-sib, 2) ahrar, 3) al-sudan, 4) haratin, and 5) ‘abid—for more ancient populations
that lived in northwest Africa, especially in the Sahara). These words are Arabic references that
mean the unruly (region), free one, dark one, freed slave, and servant or slave, respectively.
Terminological chaos becomes even greater with the infusion of the primary colonial
languages–Spanish and French. For example, the English term ‘Moor’ is a label that came to
designate Arabic and Berber-speaking groups who migrated from North Africa to the Iberian
Peninsula. The Spanish changed it to Moro, while the French adopted the term and changed it to
mean Maure. Yet, some scholars believe that this wording may have ancient Latin (Maurus) or
even Greek (Mauron)193 roots. Despite the nomenclature and the linguistic ambiguities, the
phrase of trab al-bidan will be used in agreement with López Bargados’ statement after
explaining these troubling nuances of group identity. He writes, “in this sense, the designation
Trab al-Bidan will include all Hassaniya speakers equally, irrespective of their status, adopting as
an index for inclusion the fluency or competency in that Arabic dialect, and not the status that
each determined social group holds”194 (López Bargados 2003, 117). One primary source that is
given for this term is an Islamic Saharan scholar, poet, and jurist from the Gibla region in what
193

This Greek form of Moor was a Roman derivative of Mauri, which was the name given to the ancient Berber
Empire of Mauretania and consequently lends its name to the modern country of Mauritania.
194

Taken from the Spanish and translated by the author: “En este sentido, la denominación Trab al-Bidan incluirá por
igual a todos los hablantes de hassaniyya, sea cual fuere su estatus, adoptando como índice de inclusión el manejo o
competencia en ese dialecto del árabe, y no el estatus que posee cada grupo social determinado.” Alberto López
Bargados, Arena Coloniales: Los Awlad Dalim ante la Colonización Franco-Española del Sáhara, Barcelona: Edicions
Bellaterra, 2003. See Chapter 3, note no. 83.
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should be present-day Mauritania, Sheikh Muhammad al-Mami (1792-1865). The Gibla region is
supposed to have been located in the Trarza195 Emirate. Among Muhammad al-Mami’s many
works, is one called Kitab al-Badiya, which is translated either as ‘Book of the Desert’ or ‘Book
of Nomadism.’ The phrase trab al-bidan is mentioned in this book and, according to a volume of
collected works published by six public universities in Madrid, it:
Is [an] expression of a Mauritanian colleague, El Hassen196, translating the
intentions of Shaykh Muhammad al-Mami as provisional space where
compliance197 with the 'urf198 is imposed, from local custom, made inevitable
given that it is, in the words of another great Saharan sage, Sheikh Sidi
Muhammad al-Kunti,199 a, I quote, ‘country without master,’ where there is
neither king nor prince, nor pious leader capable of placing the habitants from
shelter of injustice and arbitrariness”200 (Martínez Lillo et al. 2009, 216).

195

See Map 5.1.

196

El-Hassen, as a person of historical significance, remains un-sourced and unidentifiable.

197

Other translations may read “where reverence to the” or “where respect of the” urf is imposed or implemented.

198

Urf is customary law in Islam, which consists of traditional customs and practices on the local level that are not
directly based on the Quran and hadith but that still have legal weight. Before the modern era, it was largely unwritten
and not codified. Campo, Juan E., Encyclopedia of World Religions: Encyclopedia of Islam. New York, NY, USA:
Facts
On
File,
2009.
ProQuest
ebrary.
Web.
http://site.ebrary.com.ezproxy.fiu.edu/lib/FIU/reader.action?docID=10315266. Accessed 10 June 2015.
199

Shaykh Sidi Muhammad al-Kunti (1769-1826) was a Saharan scholar who between the approximate years of 1811
and 1826 had taken over “as head of the zawiya [religious order of] Qadiriyya that his father had created in the Malian
Azawad, around the wells of al-Mabruk and Bujbayba, some 300 kilometers northeast of Timbuktu.” Abdel Wedoud
Ould Cheikh states that al-Kunti left a considerable amount of writings that remain unpublished. “A Man of Letters in
Timbuktu: al-Shaykh Sidi Muhammad al-Kunti,” Chapter 15, in The Meanings of Timbuktu, eds., Shamil Jeppie and
Souleymane Bachir Diagne, Human Sciences Research Council, 2008) 238, 231, accessed January 15, 2016,
http://codesria.org/spip.php?article643 .
200

Taken from the Spanish, “expresión es de un colega mauritano, El Hassen, que traducía las intenciones de Chej
Muhammad al-Mami como espacio de la provisionalidad donde se impone el acatamiento de ‘urf, de la costumbre
local, dado que se trata, en las palabras de otra gran sabio sahariano, Chej Sidi Muhammad al-Kunti, de un, cito
textualmente, ‘país sin señor’, donde no hay rey, ni príncipe, ni jefe piadoso capaz de poner a los habitantes al abrigo
de la injusticia y de lo arbitrario.” Pedro Martínez Lillo, Silvio Arias Careaga, Caros Tanarro Alonso, Julia Weingartner
(Coords.), Oficina de Acción Solidaria y Cooperación / Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, Universidad y Sahara
Occidental: Reflexiones para la Solución de un Conflicto, Cuadernos Solidarios No.6, Spain: R.B. Servicios
Editoriales, 2009.
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“Boundaries” as a Source of Identity
The collection of works cited above is one of the few that mention these Saharan scholars because
their discovery was only made public in 1975 when it was presented as evidence to the ICJ
(Western Sahara Oral Statements [ICJ] 1982, 135 and 286).

The group that compiled the

aforementioned study stated that the discovery of the work of al-Mami has created opportunities
for debate about the political and juridical fundamentals of Saharan society. It has uncovered that
the nature of Saharan society was distinct from one in the north ruled by the Sultan. The
following describes al-Mami’s writings in the mid-nineteenth century and what it may infer about
the development of a separate Saharan society; a precursor to a possible Sahrawi collectivity. It
also will comment on the labels given to physical boundaries that today are utilized as arguments
for separateness by the Sahrawi.
The collection enumerates several points in al-Mami’s writings, which 1) “make visible a
representation that Saharan society was built on its own, breaking…” the European discursive
monopoly; 2) allows one to better reflect on the conditions of Saharan identity; and, 3) “is a
modest homage to the complexity of a social order” that has just begun to gain interest in Spain
(Martínez Lillo 2009, 216). In another work, only recently published, [al]-Mami “distinguished
himself for his geographic texts on the land, regional songs in which he declared the secular
independence of his country”201 (Mahmud Awa 2015, 4). Mahmud Awa mentions that al-Mami
“proposed formulas of government that organized and agglutinated the inhabitants of the
territory, then grouped in different tribes, in a single state”202 (ibid.).

Criado furthers the

argument by affirming this ‘independence’ and asserting that the Kitab al-Badiya “talks about the
201

Translated from the Spanish by the author: “se destacó por sus textos geográficos sobre la tierra, cantos regionales
en los que declaraba la independencia secular de su país.” Bahía Mahmud Awa, “Generaciones Literarias:
Intelectualidad y Política en el Sahara Occidental, 1850-1975,” Les Cahiers d’EMAM (Études sur le Monde Arabe et la
Méditerrané) [Online] 2015, 24-25, Sahara Occidental: Mémoires, Culture, Histoires—Culture et Politique Series,
accessed June 18 2015, http://emam.revues.org/774.
202

Translated from the Spanish by the author: “propuso fórmulas de gobierno que organizara y aglutinaran a los
habitantes del territorio, entonces agrupados en diferentes tribus, en un solo estado.” Ibid.
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life and culture of nomads and distinguishes other neighboring countries among which it cites
Chinguetti (currently Mauritania), Timbuktu (Mali), and Tichit (southern Morocco)”203 (1977,
83). Moya Fernández even affirms for al-Mami that:
“[F]or him the peculiar geographical and historical conditions of the Sahara, out
of the way from the central powers of Islam and being a predominantly nomadic
society was conditioned to self-regulate in a particular manner; having overcome
the existence of a central authority, the Sahara was defined as a land 'without
king or prince or ruler ' ”204 (2009, 86).
PHYSICAL BOUNDARIES: The fact that the ICJ accepted this newly discovered evidence is
surprising and perhaps even dangerous without sufficient scholarly review. The importance of
these expressions sourced from these Saharan scholars needs much more study. Nevertheless,
Muhammad al-Mami, as a historical person, did exist and left many works. However, the copies
of such works are scattered and found in few locations. To date, they are available only in Arabic
(with hardly any copies translated into another language) and, most worrisome of all, have
scarcely been studied. Yet, a few authors cite al-Mami and also refer to his mention of a distinct
boundary called ‘Jat al-Jaof,’ which delineated most of what is the trab al-bidan. Jat al-Jaof has
been translated as “línea de peligro o barrera del peligro” (Spanish for line of danger or barrier of
danger) (Criado 1977, 78; Moya Fernández 2009, 12). This boundary was actually presented to
the ICJ as verifiable proof by a Spanish representative in arguments against the Moroccan claim
over the Western Sahara. In it Mr. Martinez Caro (on behalf of the Spanish Government) stated
that:
The nomads' land, such defined in contrast to that of sedentary populations,
substantially coincides to the north with the historical borders of Morocco and to
203

“habla de la vida y de la cultura de los nómadas y distingue otros países vecinos entre los que cita Chingueti (actual
[Mauritania]), Tomboctú (Mali), y Tichit (sur de Marruecos).” Ramón Criado, Sahara: Pasión y Muerte de un Sueño
Colonial, Chatillon-sous-Bagneux: Imprimerie S.E.G., 1977.
204

Translated from the Spanish by the author: “[P]ara él las condiciones geográficas e históricas peculiares del Sahara,
alejado de los poderes centrales del Islam y siendo una sociedad mayoritariamente nómadas condicionaban a que se
autorregulara de forma particular; superada la existencia de una autoridad central, el Sahara se definía como tierra ‘sin
rey ni príncipe ni señor’.” Conchi Moya Fernández, Delicias Saharauis, (No Place: Bubok Publishing, 2009), 86.
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the south with the Emirate of Adrar Tmar. To the west, it reaches the Atlantic
Ocean, and to the east it would be more or less defined by that in the oral and
written traditions of Western Sahara, called Jat al-Jaof or ‘danger line’ – a kind
of border, facing the exterior, of all the nomadic tribes that used to inhabit the
territory …The Jat al-Jaof was thus a geographical as well as a political frontier,
because it would sometimes separate zones that were litigious or belonging to
tribes that were not a part of the agreement205 (ICJ 1982, 135-136).
Despite the lack of peer-review study because of its inaccessibility, a few media sources
did report on the ‘frontier’ findings. For example, when the ICJ disclosed its concluding “Western
Sahara: Oral Statements and Correspondence,” a few newspapers such as the Sahrawi bilingual
La Realidad206 (June 21 1975) and ABC, a Spanish Daily newspaper, reported that “a document
about the frontier between the Sahara and Mauritania” had been deciphered and presented at The
Hague to the ICJ (July 2 1975, 9). Thereafter, a few authors such as Criado (1977, 83) and the
Dirección General de Promoción de Sahara (1975, 24) have mentioned this geographic boundary.
Today, it has become legitimized and taken to be somewhat official proof that there was an
“independent” zone away from the rule of the Moroccan sultans because the evidence was
allowed at the ICJ. Sahrawi blogs and pro-Western Sahara websites have already appropriated
these “proofs” and used these boundaries to solidify their claims as a distinct identity, that live
separately (geographically and conceptually) from Moroccans. Modern scholars such as Mahmud
Awa (2015), Moya Fernández (2009, 87), and del Riquelme (1991, 117-118) have begun to refer
to this geographic division.
205

Translated from the French by María Antonieta García what is in italics: “La terre des nomades, ainsi définie, par
rapport à celle des sédentaires, coïncide sensiblement au nord avec les frontières historiques du Maroc et au sud avec
l'émirat de l'Adrar Tmar. A l'ouest, elle arrive jusqu'à l'océan Atlantique, et à l'est elle [sic] se trouverait plus ou moins
définie par ce que, dans les traditions orales et écrites du Sahara Occidental, on appelle le Jat al-Jaof ou "ligne de
danger" – sorte de frontière commune, face à l'extérieur, de toutes les tribus nomades qui habitaient le territoire. Cette
ligne partait, selon la tradition, des environs du cap Blanc, continuait au sud-est, en territoire aujourd’hui mauritanien,
passait un peu au nord d’Atar, de Chinguiti et de Ouadane, remontait vers le nord, traversant les puits de Turin, un peu
a l’est de l’actuelle frontière du Sahara occidental jusqu’à la sebka de Tindouf et revenait vers l’océan en suivant le
basin du Draa…Le Jat al-Jaof était ainsi une frontière aussi bien géographique que politique, car elle séparait parfois
des zones litigieuses ou qui appartenaient à des tribus qui ne faisaient pas partie de l'entente.” “Western Sahara,
Volume V, Oral Statements and Correspondence,” International Court of Justice Pleadings, Oral Arguments,
Documents, 1982.
206

Now a long-since defunct newspaper because of the political sensitivities from the Western Saharan conflict.
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LITERARY BOUNDARIES: The ‘first golden age’ of Saharan scholarship,207 which included alMami’s works, arose in the eighteenth century and lasted until the early nineteenth century
(Dirección General de Promoción de Sahara 1975, 13). These investigators and a few other
scholars speak of this golden age developing in the Tiris region of the Sahara. Today, the Tiris (a
mostly desert plain of the northwest Sahara; refer to map 5.5 below) region is divided among
three areas: 1) the Tiris al-Gharbiyya or Western Tiris in Western Sahara proper; 2) a small sliver
of the Western Tiris that is now part of what is named by the POLISARIO as the ‘liberated’ or
‘free’ zone of the Western Sahara; and 3) the Mauritanian province of Tiris Zemmour. These
Saharan works of poets, historians, and theologians flourished at a time when Europeans began to
re-establish more commercial and political exchanges, because of more active exploration in west
and northwest Africa. Muhammad al-Mami wrote a book titled Kitab al-Badia (Book of the
Nomad). It is an account of the nomadic independence of tribes within the trab al-bidan
demarcated by the Jat al-Jaof. A few pro-Sahrawi scholars to point to al-Mami’s Kitab as proof
that the ‘nomadic independence’ of tribes is a key distinction to their identity.
The problem with these claims by those who have actually viewed the Kitab al-Badia is
the issue of hermeneutics. For example, Mauritania had presented al-Mami’s work in order to
augment their claim to parts of the Western Sahara. Spain had submitted oral arguments to the
contrary, interpreting the Kitab’s descriptions as tribes independent from any authority. Morocco
maintained: “that to better interpret the original agreement we must talk about 'domain' and not of
'sovereignty,' which has led advocates of the Moroccan thesis to maintain that the Sultan always
had sovereignty over the Saharan lands that Spain would later occupy, although not necessarily

207

The ‘golden age’ of Saharan scholarship is referred to the works of Al-Mami and al-Kunti in the eighteenth century
in the fields of history, literature, poetry, and science.
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Map 5.5: Principal Regions of the Western Sahara

its domain”209 (Algueró Cuervo 2006, 45).

208

Thus, despite Muhammad al-Mami’s ‘Tirisian’

account, Morocco will insist that the Sultan still had ‘dominion’ over these territories.

208

Map adapted from Caro Baroja, Estudios Saharianos (Madrid: Calamar Ediciónes, 2008), 68-69.
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The question then becomes defining what is dominion? How did the Alawite Kingdom
announce the extent of its power to its external ‘desert provinces’? Were there tribal agreements
made with the Sultan as to the recognition of his authority in the trab al-bidan? Perhaps there
were inter-tribal accords made to acknowledge the Sultan on his behalf? How did Morocco
exactly delimit their domains? Did they use geographical landmarks for physical boundaries?
How does one go about placing landmarks in a desert? These questions are difficult to answer
because more study is needed to evaluate these ‘desert chronicles.’ The issue over territorial
control is a much older problem than depicted here in this chapter and adds to the historical claim
of separateness from Morocco. Even though historical territorial control may not be central to
Sahrawi distinctiveness, it is an important part of their identity.’

Saharan History as Identity: Tribal Independence
Difficulties arise in the search for historical accounts about the Sahrawi at the latter end
of the eighteenth century. The literature, excepting a few a works, centers on Moroccan
descriptions of history. Scholars on both sides of the conflict usually cite the treaties Marrakesh
(1767) and Meknes (1799) and the problems therein, but then ‘jump’ to 1830 or beyond. My
research has been able to uncover some forms of historical data in French and Spanish, but
because of the limited knowledge of Arabic many works within this period—the first golden age
of Saharan scholarship—are unavailable. Despite these obstacles, the following sketch is an
attempt to find links to a Sahrawi ‘past.’ This section reveals that south of the Moroccan sphere of
influence there was an area of Saharan society that developed independently. It details how tribes
already independent, rebelled, ignored, or passively recognized the Sultan. It also demonstrates

209

Translated from the Spanish by the author: “que para bien interpretar el original del acuerdo hay que hablar de
‘dominio’ y no de ‘soberanía,’ lo que ha dado pie a los defensores de la tesis marroquíes a mantener que el sultán
siempre tuvo la soberanía sobre las tierras saharianas que luego ocuparía España, aunque no necesariamente el
dominio.” Algueró Cuervo, El Sahara y España: Claves de una Descolonización Pendiente (Las Palmas de Gran
Canaria: Ediciones IDEA, 2006), 45.
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how tribes of the greater Western Sahara ran their own affairs, traded, and warred with each other
without consulting the Sultan of Morocco. The following recounts an independent historical
tradition that the Sahrawi claim as separate to Moroccan history in the late eighteenth and early
nineteenth centuries.
Morocco had claimed, even before this period of history, lands to the greater southern
areas of the Sahara and the littoral coast of the Western Sahara. Yet, at several historical
junctures, including this one, Morocco had trouble keeping itself together as a political entity.
Unrest had begun because many of Sidi Muhammad’s black armies were forced in 1775-1776 to
divide, were sent to different parts of the Moroccan region. They became dissatisfied, and
rebelled against the Sultan. It is important to note that the power of the Sultan depended largely
on his armies to carry out conquests, implement order, and exert influence. The ‘abid contingents
had once been a monolithic group that exhibited loyalty only to the Sultan. However, the new,
more urban army had developed a strong sense of entitlement and had become split among rival
political leaders. These local rivals had, for some time, begun to integrate Arab and Berber
recruits into their local militias. The ‘abid armies grew resentful of these changes. Subsequent
revolts by these black armies and local insurrections kept most of ‘Morocco’ under subtle
turmoil.
Certain regions and tribes highlight the pattern of the lost Saharan history beginning in
the latter half of the eighteenth century through about the 1850s. Much of what today is
considered Western Sahara proper was devoid of direct control between the 1750s and 1820s.
Despite some tribes recognizing the Sultan’s spiritual authority, many Saharan qabila
(confederations of tribes) actively governed their own affairs and pursued their own interests—in
grazing and trade. Sidi Muhammad’s death gave the seat of ‘Morocco’ to his son al-Yazid. Two
years of relative unruliness marked al-Yazid’s short reign. Yet, well before the beginning of the
nineteenth century, the Western Sahara had developed its own historical record of events
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independent of the makhzen government of the ‘Moroccan Empire.’ Damis argues that in these
“areas of dissidence, tribes would accept the Sultan’s suzerainty but refused to submit to central
administrative control” (1983, 20). One of these regions lies between the Oued Nun, including
the Oued Dra’a, and north to the Sous River Valleys. In summary, Damis states that: “During the
periods of central weakness or instability, tribes near the periphery would rise up in revolt,
enlarging the siba lands and encroaching on the area under the sultan’s control. At the same time,
there were tribes that submitted partly to central control, thus forming areas of semi dissidence. A
tribe in the middle ground might receive the sultan’s officials and obey their directives but refuse
to pay taxes” (ibid).
Trout recounts that, “around 1765, most of the Tekna confederation found near the mouth
of the Oued Draa broke away from Moroccan control” (1969, 143). The Tekna were described
above as a tribal confederation but Lydon writes, “many [of his] informants explained that the
Tikna [sic] formed a national entity (emphasis added) rather than a ‘tribal’ or even ethnic one”
(2009, 174). They had briefly developed an autonomous principality in the city of Tazeroualt,
whose main port was Masa, until Moulay Rashid took control of the city (Pazzanita 2006, 40607). Much later and relevant to this period, a branch of the Tekna, the Ait Moussa ou Ali arose to
create another smaller independent Oued Nun princedom, “centered upon the trading town of
Goulimine” (or Guelmim210) (Trout 1969, 143). Other sources state that Tazeroualt resurfaced
again “constituting a virtually independent maraboutic211 principality until the late 19th century”
(ibid.; Schroeter, 2015). In fact, Trout broadens the geographical scope of Moroccan non-rule by
writing: “Farther to the east, along the upper course of the oued Dra [sic], from the High Atlas to

210

Another alternative spelling includes Guelmin.

211

Maraboutic from the root marabout is the designation of a saint or his descendants who are called upon to dispense
blessings, and whose tombs are places of pilgrimage. In this context, a maraboutic city-state seems to be one where its
inhabitants are either descendants or followers of a Muslim saint buried in that area.
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the ‘Bend of the Dra’ (where all sedentary population along the Dra ends), Moroccan authority
was sporadically maintained; but even here open revolt was a frequent occurrence” (1969, 143).
López Bargados relates how another confederation of tribes or qabila,212 the Oulad
Delim, which under Saharan tradition were thought to be part of the Beni Hassan, became very
independent of Moroccan control as well after the Shar Bouba War in the mid-seventeenth
century. He claims that they are of particular importance because of their regional singularity and
close ethnic affinity to the Arab Hassani tribes. They gravitated to the Western Sahara’s bidanic
region between the thirteenth and fifteenth century. Gradually, they moved south into the
nomadic territory of the Tekna and finally to the peripheral domains of the Trarza Emirate,
coming into conflict with both independencies. There is no mention of intervention by the
Sultan213 in any of these battles that lasted for decades with the eventual defeat of the Oulad
Delim. However, El Hamel writes that in 1807, the Sultan did lead an expedition to Guelmim, an
important link in the caravan route. Nevertheless, El Hamel also writes that the ruler of the people
of Guelmim, ‘Abd Allah Usalim “commanded independently [emphasis added] a vast region in
the western Sahara…dominated the trans-Saharan caravan trade and had an army of fifteen
hundred black slaves” (El Hamel 2013, 233).
Despite the propensity toward disparate tribal affiliation, contempt for the Sultan’s
authority, and the susceptibility of each to warring, there was a semblance of order within and
among tribes (or tribal confederations). Criado finds that there is not only evidence of a
suspension of warrior-like activities but also proof of collective responsibility among tribes.
Criado, commenting on López Bargados’ mention of a tribe called the “Bu Amaran” (although
his writing focuses mainly on the Oulad Delim) located in the Oued Nun next to Ifni, discusses
how they had “dedicated themselves to agriculture from October to May and that, once the
212
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harvest was obtained, they rushed to war amongst each other until the new sowing season”214
(1977, 87; López Bargados 1955, 341-342). He insists that these skirmishes, “typical of the
Moroccan bled as-siba” did not exist among the tribes of what he describes as the Sario.215
(Criado 1977, 87). “They had established once and for all a supratribal order that avoided the
waste of energy and human life and that it would allow the resolution of disputes through
mediation”216 (Ibid).

Caro Baroja has implied that Western academic study of the tribe,

especially in terms of the Western Sahara, is prone to view it as disparate, disorderly, and
anarchic. While these characterizations may be true, they only apply when there is another power
that attempts to co-opt, win, or conquer the region of its inhabiting tribes. Therefore, the
alternative position would indicate, based on the evidence of ‘super tribes’ or, as some scholars
have designated, confederations of tribes, that there was indeed ‘tribal’ order. Still, it was
“‘primitive,’ egalitarian, and static, lacking in itself the necessary elements for an evolution”217
but one which does not conform to Western pretensions of social order (Criado 1977, 87).
Moulay Sliman came to power as Sultan of Morocco in 1792 and his reign lasted until
1822. He was able to take control of the north of Morocco and proceeded to suppress and bring
under his control the ‘unruly’ south. Julien notes that Sliman managed to “enlarge… [the bilad almakhzen] somewhat by bringing back under control the Dra’ [sic], Figuig, and part of the
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Tadla218 ” (1970, 269). However, once again his power waned and by 1818 he had lost the Tadla.
By his death the area “once more headed for anarchy” (ibid.). El Hamel documents that Moulay
Sliman had trouble reorganizing his country due to the rebellious black armies, internal
dissension among local power brokers in the different cities, and usurpers to his authority in the
east and south of Morocco (2013, 226-227). Apart from Rézette (and his more pro-Moroccan
view of the period), Dunn in Arabs and Berbers speaks of political investiture given by the
Moroccan Sultan to local leaders. However, the references that Dunn makes seem to be about
populations in Tafilalet and the city of Sijilmasa, and even farther to the southeast in Tuat (which
is now in present-day Algeria) (Dunn 1972, 99). These are regions to the east of Morocco over
the Atlas Mountains stretching into the Sahara Desert. Apart from some correspondence and a
referenced gift sent to the Emir of Trarza there has not been any mention of an authoritative
investiture given to the southwestern Emirates of the Sahara. While this was probably true for the
east and some of the southeast areas of the Morocco, the south and southwest along the Atlantic
coastline, beginning with the Sous Valley, has been, more often than not, described as the bilad
al-siba (land of dissidence) and by extension part of the trab al-bidan.
Confederative tribal struggles of power over trading routes, grazing territory, and blood
feuds marked much of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries well into the 1850s.
López Bargados writes of the wars between the Oulad Delim and the Oulad Qaylan tribes (2003,
248). Another confrontation was that of the Oulad Delim with the Reguibayt, including constant
ghazzian (warrior) raids by the Oulad Delim defended by the leader of the Trarza Emirate Ahmad
wald ‘Ayda. These battles between the eastern section of the Oulad Delim, the Oulad Salim and
Oulad Mulat, (ibid., 240; Caratini 1989, 79) was fought for twelve years (1824-1836). Timbuktu
had finally been subjugated by the Tuareg in the 1790s. Caro Baroja notes that the Reguibayt
began a struggle with the Tajakant in 1825 and ended with the complete victory by the latter
218

The Tadla is located surrounding the city of Boujad on Map 5.2 and 5.4. As an interesting note, the author lived and
taught English in the city of Boujad while he served as a U.S. Peace Corps Volunteer in 2002—2003.
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(1955, 348-349). Perhaps before 1830, another tribe, the Ait Atta, who would later merge into
the Tafargant alliance with the Bani Mhammad, also escaped Sultanic control during the reign of
Abd al-Rahman, Moulay Slimane’s son, and secured their hold of the western Ziz Valley in the
Tafilalet region in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (Dunn 1972, 91-93). This alliance of
tribes was largely successful focusing on the commercial trading enterprise along the eastern
fringes of the Ziz Oasis (ibid., 98). It also maintained such peaceful relations with another the
Dawi Mani, for pasturage in the east of the Ziz that “inter-tribal boundary demarcations did not
exist and conflicts over grazing rights were isolated and infrequent” (ibid., 92). These tribal
struggles are written by these sources but they arrive in these volumes as part of oral history.
These accounts serve to highlight the nature of tribal independence and their objection to
the Sultanate outside of the major ‘Moroccan’ cities of Fes, Marrakesh, its northern coastline, and
east of the Atlas Mountains. These tribes were running their own affairs after the demise of
Muhammad III in 1790. The actions of these tribes argue for the autonomous nature of their
society. The POLISARIO assert that these examples of autonomy prove that the Sultan never had
complete control over the Western Sahara. They will make the historical claim that ‘Sahrawi’
tribes were not only making independent choices but were also cohabitating separately from the
Kingdom of Morocco, irrespective of any spiritual investiture. Damis admits that Morocco can
argue that these tribes recognized spiritual authority but questions how “the sheer distance
between the Sahara and the seats of power in Fes, Meknes, or Marrakesh posed an obvious
obstacle” – and logistically, it would be almost impossible to ‘exercise’ administrative control
over the nomadic tribes, which required “population centers...[and] the Western Sahara has no
major oases or other natural centers from administrative control could be exercised” (Damis
1983, 21). Autonomous tribal action and the habitation of populations not under control of the
Sultan, however, do not constitute a unique identity. There were several tribes living in this
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manner. There was no collective awareness or ‘national’ identity much less one for a ‘Sahrawi’
identity.

Early European Observations
There are brief accounts among European explorers and diplomats in their travels and
observations that document the tenuous rule of the Sultan. Here, only a few brief passages of their
reflections will be given. These examples express the continuous problem of Moroccan territorial
integrity. Europeans viewed the internal weakness of the Sultan as an opportunity for commerce
with the tribes south of ‘Morocco.’ As they established trading posts and negotiated terms of
commerce, they began to distinguishing between those tribes that were open to trade and those
that were not; usually those that were controlled by the Sultan. These relationships would soon
begin to help differentiate between subject tribes of the Sultan and those ‘freer’ tribes. At the
same time, the sense of tribal autonomy allowed for disparate historical trajectories; one not
subject to Moroccan control. Tribal identity, thus begins to change because of indirect influences.
One such comment by the representative of the Spanish Crown to the Court of Morocco,
Jorge Juan, as official negotiator in the 1767 Treaty indicates the precarious position of the
Empire. He states that:
It is true that the population of the whole country is neither as excessive as
hitherto believed, which is evidenced in the small number of places, because
although it is said that more live in encampments, nor are these as numerous, and
proves that even in the province of Duquela that qualifies as the richest, and most
populated, for just as we passed were they able to gather 10,000 men even though
anyone who can handle a horse is presented with him, and those who could not
[would present themselves] with weapons only, as if all were soldiers, when in
fact they are nothing more than a kind of militia without discipline, or obedience,
for such reasons any of its main squares [or parade grounds] that are reduced to
[the cities of ] Tetouan, Tangiers, Larache, Sale, Mogodor [sic] and Santa Cruz
could be taken by a surprise attack with 60 men who could land in the
surrounding artillery area, which by the poor state of its fortifications have
pointed them over the beaches, they would immediately lose capturing them from
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the rear without fear of any early relief, for at most could they seek in four days
would be 6000 men [emphasis added]219 (Rodriguez Casado 1941, 41).
In another account written in 1813, a notation is made concerning ‘Modern Barbary’ or what was
historically described as the Barbary States, which included the empire of Morocco.220 Lempriere
is referring to the southwestern extremities of ‘Barbary’ and their piratical activities when he
states that: “To the west, the line of coast is not so extensive, as it does not reach further than
Cape Non in the 29th latitude, but it is sufficient to afford the Moors a ready access to several
important islands in the Atlantic Ocean, and to extend their depredations to the western coast of
Europe, which not unfrequently has suffered by their piracies [emphasis added]” (1813, 4). Later
in his volume, Lempriere states that Tarudant, capital of what was previously the metropolis of
the kingdom of the Sous,221 “may be considered as the frontier town of that part of the
[Moroccan] emperor’s dominions.” He also states that:
The [Moroccan] emperor, it is true, claims the sovereignty of the desert of the
Zahara [sic], and the territory of Vled [sic] de Non [sic]; but his authority over
that part of the country is almost nominal as it entirely depends on the caprice
and inclination of the Arabs who inhabit it; and who from their distant situation
from the seat of government, are more properly under the dominion of their own
chiefs. They acknowledge the emperor to be their sovereign, and the head of their
church, and occasionally pay him tribute as sultan; but they give no attention
whatever to his particular orders, and over their interior government he has not
the least control. These people consist of different tribes of Arabs, who live in
219

Translated from the Spanish by the author: “Bien es verdad que la población de todo el país no es tan excesiva como
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tents without any fixed places of residence: they wander over the country in
search of plunder, and are supposed, on some occasions, to extend their
depredations as far as Nigritia, whence they carry off Negroes” (Lampriere 1813,
152).
By the end of Abd al-Rahman ibn Hisham’s reign (1822-1859), the Kingdom was beset by both
internal conflict, which he managed to control, and direct French intervention. The French had
taken Algiers in 1830 but did not completely vanquish Algerian resistance until 1847. Algerian
resistance had received aid from tribes in Morocco during the 1840s to support the Emir ‘Abd alQadir and his troops against the French. Irritated by Moroccan assistance, France then bombed its
ports at Mogador and Tangier in 1844.222 The Spanish seized the Chafarinas Islands in 1849 off
the northern coast of Morocco. The British pressured Morocco into signing a bi-lateral
commercial treaty in 1856.223 Upon the death of Sultan ‘Abd al-Rahman (1859) the Spanish
observing the weakness of the Sultan, and not to be outdone by the major competing powers,
declared their first official war (1860) with the Kingdom of Morocco in the North and secured
“from Morocco the town of Ifni, near Cape Nun” in the south (Johnston 1966, 120). The
engagements with the Europeans distracted the Sultan from its southwestern and southern
Saharan periphery and left those territories unmanageable. In addition, due to the many-sided
conflicts with the Spanish, French, as well as diplomatic exchanges with the British and even
American frigates (because of piracy), Morocco almost fragmented into smaller political units.
Thus by 1859, direct European involvement began to influence Maghrebi politics, and its
consequences would reverberate in the Western Sahara. Moroccan politics would forge a defense
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of its frontiers against European encroachments and extol the aid of the surrounding tribal
confederations.

This section attempts to link historical territorial autonomy as part of Sahrawi identity. It
features autonomous tribes who manage their own affairs without approval from the Sultan or
rebel against his in the Western Sahara. It also evaluates treaties that were agreed upon between
Europeans and the Sultans. The Sultan(s) acknowledge that they did not have complete control of
its southern flank. The discussion of physical boundaries based on the concepts of distinction
highlight how the socio-political environment of the greater Western Sahara was viewed; there
were groups that were different from those under the rule of a Moroccan sovereign. The section
on literary boundaries presented the case that there were two competing historical trajectories:
one being written by the Moroccan Sultans and another that has been neglected but ‘rediscovered,’ written by obscure Saharan scholars. Yet-to-be translated and studied manuscripts
from these golden years of literature also seem to suggest that there was a Saharan-wide
scholarship, providing evidence of an autonomous Saharan society. It depicts a whole separate
history, independent of Morocco. It chronicles a distinct history of not only the Western Sahara
but also the deep southern extremities of the region.
Historical evidence suggests that there was no break in the genealogical line of the
Sultans. However, while it is difficult to criticize that Morocco was always a coherent religiopolitical entity, its socio-geographical (especially its southeastern, southern, and southwestern)
frontiers certainly are open to question based on the research herein. The discussion in this
historical period suggests that there were other tribal identities, separate from Morocco. There
were other histories being written, boundaries were made, and were being recognized by both the
Sultans and the Europeans. Still, instead of a fusion of independent clans moving toward one
supreme, region-wide trans-Saharan federation of tribes, the opposite had occurred. Several
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independencies arose, power struggles ensued; different tribes had already merged with each
other and established confederations of super-tribes. They competed with each other over land
(grazing rights and agricultural resources), trade routes, and commodities—animal husbandry,
gum, salt, gold, and slaves. Yet, the only possible association to the modern Sahrawi are the
building of subtle ‘layers of distinction’: the Hassaniya language, separate tribal history, and
territorial autonomy. These features of identity though were found among numerous tribes. Thus,
despite these insights into Saharan society, a less than cohesive Moroccan Empire, and proof of
self-governing super-tribes, there are no concrete links to Sahrawi national identity in this
historical segment.
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VI. IDENTITY CONSTRUCTION IN THE MIDST OF EUROPEAN INTERVENTION
(1860 — 1883)
This chapter will focus on the roots of Sahrawi identity from the period beginning in
1860 until right before the Act of Berlin in 1884. This period includes the diplomatic peak
between Morocco and Spain over commerce and territory surrounding the contested frontiers of
Morocco. The Berlin West Africa Conference, a series of negotiations (Nov. 15, 1884–Feb. 26,
1885) held in Berlin where the major European powers “met to decide all questions connected
with the Congo River basin in Central Africa” effectively accelerated European ‘spheres of
influence,’ which included northwest Africa (Britannica, 15th ed., s.v. “Berlin West Africa
Conference”). Although these dates are not exclusive to the Sahrawi timeline, they do represent
historical landmarks in the search for the roots of their national identity. The socio-historical
analysis of the period in the western and southwestern Maghreb region (including Mauritania,
Western Sahara proper, and Morocco) continues to provide insight to claims of separateness. The
continuing question remains: do the origins of Sahrawi identity lie within this period, and in what
form does it materialize?
This chapter will analyze historical sources that document Western Saharan history,
including maps from the latter nineteenth and early twentieth centuries depicting frontiers of the
northwestern Sahara and literature about the Western Sahara. Written texts begin to expand with
respect to this period, but only provide intermittent details of ‘Sahrawi’ history. The literature is
scant and considerable effort has been made to find as much information as possible with the
limitations discussed in the introduction. The research found alternative sources of information
not available in the United States—via independent booksellers in small street bookshops and
online booksellers, at the various AHN (National Historical Archives) localities, and in the BNE
(Biblioteca Nacional de España) in Madrid. It is the hope that this chapter will shed some light as
to the approximate origins of Sahrawi national identity.
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This period does not lend itself to the primordial theory of Sahrawi origins in the near
past. Again, questions arise about what can be considered as the traditional past. Is 1860 too early
to be considered as evidence for a primordial past? Perhaps highpoints in the discernable past,
despite fluctuations in national awareness, are links to national identity. The argument linking
national identity to historical features falls within the theoretical approach of primordialism—
perennialism. From perennialism, an argument can be derived demonstrating that despite
evidence contradicting the notion of any formal acknowledgment of nationhood, there might be
‘low levels’ or traces of sentiments of national coherence. Undoubtedly, further questions arise
about how these low levels of identity should resemble—how are they to be discovered, or what
should one search for? Clearly, ‘perennial’ notions of history must demonstrate traces of an
identity that can be associated to later, more distinct manifestations of nationality. These lowlevel forms of national identity are far beyond the scope of this work. That work will be left to
anthropologists and other social scientists. Here, the reader should consider the socio-historical
evidence presented and judge for themselves.
By 1860, the Western Sahara entered the modern period of world history. Previous
chapters presented a connection to the early modern (1524) to the beginning of the modern period
of history (1789).224 This chapter seeks evidence that may indicate that the national identity of the
Sahrawi was established within this period of history. It also seeks evidence that there are
lingering traces of Sahrawi nationality that can be linked to previous eras. If the sources of
Sahrawi national awareness were not evident in previous segments of history, then they must
have begun at the dawn of European intervention, if not later in this period. This argument is
widely considered, by most modern scholars of the Western Sahara, to be the most prominent for
the development of the Sahrawi national identity.
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benchmark. By 1859, nations have entered the modern period of history.
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A combination of both the primordial and top-down level arguments is based on the
region's socio-political environment. The second hypothesis claims it is arbitrary and subjective
to select point of origin—indeed almost instrumental, especially if a group is making a case for its
cause. Thus, its arguments, formulated from constructivism, advocate that: 1) Sahrawi identity
was created in response to the encroachment of foreign powers into west and northwestern
Africa; 2) in this period of history, Western Saharan society became more organized as a sociopolitical entity due to stronger regional ties, not only to other groups, but also to the land. These
two derived explanations further pursue a diverse understanding of nationalities—from the
ground level and upper levels of influence. The constructivist approach resonates most fully with
contemporary social science thinking, in that it enhances our understanding of identity politics by
fusing instrumentalism and primordialism—two streams of thought that some suggest are largely
dated and unpopular.
Yet another argument derives from pure instrumentalism. The argument posits that group
cohesiveness may be a result of regional leaders (shaykhs, sultans) or other actors (foreign
powers or leaders)—sometimes labeled as “ethnic entrepreneurs”—co-opting, manipulating, or
embellishing directly, subtly, or unwittingly the markers of identity for solely economic or
political objectives. The only force powerful enough to forge a sense of national consciousness
among the Saharan population in the previous chapters was that of the Sultan of Morocco.
However, his influence was stunted in the face of prominent forces such as the southern Emirates
in the Western Sahara and other tribes who chose not to acknowledge his authority. The intrusion
of the French and Spanish in the internal affairs of the Western Saharans may be the biggest
marker of identity formation for the Sahrawi but not before they had already established nominal
political independence prior to 1860. Still, the historical analysis must continue to ask if, in fact,
there were select proto-Sahrawi leaders who could bring together these populations. tribes.
Constructivists seek products of human social interaction, that is, socialization and historical
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forces states that combine a combination of cultural artifacts and social constructs. This section,
then, evaluates how Europeans, the Sultanate of Morocco along with the tribes of the

Map 6.1: Map of the People of the Sénégal 225

225

Map taken from Abbé David Boilat, “Carte des Peuples Du Sénégal,” in Esquisses Sénégalaises: Physionomie du
Pays— Peuplades— Commerce—Religions Passé et Avenir Récits et Légendes (Paris: Librairie P. Bertrand, 1853),
512,
Gallica.bnf.fr.
—
Bibliothèque
Nationale
de
France,
accessed
June
12
2015,
http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k103361c/f512.image.

174

greater Western Sahara (see map 6.1 and the political communities in the deep southwestern
Sahara) interacted with each other. Did these interactions aid in developing concrete forms of
national identity among the Western Saharans? It seeks the synthesis of distinctive (Hassaniya,
territorial affinity, political autonomy) ethnic features with the aspirations of actors or forces
(resistance) as catalysts to Sahrawi identity. If the fusion of these top-down elements is evident in
this period, then it will confirm the constructivist hypothesis for the origins of Sahrawi identity. If
not, the search will continue.

The Socio-Political Environment of Southern ‘Morocco’ (1850s—1900)
Indeed, when Moulay Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman (or Abderrahmane), also known as Sultan
Muhammad IV (1830-1873), replaced his uncle, Moulay Sliman, on the throne, Morocco’s
weakness was prominently displayed to the European powers. Julien in a very telling comment,
wrote that: “Thus it was that, in a world in full and swift evolution and increasing daily in
strength through improvements in means of transport and growth of the volume of trade,
Morocco remained an amalgam of tribes, very unstably bound by the link of religion…and
attached to a centuries-old if not thousand-years-old economic system” (Julien 1970, 270). Flint
adds that European involvement in the Morocco-Saharan sphere of north Africa, which coincided
in an untimely way for Morocco with the Sultan Abderrahmane’s death, was “invariably the
occasion for revolt in various parts of the kingdom” (Flint 1976, 122). Revolts broke out in
Morocco in the north and in the south as the new Sultan tried to suppress Rahamna Tribesmen
from besieging Marrakesh (ibid). As a consequence of these events, colonial opportunities arose
for the great powers from the north of the Mediterranean.
Spain, after an attack by a squad of Riffian militants on one of its fortifications in Ceuta,
responded by landing an army in Ceuta and occupying Tetuan in 1860 with British and French
consent (Spanish War History 2012).

The Treaty of Wad Ras (which ended the 1859-60
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Hispano-Moroccan War) not only cemented Spanish control of Ceuta and Tetuan, but also
“secured from Morocco the town of Ifni, near Cape Nun on the Atlantic coast” (Johnston 1966,
63). Several authors (ibid., 120-121) write of the weakness of Muhammad IV as he attempted to
deflect the eyes of the European powers away from its “tempting geographic position” and “lying
along essential maritime routes” (Julien 1970, 271). However, the importance of the Straits of
Gibraltar, located at one of the major transportation intersections of the world, did little to
diminish European interests. In addition, his primary advisers were “divided amongst those who
saw all that was happening as a result of European penetration and who urged adherence to a
rigid, traditional, anti-European attitude and those who believed that it was necessary to
modernize and to improve the administration” (Johnson 1976, 123).

Laroui, tellingly,

summarizes the state in which Morocco found itself by asserting, “that the sultan’s independence
and the integrity of his territory were safeguarded not by the Moroccan army, which was
disorganized and poorly equipped, but by the protection of the English” (i.e, the British
diplomatic corps) (1977, 317).
Historical documentation generally indicated that in the southwest of Morocco, in the
area of the Sous, and further south into the Oued Dra’a, there appeared to be a loosening of
control by the Sultan at the time (late nineteenth century) of these crises. One important tribe is
the Tekna mentioned previously in chapter five. The Tekna claim links to the Almoravid Empire
that stretched from what is now Morocco to the southeastern peripheries of the Sahara adjacent to
the ancient Ghana empire and their present-day connections to the Sahrawi. As a historical note
and mentioned briefly in chapter three, the Sanhaja family of Berbers226 of the twelfth century
were sub-divided among several groups of tribes—the Hawwara, Lawata, Lamtuna, Massufa, and
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Guddala. The Almoravids, a hodgepodge of “Lemtoûna”

227

[or Lamtuna] (Doutté 1914, 344),

Guddala, and other tribes that gravitated from the southwestern Atlantic coast of North Africa,
picked up converts, and traveled north to modern Morocco. Other scholars believe that the Tekna
are a mix of either Lamta (De La Chapelle 1930, 50) or descendants of the Gazula (Lydon 2009,
173-174; Norris 1986, 142, 145). However, most scholars conclude that the Tekna were the
“earliest inhabitants of the Wad Nun” (ibid., 173). The result, evident according to POLISARIO
proponents, are that those members of the present-day Tekna Confederation now located in
southern Morocco and Western Sahara proper (including some refugees that inhabit the Algerian
camps near Tindouf) compose part of the Sahrawi nation.
Chapter five documents how the “país Tekna” (the Tekna nation) (Martinez Milán 2007,
367) and a certain personality, Shaykh Beyruk (1815-1859), of the Ait Moussa Ou Ali of the
Tekna Confederacy came to prominence in the early part of the nineteenth century (see map 6.2)
and ruled with autonomy (Pazzanita 2006, 408), free from the control of the Sultan, in the Oued
Nun from the city of Guelmime (Lydon 2009, 164, 174-175). He, along with his sons thereafter,
attempted at various times to create a commercial port in Tarfaya (Cape, or Cabo in Spanish,
Juby). (ibid., 167-169; Pennell 2000, 100-101; Ould Mohamed 2010, 248-249 note 9). Both
Shaykh Beyruk and Sidi Hashem had tried to establish trading posts along the Atlantic coast with
the Europeans in order to circumvent taxes on trade levied by the Moroccan Sultan (Hodges
1983, 32). Sidi Hashem was the Sharif228 of Iligh in the Tazeroualt
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envahirent cette même région du H'oûz il y a bien des siècles : les Tekna d'aujourd'hui sont des Almoravides. C'est bien
ainsi qu'étaient les compagnons de Ioûcef ben Tâchfîn, les Lemtoûna au visage violé, venus des profondeurs du
Sahara…,” Edmond Doutté, Mission au Maroc: En Tribu. Paris: Librairie Paul Geuthner, 1914.
228

Sharif in Arabic denotes “noble” or “high-born.” An Arabic title of respect, restricted, after the advent of Islam, to
members of Muhammad’s clan of Hāshim. Encyclopedia Britannica Online, s.v. ‘Sharif’ May 9, 2014
http://www.britannica.com/topic/sharif, Accessed October 16 2015. “In several cases, Sharifian descent was part of a
dynasty’s title to rule…Most important of all for the history of Africa south of the Sahara were the Sharifian
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Map 6.2: Tazeroualt, the ‘State’ of Beyruk and Tekna 230
Sahara Desert. Lenz, who visited Morocco in 1880, stated, “Sidi Husayn, an old black man who
ruled the area as an independent prince, maintained an army of five thousand slaves, all black
from different backgrounds in West Africa, including the Fulani” [Emphasis added] (Lenz 2013,

pretensions of the ‘Alawi dynasty of Morocco.” H. J. Fisher, “The Eastern Maghrib and the Central Sudan, in Roland
Oliver, ed., The Cambridge History of Africa 3, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) 1977, 314-315.
229

Tazeroualt is also found spelled as Tazerwalt, Tazarwalt, or Tazerualt (in Spanish).
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Map is adapted and translated by the author directly from the Spanish in José Carlos López-Pozas Lanuza, “África
Occidental Española: La Cuestión de Soberanía y La Retirada del Sahara” (Ph.D. diss., Instituto Universitario General
Mellado, 2015), 313.
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251). ‘Sidi Husayn’ is the same Sidi Hashem of Iligh mentioned above. His given name would be
Sidi Husayn Bin (or Ben) Hashem (1842-1886) based in the city of Iligh, which was found in the
Tazeroualt (region). Curiously, although Pennell writes that the Iligh Sharif had acquired great
economic autonomy, he adds that he was not the kind of leader that would lead a rebellion against
the sultan (Pennell 2000, 26). Then in the following paragraph, he states that neither Sidi Hashem
nor Shaykh Beyruk were a threat to the sultan (ibid.). In fact, Sultan Moulay Hassan I (18731894) would ask other leaders of the area to intervene, such as Sidi Hashem, to try to influence
and rein “in Beyruk and [David] Mackenzie, but Husayn [bin Hashem] was a very autonomous
subject and was negotiating on his own account with French and German representatives” (ibid.,
101).
In addition to the odd juxtaposition of these sentences, it is questionable why these
leaders would want to initiate a full-scale war with the sultan’s armies in the first place. It would
have interrupted their successful business enterprises and only then evoked the ire of the
Kingdom’s forces. Still, trade negotiations with the Europeans by Beyruk (1835-36, 1840, 1845,
and 1853) and Sidi Hashem proved unsuccessful and were permanently discarded when Sultan
Moulay Abderrahmane co-opted the shaykhs and his sons away from the influence of the British
and the French.231 Still, these failures did not prevent other tribal entities from initiating
commercial endeavors with the French farther south in the Senegal River Valley. Again though,
instead of maintaining these agreements, the French expanded up the Senegal in order to seize
control of the acacia gum trade away from the Emirates of Trarza, Brakna, and the Tagant.
Eventually, France defeated the Moorish Emirates, including the Kingdom of Waalo, which was
located south of the Senegal River.
In an interesting and severe criticism of European ethnography by colonial adventurers
and travelers, Hasan Mohamed ponders how a major qabila (or coalition of tribes), such as the
231

However, the Sultan did finally concede to Shaykh Beyruk a trading house in 1844 at Mogador.
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Tekna, could have been left to negotiate with Europeans, and possibly displacing, the caravan
trade. He indignantly asserts “it is difficult to imagine how the Bayruk could have been shortsighted to the extent that they would risk confrontation with the Alawite court in return for access
to European markets that have no use for their slaves” (due to the abolitionist movement that
initiated in England) (Hasan Mohamed 2012, 277). The Alawite Kingdom would dote on the
Tekna with “a system of patronage…with lavish distribution of ‘decrees of respect’ to” the
zawaya [religious] power centers to secure the security of trade routes “over the ‘qabila [Beyruk]
ensembles’” (ibid., 138-140). In addition, H. Mohammed makes the very arduous and methodical
case that the claims of Tekna origins to the Sous and the wider Oued Nun region, are documented
from outside observers. He is also doubtful of the Tekna’s homogeneous ancestry for in the least,
they are a series of hybridized foreign bloodlines—Arab, Berber, and possibly even Moorish. As
such, he criticizes all the aforementioned scholars for ‘mistranslating’ the ‘tribe’ and objectifying
‘libertarian’ concepts incorrectly associated with the Tekna and the Shaykh Beyruk. Furthermore,
he states that the Tekna’s “notions of origin were often authored by ‘foreign elites’ such as the
Beyruk,” thus relying heavily on Arabic and other ancient Saharan sources, such as Ibn Khaldun
(ibid., 210).
Hassan Mohamed’s critique implies that the Moroccan Sultan did have control of Shaykh
Beyruk and that the Tekna were not native to the Oued Nun or Sous Valleys in the late nineteenth
century. He also suggests that the Tekna were not independent. This argument will prevent the
use of the Tekna as a perennial ancestor to the Sahrawi because the POLISARIO have argued that
they have always been free of any Sultan. More study would be needed to understand how the
Tekna viewed themselves at that time. Yet, the POLSARIO, based on the several interviews
conducted in Rabouni Camp, acknowledge that they are a mix of different identities. The problem
with that notion is that there is uncertainty over which tribe or tribes to use in order to properly
trace the origins of the Sahrawi. The only alternative is to consider all regional tribes as possible
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candidates. Yet, another problem arises: how many tribes and how far the region should one
include? Are the tribes in and around the Sous, Nun, Dra’a, and Sequiet al-Hamra the only viable
contenders? Or is it necessary to study all tribes of the greater western Sahara: nomadic and
sedentary and across modern frontiers (Mali, Mauritania, and Morocco)? More investigation is
needed that is beyond the scope of this study.

However, despite Hasan Mohamed’s aversion to European ‘misconceptions, he does
conclude that the Beyruk became originators of their own history (and that of the Tekna), because
“of the frequency of their encounters with the outside world, and ability to accumulate resources
and concentrate power” (Hasan Mohamed 2012, 210).

Rézette indicates that their loss of

independence was actually the result of the threat posed by the Spanish Monarchy in attempting
to establish a port of trade somewhere “between the Wadi Noun and Agadir,” which “seemed to
them to correspond exactly to the old Santa Cruz de Mar Pequeña” (1975, 58). Both the threat
and these ‘dissident’ tribes were thus met with force by the Sultanate. The Sultan would invade
and leave garrisons of armies, loyal to him, to maintain order. For example, in 1882, Sultan
Moulay Hassan I, marched with an overwhelming mass of troops, numbering between 40,000 to
70,000, from Marrakesh to Guelmime “to appease the appetites of the local chiefs” and crush the
aspirations of these independent rulers (ibid.). It is hardly surprising to read from Rézette that the
defeated “tribes’ notables came to affirm their loyalty to him and to promise to oppose European
movements” (Rézette 1975, 58).

Pennell, who seems to lean on the more official side of

Moroccan history, affirms that the ‘dissident’ or bilad al-siba areas “still recognized the Sultan,
even if they took little notice of him in daily affairs” (2000, 28).

Yet, he admits earlier:

“Otherwise, the Sultan was content to let the remoter regions well enough alone, since it was too
expensive to maintain direct control over unproductive areas. He only required that the caravans
get through, that bandits should not close the roads and, above all, that his leadership of the
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community be recognized in the Friday prayers” (ibid.). None of these interactions though gave
the tribal confederations impetus for ‘national’ cohesion.
This is similar to what many around the world perceived as American military, political,
and possible economic domination of global affairs after World War II. Yet, the United States
would affirm that it would not become embroiled in any sovereign country or region unless it had
a vested national interest for such intervention. The United States would undoubtedly defend its
well-demarcated geographical borders. In contrast, nineteenth-century Morocco had ill-defined
frontiers and ‘invasions’ into the Sultan’s land were subjective. However, similar to the Sultanate,
the U.S. would most likely only become involved in key transit or economic zones (South China
Sea, Panama Canal) because of the importance in international commerce. Otherwise, America,
too, would deem it far too expensive to maintain direct control of all trade routes, and would
prefer ‘to let these’ more remote regions ‘well enough alone.’ The problem with these statements
is rooted in the socio-cultural environment of the day. The modern-day Westphalian concept of
the nation-state does not provide one with an accurate description or characterization of the
‘nation’ of Morocco in a North African setting during the Sa’adian and Alawite Dynasties,
depicted by historians such as Pennell.
The modern era invites this analogy but only because the United States is a well-defined,
territorially fixed nation-state, whereas the Sultanate of nineteenth century Morocco cannot be
well defined in twenty-first century fashion. The only group identities, outside of the tribal, were
those fashioned by the regional leaders, such as Shaykh Beyruk, Sidi Hashem, and Sultan Moulay
Hassan I. If the Westphalian concept of the modern nation-state were to recognize titles of
spiritual investiture as criteria for statehood, the Vatican would surely inherit millions of
adherents across dozens of states. It would result in the reemergence of an ‘Holy Empire’ never
before seen. Yet, no one today would agree to such a notion. Even Criado will argue that in the
nineteenth century, ‘decrees of respect,’ ‘occasional affirmations of loyalty’ by other tribes
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(Pennell 2000, 100), or letters of investiture and acknowledgement by the Alawite Sultans did not
signify that their power extended over all tribes. He states “it was a type of propaganda without
efficacy, intended to produce the illusion of a domain with no real existence”232 (Criado 1977,
90). It is difficult to assert that a Sahrawi national identity had emerged at this time. The only
verifiable (group) identities were those socio-political entities established by dynastic and tribal
leaders.
Independent Entities in the Northwestern Sahara
The autonomous entities described in the following provide examples of group identities that
developed at the end of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in and around modern
Western Sahara. It gives an account of certain groups that had already established a cohesive
identity, independent of the Sultanate. It tries to establish a possible link from some of these tribal
confederations to the emergence of Sahrawi national identity. It also introduces the debate over
autonomy and its relation to national identity. If documenting the correct set of tribes does not
help in seeking the origins of Sahrawi identity, then perhaps territorial autonomy can be a better
tool.
For instance, a publication by La Presse (Parisian Daily) written in 1844 of June 14 reads:
“At the beginning of last century, Morocco still extended its authority down to Tombouctou in the
Sahara, but its influence decreases every day, especially since 1795; most of the kingdom of Sous
was detached from the empire of Morocco to form the independent state of Sydy-Hecham”233 (4).
Caratini, states, “the economic power of the Tekna of the Oued Nun had developed in relation to
Tazeroualt. This state, created, at the time of the decline of Sa'adians, around the seaport of Masa,
232

Taken from the Spanish: “se trataba de una especie de propaganda sin eficacia, destinada a producir la ilusión de un
dominio sin existencia real.” Ramón Criado, 1977, 90.
233

Taken from the French and translated by Dr. Maria Antonieta Garcia: Au commencement du siècle dernier, le
Maroc étendait encore son autorité jusqu’à Tombouctou dans le Sahara, mais son influence diminue tous les jours,
surtout depuis 1795; une grande partie du royaume de Sous s’est détachée de l’empire de Maroc pour former l’état
indépendant de Sydy-Hecham. “Nouvelles et Faits Divers,” La Presse, June 14, 1844, Gallica.bnf.fr. Accessed August
12, 2015.
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is, intermittently, independent of sharifian authority” before 1765 (1989, 80).234

In another

reference, Désiré-Vuillemin states, “the ‘great nomads’ are especially the Reguibayt (Sahel and
Lgouacem), Oulad Delim, but their cousins Tekna are ‘lessor [or junior] nomads’ — herders.
They live between the confines [or frontiers] of Morocco and the Adrar (See map 6.4), far from
any authority” [Emphasis added]235 (1962, 55). The ICJ, in their 1975 Advisory Opinion on the
Western Sahara, stated “although Morocco asserts that the Regheibat tribe always recognized the
suzerainty of the Tekna Confederation, and through them that of the Sultan himself, this assertion
has not been supported by any convincing evidence” (48). However, later in this report, the ICJ
equivocated and acknowledged that:
Those Tekna septs236 in their nomadic journeys spent periods of time within the
territory of the caids237 of the Tekna confederation appears, however, to the Court
to lend support to the view that they were subject, at least in some measure, to the
authority of Tekna caids…Furthermore, the material before the Court contains
various indications of some projection of the Sultan’s authority to certain Tekna
tribes or septs nomadizing in Western Sahara238 (ibid.).
Despite the independent attributes identified by some of these scholars, the Tekna have
historically demonstrated the closest ties to the Sultanate of Morocco (Deubel 2010, 67).
Thus far, the most important point here is that each tribe had already developed a sense of
234

Translated from the French and translated by Dr. Maria Antonieta Garcia: La puissance économique des Takna du
wad Nun s’était développé en relation avec le Tazarwalt. Cet État, créé, au moment de la décadence des Sa’adiens,
autour du port maritime de Massa, est, par intermittence, indépendant du pouvoir chérifien. Sophie Caratini, Les
Rgaybat (1610-1934) : Des Chameliers a la Conquete D’un Territoire, Tome 1. Paris: L’Harmattan, 1989, 80.
235

Translated from the French and translated by Dr. Maria Antonieta Garcia: Les ‘grands nomades’ sont spécialement
les Regueibat (Sahel et Lgouacem), O. Delim, mais leurs cousins Tekna sont ‘petits nomades’ moutonniers. Ils vivent
entre les confins marocains et l’Adrar, loin de toute autorité. Geneviève Désiré-Vuillemin, “Contribution a L’Histoire
de la Mauritanie de 1900 a 1934,” Ph.D. Diss., Université de Montpellier, 1962, 55.
236

Sept is a term used mostly in Irish and Scottish culture signifying folds (divisions within a family) or clans.
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Caids
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Such material includes documents relating to the recovery of shipwrecked seamen and other foreigners held captive
by Teknas in Western Sahara… or documents showing that on some occasions, notably the Sultan’s visit in 1882 and
1886, he received the allegiance of certain nomadic tribes which came from Western Sahara… and in letters from the
Sultan to Tekna caids requesting the performance of certain acts to the south of the Noun and the Dra’a. Sahara
Occidental (Reports of Judgments, Advisory Opinions and Orders) ICJ Advisory Opinion of 16 October 1975, 48.
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separateness despite being subject or non-subject to the Sultan. They had distinguished
themselves by self-government even if this charge was through devolution of power. Tribes had
developed trade hubs and were willing to exchange goods with the Europeans in spite of
Moroccan challenges. These social interactions provided stability and autonomy, which was
attached to territory, mostly with the more sedentary tribes. Tribal identity was strong but the
sense of a national identity was absent. Affinities were still very localized. There certainly were
several emerging tribal identities but not one that can be described as Sahrawi.
There is an ambiguity to the domain of the Sultanate over areas predominantly controlled
by the Tekna confederation in the Oued Nun, Sous River Valley extending to the Sequiet alHamra. These ambiguities pose a challenge to defining domains by political groups. If the task of
defining the territorial control of a political group in an environment of competition and intrigue
is challenging, how much more difficult can it be for identifying the roots of a nation? The Tekna,
descendants of the Almoravids and presently claimed by the POLSARIO to be the ancestors of
the Sahrawi, despite having once been subjugated and under the control of others (as confirmed
by the many scholarly sources) developed a ‘nation’—an established geographical area,
commercial system, and a sedentary, semi-nomadic, and nomadic way of life, with a small ruling
political system. Yet, the author of this work does not yet find strong evidence for an awareness
of ‘Sahrawiness’ or a defined Sahrawi identification, much less the establishment of the Saharawi
nation. On the contrary there were an abundance of tribal entities. The lack of Sahrawi national
presence in this period and in the preceding chapters does not preclude the fact that their origins
emerged from such historical accounts; the results of which are grounded in constructivist
arguments.
Another approach that could have shed some light on the creation of older ‘nations’ is a
sub-field of primordialism—perennialism. For instance, the Tekna (see map 6.3), Reguibayt,
Tajakant, Oulad Delim, and those tribes farther south in Tiris, Zemmour, the Adrar, and Brakna
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all have, to a degree, descended from Sanhaja Berbers. (see chapter three) These descendants
intermarried with Arabs and split into the several branches of the Sanhaja. The POLISARIO have
claimed that these tribes or at least the greater part of their composition belong to the Sahrawi
nation. These arguments may be derived from the idea that nations may be evident since
antiquity, or recurrent, disappearing but reappearing at a later time in a different fashion. Most of
these perennial arguments though seem to only fit verifiable, strong and established groups such
as the Jews, Greeks, Egyptians, who were present in antiquity and still exist today. 5,000 years
ago, there had not yet been one Sahrawi. Evidently, these arguments do not fit in the Sahrawi
case.
Furthermore, there are reports that acknowledge the independence of not only the Tekna
Confederation but also many other independencies. One example of a political entity that
developed alongside the Tekna (see map 6.3) and the Moroccan ‘Empire’ are the Reguibayt. The
Reguibayt were “[h]eirs of the baraka of their eponymous ancestor, Sharif Sid Ahmed Reguibi
established in the Seguiet el-Hamra in the XVI century”239 (Beslay 1984, 84). Scholars have not
agreed as to the origins or even the birth of their legendary founder of the Reguibayt. In fact,
there is even disagreement as to the actual territory that was controlled by this tribe. Criado writes
that, according to Mamadu Ahmadu Ba, “During its history, the Erguibat were never under
foreign domination. Politically, they were always independent of the Mauritanian emirs as the
Tekna caids’ representatives of His Sharifian Majesty in the rejected southern Anti-Atlas”240
(1977, 90). Zunes and Mundy have also stated that the Reguibayt had always rejected the
Sultan’s suzerainty (2010). Yet today, even though “the base of support for the POLISARIO is
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Translated from the French and translated by Dr. Maria Antonieta Garcia: Héretiers de la baraka de leur ancêtre
éponyme, le chérif Sid Ahmed Reguibi établi dans la Seguiet el-Hamra au XVI siècle. François Beslay, Les Reguibats:
De la Paix Française au Front POLISARIO, Paris: L’Harmattan, 1984, 82.
240

Taken from the Spanish and translated by the author: “Durante su historia, los Erguibat no fueron jamás sometidos a
dominación extranjera. Políticamente, fueron siempre independientes de los emires mauritanos como de los caids tekna
representantes del su Majestad Cherifiana en el sur del Antiatlas.”
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Map 6.3: Morocco 1894: Sultanate of Morocco and Rio de Oro Colony 241
among some of the Reguibat tribes of the east…the Reguibat tribes in the western part of the
[Western Sahara] territory as well as the Tekna confederation are largely pro-Moroccan.”
[Emphasis added] (Pham 2010, 16).
There is also documentation of tribes that settled and established small villages, then
cities without the direction of a regional leader, but far outside the sovereign control of the
Moroccan Sultan. For instance, as mentioned in the previous chapter, the Tajakant who enjoyed
nomadic living in the Adrar, once held the abandoned oasis of Tinigi. However, after being
ousted by the Reguibayt, they established the Saharan city of Tindouf that later became a central
caravan hub (Lydon 2009, 155).242 In fact, the Tekna, recognizing the Tajakant’s value to
trading, became allied to them by the late 1850s. There were also Hassani (mostly Arab) tribes
that “triumphed in the beginning of the eighteenth century over the Ideyeselli, who until then
dominated the oases and grazing grounds of Adrar… [and] represented in that period a unity of
tribes with segmentary lineages” (Bonte 1981, 46). The authors state that these tribes later
organized themselves as a Moorish Emiral state around the Emiral lineage of Shaykh Ahel Etman
(Bonte, 48). In addition, Pennell describes how, despite the nomination in 1882-84 by the
Moroccan Sultan, Moulay Hassan I, of a local khalifa “over the Figuig oases, and in 1892 a local
administrator over the Touat…the population243 refused either to pay taxes or to recognize the
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Translated from the Spanish and translated by the author: “Marruecos 1894: Sultanato de Marruecos y Colonia Río
de Oro-Poderes Reales/Imperiales,” Euroatlas.net, 2014. http://www.euratlas.net/index_en.html. Accessed July 31,
2015. http://www.euratlas.net/history/hisatlas/africa/es_1894marocTRZ.html.
242
Apparently, Tindouf was an important trading city that connected Oued Nun, Tazeroualt, Tafilalet, and the oasis of
Tuat. Lydon On Trans-Saharan Trails, 155.
243

This refusal by the population may have been in part to support the Algerian rebel leader, Bu Amaran, as these
communities resided on the Algerian-Moroccan frontier. Pennell, on the other hand, will state “in the Sous, local
leaders undermined the Makhzan’s authority not by fighting but by trading with the Europeans.” However, it is unclear
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authority of the Sultan’s qaids” (Pennell 2000, 100).
The absence of sovereign control over the peripheral areas surrounding Morocco allowed
for the independent tribes to flourish and create their principalities. It allowed for the
development of distinct tribal identities. It also alters the nomadic lifestyle of some tribes, now
even in the deep south. The major northern tribes of the Western Sahara such as the Tekna,
Reguibayt, and Tajakant become urban and more powerful. The smaller tribes seek alliances.
These examples demonstrate that there was no one ‘national’ identity that bonded all tribes; they
had become self-sufficient, autonomous. In fact, tribes fractured through conflict, divisions, or
because of demographic agricultural limitations. They also merged because of conquest, through
inter-breeding, or the loss of grazing and water shortages necessitating alliance with others. Tribal
identities, at least for smaller tribes shifted. Although these examples provide glimpses of
territorially-independent tribal identities, they still do not prove that there was evidence of a grand
Saharan, or much less, Sahrawi ‘national’ identity. In the southern extremities of the Western
Sahara, similar developments are taking place.

Independent Entities in the Southwestern Sahara
In 1724, Moulay Ismail “sent an army to support southern Saharan Arabs against the French
along the Senegal River” (Cleaveland 2002, 99). However, this would become one of the last
instances in which a Sultan would be able to intervene in the politics of the southwestern Sahara.
A detailed study on the Walati,244 confirms that this was another decidedly independent region
with rich history. “An early twentieth-century Walati chronicle conferred on Mulay Ismail and
the other Alawi sultans the title of Amir al-Mu’minin (Commander of the Faithful)” [Emphasis
and still would require much more study as to the nature of the makhzen (Moroccan administration) authority. Morocco
since 1830,
244
Walati were a “people from the Saharan oasis called Walata or Oulata, which is about 300 hundred kilometers west
from Timbuktu.” Walata is located in present-day southeastern Mauritania. Timothy Cleaveland, Becoming Walata: A
History of Saharan Social Formation and Transformation (Portsmouth, NH: Heineman, 2002), xix.
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added] (ibid.). However, Cleaveland adds that this same chronicler, along with other Walati
leaders had publicly “submitted to Ahmad, the son of Fulani jihadist ‘Umar Tal, in 1873,
describing both as commanders of the faithful” [Emphasis added] (Cleaveland, 99). The Walati
chronicles “leave the reader with the impression that Walatis never considered themselves part of
the Sa’adian or Alawi domains, and give much more attention to the Ruma245 [or arma] regime in
Timbuktu246 and Fulani politics in Masina” (ibid.). In fact, based on scholarship outside the
scope of this study and other oral histories, there were several independent confederations that
rose, fought, and declined in the Tagant, the area surrounding the town of Walata, and in the
Hawd247 (ibid., 103-104).
Lydon speaks of certain regional Emirs (see map 6.4) that came to power in the
southwestern and southern Saharan. Ahmad Mawlud Wuld ‘Abd al-Wadud Wuld Intaha’s
describes this period of relative stability:
The coming to power of (the Emir of Adrar) Ahmad Wuld Muhammad (a.k.a.
Lemhammad) Wuld ‘Abdy. He was just and he entertained good relations with
Bakar Wuld Swayd Ahmad (Idawish Emir of Taganit) and ‘Aly Wuld
Muhammad Lahbib (Emir of Trarza) and Muhammad Mahmud Lahaymid (Emir
of Brakna) and Dahman Wuld Bayruk (Tikna leader of Guelmim in Wad Nun)
and Mulay al-Hasan (Sultan of Morocco)248 (2009, 127-128).
245

The Arabic term ruma(h), translated as ‘musketeers’ in English, is the plural form of rami (shooter), the name given
to the combined Sa’adian army of Sultan Ahmad al-Mansur of “Spanish, Berber, and Arab mercenary soldiers who
participated in the Moroccan conquest of Timbuktu in 1591.” This army settled and mixed “with the local elites,
becoming the ruling caste.” John O. Hunwick and Alida Jay Boye, The Hidden Treasures of Timbuktu: Historic city of
Islamic Africa, London (Thames & Hudson) 2008, 154. Al-rumah later passed into Songhay as arma, the term used for
the Moroccan ruling elite in Timbuktu post-1591, whose descendants still form a social class. John O. Hunwick, edited,
Timbuktu and the Songhay Empire: Al-Sa’di’s Ta’rikh Al-Sudan Down to 1613 and Other Contemporary Documents
(Boston: Brill, 1999), 166, 197.
246

Ahmad al-Mansur’s march south toward the southern fringes of the Sahara defeated the Songhay Empire, and
subsequently, the Arma or al-rumah (in Arabic) administration that was established by the Sa’adian Sultan became
independent of his rule by 1618.
247

The Hawd is a term that means “Arabic for ‘basin,’ and refers to the regions’ lower topography in relations to the
neighboring Tagant highlands, and the elevated plateau to the north and northwest, respectively. In Saharan narratives,
the Hawd was the ‘end of the line,’ one of the last regions where groups claiming Arab origins exerted hegemony over
indigenous farmers and herders.” John H. Hanson, Migration, Jihad, and Muslim Authority in West Africa: The
Futanke Colonies in Karta, (Indianapolis: Inmdian University Press) 1996, 49.
248

Ahmad Mawlud Wuld ‘Abd al-Wadud Wuld Intaha. Ta’rikh Adrar, Manuscript by his son Jilil b. ‘Abd al-Qadar b.
Intaha (1934) quoted in Lydon, Trans-Saharan Trails, 127-128.
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The Adrari Emir Lemhammad is claimed to have “brought relative peace and great prosperity,
assisted by several years of abundant rains” to the region (ibid., 127).
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Indeed, Lydon

Map 6.4: 1876 Map of the Western Sahara
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This map shows, magnified within the westernmost red lines, 1) the “Aderer” or Adrar Emirate; 2) At the
southwestern-most point, the Trarza Emirate; 3) To the east and last to be formed, the Emirate of the Tagant; 4) Finally,
due north are the independencies of the ‘Uled’ Tidrarin, the Arusin (otherwise known as the Arosien Tribe), the
Ergrebat (or in this study spelled as the Reguibayt), and the Tajakant located south and southeast of the ‘Wad’ Nun and
the Sakiat el Hamra River Valleys. (Not magnified but on the map is also the Emirate of Brakna) E. G. Ravenstein,
“The Western Sahara,” in Sir Clements R. Markham, ed., The Geographical Magazine III (Trubner and Company:
London), January 1 1876, 12. Google Play Books.
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also adds that Emir Lemhammad signed several agreements “with Dahman bin Beyruk, then the
Tikna ruler of Guelmim” (2009, 127).

Bonte reports “the ‘customs’ paid by the French

merchants to the Moorish chiefs…strongly reinforced the powers of the emirs” (1981, 46).
McDougall and Steele describe that, “by the mid- to late eighteenth century, it is clear that the
sultan’s interests in the region (Tegaza to Timbuktu) remained strong; moreover, his authority
was recognized as legitimate by at least some important Saharans” [Emphasis added] (2012, 52).
However, a correspondence with the Sultan of Morocco about tariffs on salt, explains: “The
famous shaykh Sidi al-Mukhtar al-Kunti claimed that the Kunta250 should be exempt from paying
salt taxes not because the sultan had no right to levy them in the first place, but because as a
respected family of venerated saints, the Kunta should answer to no secular authority, such as
Moroccan representatives, or qa’ids” (McDougall and Steele 2012, 52).
McDougall and Scheele reveal details on specific autonomous entities by exploring their
caravan trade networks (ibid., 44-45). Lydon used a diaspora framework that centered on the
growth and fluctuation of trade routes, which originated in the Tekna heartland in southern
Morocco, to exert control over the Western Sahara. Alternatively, Norris saw control of the
Sahara as part of the Arab mentality of conquest through “the agency of local Saharans” (A.
McDougall 2012, 45). Control over the southwestern Sahara, even in the late nineteenth century
was still in doubt and indicates that the Sultan could not have had proper dominion over these
territories. As a result, Morocco’s King today, cannot claim that these lands have been
historically apart of the Kingdom. Still, there was no Sahrawi Emirate or Emir that was building a
conglomeration of Saharan tribes.
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It is important to mention that the Kunta were not always of one mind. “During the same historical moment
(purportedly ca. 1766-1767) mentioned above, a western branch of the Kunta family claimed ownership of the Ijil
mine—but reportedly, only after seeking approval from the Moroccan Sultan.” E. Ann McDougall, “On Being
Saharan,” in James McDougall and Judith Scheele, eds., Saharan Frontiers: Space and Mobility in Northwest Africa,
(Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2012), 52.
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Rather, there appear to be several independently flourishing, not just semi-nomadic tribal
confederations but sedentary principalities in the Western Sahara along the Atlantic coast from
south of the Sous River Valley to the vicinity of the Senegal River. The Hassaniya language, the
practice of pastoralism (for those more semi-sedentary), nomadism and semi-nomadism, raiding,
and Islam were all suitable features of identity that could have facilitated the union among tribes.
Yet, there was no common bond that tied these tribes together as ‘nation.’ Identity remained
tribal. In addition, despite disagreements among scholars about Moroccan authority over certain
groups, tribes were already ‘self-aware.’ Tribal identity was tied to the family of clans, who
participated in a separate sphere of local body politics distinct from wider ‘Moroccan’ aspirations.
There is no evidence that these tribal communities were aware of a greater socio-political
consciousness other than what was locally known to them. Thus, despite the relative
independence of several tribal confederations, in and around modern Western Sahara, even
among groups who the POLISARIO claim are ‘pre-Sahrawi,’ this did not feature as part of a
Sahrawi autonomous identity.

Conclusion
There does not seem to be cohesive notions of ‘Sahrawiness’ in the latter half of the nineteenth
century based on the features discussed in the introduction (Hassaniya vernacular, territorial
affinity, and tribal autonomy) to this historical period. Seeking Sahrawi origins based on these
elements of identity throughout history remains elusive. These elements of identity provide for
group consciousness but it does not offer conclusive results for establishing a national identity.
Rather than searching for the ‘genesis’ of origins as Armstrong refers to, perhaps it would be
better to seek patterns or the persistence of ethnic attachments (1982, 4). These are, according to
his typology, based on latent, conditioned, and framework attachments (ibid., 288). In other
words, language, a nostalgia for nomadism, or the identification with one’s group genealogy as a
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persistent feature of identity is key to building a nation. If then, there is no substantive evidence
for a discernable Sahrawi identity at this time, what can be said is that there are latent attachments
that have laid the groundwork for an identity.
For instance, the Jewish, Greek, and possibly Egyptian people can trace their origins to
antiquity despite today’s modern, re-conceptualized form of national identity. They feel proud of
their ancient history, take care in restoring their symbols and heritage in spite of the gap in
thousands of years of history. The same may be warranted for the modern Sahrawi. Underlying or
layers of ethnic attachments begin to take hold and bond to the Saharan: a genealogical
framework tied to the clan, then tribe, expanding to the confederation of tribes; a territorial
affinity also perhaps tied to genealogical history. Group autonomy, not one of Armstrong’s
underlying attachments, serves to enhance group consciousness through patterns of collective
management. The Sahrawi also speak a distinct form of Arabic called Hassaniya. These layers of
identity have taken shape over time. If viewed in this sense, then we may find that origins of
Sahrawi national identity have been taking shape all along and this period of analysis adds to their
history. If these layers are viewed as mutually exclusive elements of identity, then one can only
speak tribal identities at this juncture.
The constructivist hypothesis sought for socialization and historical forces that would
combine cultural artifacts with social constructs. Socialization involved commerce exchange,
conflict (ghazzian raids), political engagement (through agreements and accords with fellow
Saharan tribes, including the Sultanate, and Europeans), and interactions with each other
(alliances). These interactions were made by largely independent political entities; tribes that
were autonomous. These tribes were led by either their shaykhs or emirs. The instrumentalist
hypothesis, however, does not have much support in this period because no leader or group of
elites resolved to unify all, or a majority of tribes, in the greater Western Sahara toward a greater
cause for ‘national’ cohesion.
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A better conclusion rests in the knowledge that there have been several layers of identity
developing over time. Social and historical forces have forged independent groups acting in
opposition to or sometimes in conjunction with Europeans and the Sultanate. The ethno-cultural
resources for identity have been identified but they have not fully merged with the leaders and
elites of the disparate tribes. The tribes remain aloof from any ‘national’ objective. Identity
remains local. The moment for the emergence of the Sahrawi has not yet become apparent but the
groundwork (latent ethno-cultural elements) has been laid for the next historical period.
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VII. A NEW POPULATION EMERGES: THE DAWN OF THE SAHRAWI
(1884 —1973)
This chapter completes the socio-historical analysis through 1973. In 1973, the
POLISARIO Front became the ‘guardians’ of the Sahrawi movement that today seeks to free the
Western Sahara from Moroccan control. Initially established in 1973, the Front had garnered the
support from much, if not all, of the ‘Sahrawi’ population. Its claims, in addition to those of
scholars who report on the status of the Western Sahara, are based in part on a historical lineage
of Sahrawi characteristics that fall in line with arguments from primordialism. As researched by
the author of this work, these claims have been somewhat vague, inconsistent, and only serve to
argue against the propriety of Moroccan control over the region. Moreover, evidence for a distinct
group of Saharans that represented the region of the Western Sahara has been difficult to
demonstrate. In fact, the research shows that there were several distinct groupings that
represented political entities that inhabited the ‘Greater Western Sahara.’
The question remains where the origins of Sahrawi identity lie. Primordial claims begin
to take shape at this time, but they do not support one distinct group, namely the Sahrawi, but
several independent political entities. The contention, an identity forged from the oppression and
marginalization by the Moroccan state and/or the subjugation of colonialism, seem only more
clear at the end of this period. The appropriation of Sahrawi identity by independence-seeking
groups, such as the POLISARIO, may have been the key development that formalized a
‘Sahrawi’ identity. However, the constructivist premise that past and present day struggles
formed the catalyst that helped to coalesce opposition groups will be discussed later in this
chapter. It also incorporates the end solution created by the major powers at the end of the
nineteenth century (1884-85 and 1906) that established borders (see map 7.1) and subsequently
created 'international barriers' that interfered and divided both the long-established nomadic
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Map 7.1: The Spanish Sahara in 1903 251
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Map Adapted and taken from Alberto Martin, “Posesiones Españolas en África: Costa Occidental (Sahara Español
(Rio de Oro) y Sta. Cruz de Mar Pequeña, Golfo Guinea (Islas de Fernando-Póo, Annobón, Corisco y Elobey y Guinea
Española (Territorio del Muni)), Barcelona, 1903.
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lifestyle and independence of those residing in the region. Research indicates that all these
arguments are valid but a sense of group ONLY appealed about twenty years prior to the
formation of the POLISARIO.
This chapter argues that ethno-cultural resources have been developing for some time.
These features of identity, however have not adequately transformed the tribes of the Western
Sahara into one cohesive national identity. The primordialist hypothesis is weak without more
support. As the major European powers directly become involved in the colonization of the area,
resistance begins. The constructivist hypothesis argues that opposition to European intrusion
catapulted the union of many tribes and reaffirmed tribal independence. It will ask whether
European colonization stimulated identity formation among the pre-Sahrawi in this last period of
history. The instrumentalist argument will also be assessed with the account of Ma’ al-‘Aynayn
and his followers. All three arguments can be examined in light of the dynamics of the period to
determine of a Sahrawi nation emerges.

The Europeans Move Inland
If the preceding chapters failed to draw a clear picture of the origins of the Sahrawi, it is due to
the ambiguous nature of the development of Sahrawi national identity. Moreover, just when
Saharan history is re-oriented by independent political entities arising in the nineteenth century,
Morocco’s southern frontier became embroiled in further territorial disputes with Europeans who
encroached into the interior of northwest Africa. The French had already begun limited
engagements with the political entities at the southern fringes of the Western Sahara. Spain had at
various times (January 1873, 1883, July 1885) attempted to gain ports of trade on the Atlantic
coast of Morocco as compensation for the attacks waged by Rif tribes (supported by the Sultan)
and against its northern territories (Ceuta, Melilla). The Sultan preferred to negotiate a financial
settlement with Spain. Sultan Moulay Hassan I decided to move on the independent commercial
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centers of “Oued Noun and Tazeroualt” off the Atlantic coast in 1882 and 1886,252 “fearing that
other European interests would gain a foothold on the coast” (Trout 1969, 152).
These actions conspired to reduce ‘control’ by the Sultan of Morocco over the
southernmost regions of the Western Sahara, and encouraged stronger feelings of tribal identity
among Western Saharans beyond the Oued Nun, the Oued Dra’a, indeed into the Oued Sequiet
el-Hamra. The actions by France, Spain and other powers brings us to the following questions. (1)
Did European colonization have a crystallizing effect on Sahrawi national identity? Or (2) did the
anti-colonial opposition movements have a significant effect on Sahrawi national identity? These
answers are shaped by four developments: A) European commercial ventures in the region; B) the
1884-1885 Berlin Conference; C) the several treaties between the Sultan and the European
powers; D) intensification in the power of tribal autonomy.
First, the colonizers pursued not only commercial ventures on the coast but also
exploratory missions to the interior of the Sahara (in search of even more marketable resources
and more navigable transport routes). Various geographical societies of the age sponsored these
explorations. The British bypassed direct conversations with the Sultan by employing Scottish
trader, Donald Mackenzie, who only consulted with Shaykh Beyruk for a ‘portion’ of land
labeled as the ‘Tarfaya Strip.’253 Mackenzie then established the North-West African Company
(1879) in order to extend British trade in the area. The dispute254 between Morocco and the tribes
that aided Mackenzie over Cape Juby would go on for twenty years. Shortly before Sultan Hassan
252

Trout states that “as a result of these campaigns, as series of Moroccan posts were established to the south of
Agadir: at Tiznit, Kasbah Ba Amrane, Assaka, and at Goulmine.” Frank E. Trout. Morocco’s Saharan Frontiers,
(Geneva: Librarie Droz, 1969), 152.
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The Tarfaya Strip, or ‘Tarfaya,’ “called by the natives” as such, beginning with Cape Juby, was according to (Lt.Gen.) Sir Arthur Cotton, “was some 100 miles south of the Wad Draa, which is recognized as the southern boundary of
the Sultan of Morocco’s territory, and 50 miles north of the river Sakiet el Hamra.” The Story of Cape Juby, (London:
Waterlow and Sons, 1894), 21, 2. Google Play Books. Accessed September 16 2015.
254

Cotton describes that the area agreed upon with the Shaykh Beyruk “should be remembered that it is in free and
independent Tekna, occupied by the tribes constituting the Ait al Jamel, and below the Wad Draa, the southern
boundary of the Sultan’s dominions, that the North-West African Company has settled.” Ibid., 21.
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I’s death in 1892, the British consented to sell “Mackenzie’s trading station to the Moroccans for
a sum of £50,000” (Trout 1969, 154). Subsequently, in a turn of events in favor of Morocco, the
first clause of the Treaty of 1895 stated, “If this [Moroccan] Government buy the buildings, etc.,
…no one will have any claim to the lands that are between Wad Draa and Cape Bojador, and
which are called Terfaya… and all the lands behind it, because all this belongs to the territory of
Morocco” (Herstlet 1909, 970).
There are two different accounts as to the claim of the southernmost limits of Morocco
(See Trout 151-152 and Rézette 59-72). Rézette argues that Spain’s ambitions were not only to
open ports of entry and thereby the exploration of the ‘hinterland’ but also “to prevent other
powers, especially England from doing so” (1975, 55). For example, La Sociedad Española de
Geografía Comercial (SGC), La Sociedad Española de Africanistas y Colonialistas (SAC), and La
Sociedad Geográfica de Madrid (1876) were able to send various explorers and entrepreneurs to
southern Morocco on behalf of Spain (Burke III 1972, 178-179). In an excerpt from Algueró
Cuervo:
Spain, via the Canary fishermen, retained, into the nineteenth century, a presence,
token if you will, but effective, on the African coast in proximity to the Canary
Islands. For that reason, when in 1876 ... Mackenzie created a trading post in
Cape Juby, in a zone—supposedly abandoned—vital for Spain, the indignant
voices were raised of those who represented the Hispanic version of Africanism
that was already prevailing in Europe255 (2006, 49).
The Spanish sought to emulate British action by negotiating with the tribes of Ouled Delim. In
1884, these actions established ports of entry for trade at the Rio de Oro bay in September 1881
(“bounded by what is now the coast and peninsula of Villa Cisneros”) and other trading stations
in November and December of 1884 (Rézette 1975, 59). Moreover, the Spanish, not wanting to
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Translated from the Spanish by the author: “España, a través de los Pescadores canarios, conservaba, entrado el
siglo XIX, una presencia, testimonial si se quiere, pero efectiva, en la costa Africana próxima a Canarias. Por eso,
cuando en 1876…Mackenzie creó una factoría comercial en Cabo Juby, en una zona—supuestamente abandonada—
vital para España, se alzaron las indignadas voces de quienes representaban la versión hispana de un africanismo que
triunfaba ya en la Europa.” José Ignacio Agueró Cuervo, El Sahara y España: Claves du una Descolonización
Pendiente, (Las Palmas de Gran Canaria: Ediciones Idea, 2006), 49.

201

get involved in the dispute over Cape Juby (given to Mackenzie by the tribes therein on behalf of
the British) pushed farther south of Cape Juby.
Second, in the 1884-1885 Berlin Conference the Great Powers accorded themselves the
right to take not only coastal emplacements in Africa, but also the interior lands, so long as the
inhabitants acquiesced to their rule. Needless to say, these decisions were discussed without the
consent of any African representatives. Spain publicly ‘declared’ to the competing powers (July
1885)256 that the “Spanish protectorate of the African coast” extended from Cape Blanc to Cape
Bojador (Rézette, 60; Trout, 151; Agueró Cuervo, 51-52). There were numerous treaties between
the Spain, France, and Britain and the Emirates in southern Western Sahara, the Sultanate of
Morocco, and with Algeria.
At this juncture European fascination with northwest Africa impeded any effort to bring
about greater western Saharan, much less Sahrawi, unification. Moreover, European exploration
highlighted disputes over the southern delimitations of the Sultan’s dominion. Trout explains it
well when he writes that “at the close of the nineteenth century,” when Morocco’s southwestern
borders were being debated: “It was impossible to give credit to Moroccan pretentions when there
was no evidence of existence of any Moroccan administrative control either in Mauritania or in
the Soudan [i.e., modern day Mali]. The issue that arose was instead the question of where lay the
southern-most limits of the bled-es-siba” (Trout 1969, 144).

The bilad as-siba, or land of

dissidence, would remain an area of contested control despite the independencies present at the
time. Although the Sultan laid claim to areas as far as the Senegal, at no point is there evidence
that did the population acknowledged them, administratively, politically, or even culturally. In
fact, as the scholarship demonstrates, the only recognition was within the context of spiritual
authority. The problem was not the existence of a Moroccan Kingdom; Rather, the problem was
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However, this declaration was made on December 26, 1884 to the Great Powers and then later placed in writing on
January 14, 1885. Robert Rézette, The Western Sahara and the Frontiers of Morocco (Paris: Novelles Edition Latine,
1975), 60.
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determining those geographical boundaries, and assessing whether the Kingdom’s physical,
territorial influence extended up to these ends. Written works on the socio-historical development
of the northwestern Sahara has thus far not revealed far-reaching support for a (historical)
‘Greater Morocco’ that dominated lands beyond the Sous and Dra’a River Valleys, much less
deep into the southwestern Sahara approaching the Senegal.
Third, several treaties and agreements on behalf of the European powers, diminished the
Sultan’s power and influence over not only the disputed territory, but also his own. These treaties
began to fragment any unifying momentum from the time of the Ma’ Al-‘Aynayn-led rebellion.
For example, the Treaty of Muni (or Paris) signed (27 June 1900) by both Spain and France
established their possessions on the coast of the Sahara but did not take into account its
inhabitants. According to Barbier, the treaty, “In fact, [it] only covered the southern and
southeastern border of the Rio de Oro, la Seguiet el Hamra being ignored [or set aside].
Moreover, as they did not know the country very well, that border was essentially based on the
meridians and parallels, without taking into account its inhabitants” (Barbier 1982, 58). Again, in
1902, further negotiations257 between France and Spain delineated “their respective spheres of
influence in Morocco” (ibid., 59). Article 3 of the 1902 convention stated that,
it determined the dividing line between the French and Spanish spheres of
influence. In particular, it gave Spain a zone in the north ... and another in the
south, which was located between the Rio de Oro and the Oued Sous and
included Seguiet al Hamra, the Tarfaya area, the Draâ, the Nun and the AntiAtlas. This showed that the Moroccan government did not exercise its authority
over the region located south of the Oued Sous and neither France nor Spain
recognized such authority258 [Emphasis added] (ibid.)
257

These negotiations resulted in a draft convention on November 8, 1902 but was not ratified. Maurice Barbier, Le
Conflit du Sahara Occidental, (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1982), 59.
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Taken from the French and translated by Dr. Maria Antonieta Garcia: En 1902, il y eut de nouvelles négociations
entre la France et l'Espagne, en vue de délimiter leurs zones d'influence respectives au Maroc. Ces négociations
aboutirent à un projet de convention le 8 novembre 1902, mais qui ne fut pas ratifié. Dans son article 3, celui-ci
déterminait la ligne de démarcation entre les sphères d'influence française et espagnole. En particulier, il accordait à
l'Espagne une zone dans le nord, ... et une autre dans le sud, qui était située entre le Rio de Oro et l'oued Sous et
comprenait la Seguiet al Hamra, la région de Tarfaya, le Draá, le Noun et l'Anti-Atlas. Cela montrait que le
gouvernement marocain n'exerçait pas son autorité sur la région se trouvant au sud de l'oued Sous et que ni la France,
ni l'Espagne ne reconnaissaient une telle autorité. Barbier, Le Conflit du Sahara Occidental, 59.
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The secret convention of 1904 in Paris and another in Madrid in 1912 also led to further
European appropriation of the lands in the northwest Sahara. These conventions confirmed that
(despite Morocco’s claims to most of the northwest Sahara) the colonial powers did not
acknowledge any Moroccan authority to the lands adjacent to its peripheral south and southeast.
In 1904, a clandestine agreement between France and Spain affirmed their rights and interests in
the region. “The agreement determined the sphere of influence of Spain on the Moroccan
Mediterranean coast. It also fixed the boundaries of the settlement conceded by Morocco to Spain
in Santa Cruz de Mar Pequeña, that is to say Ifni, under the treaty of 1860 (Article 4). Finally, it
completed the Spanish Sahara border (see map 7.1 above) and delimited the sphere of influence
of the French and Spanish in the south”259 (ibid., 60). In November of 1911, German ambitions
in North Africa were made known at the resolution to the Second Moroccan Crisis (or Agadir
Crisis of July 1911). The resolution included two letters of understanding between France and
Germany. Barbier stressed what was not found in those letters, “the recognition by France and
Germany of Morocco 's borders and sovereignty on the Seguiet el Hamra and Mauritania…the
context clearly shows that it is not so”260 (ibid., 61).
France and Spain needed to ascertain that they were really free “to exercise their
influence” within the frontiers of Morocco. However, this was not possible, because clear limits
did not exist. They had to indicate the zones of influence (ibid.). The treaties “recognized Spain’s
freedom of action in the territories of Saguia al-Hamra and Cape Juby, ‘which are outside the
borders of Morocco’” (Abi-Mershed and Farrar 2014, 12). Also, Merry Del Val writes that
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“la convention déterminait la sphère d’influence de l’Espagne sur la côte marocaine de la Méditerranée. Elle fixait
aussi les limites de l’établissement concédé par le Maroc à l’Espagne à Santa Cruz de Mar Pequeña, c’est-à-dire à Ifni,
en vertu du traité de 1860 (article 4). Enfin, elle complétait la frontière du Sahara espagnol, délimitait ainsi les sphère
d’influence française et espagnole dans le sud.” Barbier, Le Conflit du Sahara Occidental, 60.
260

Taken from the French: “une reconnaissance par la France et l’Allemagne des frontières du Maroc et de sa
souveraineté sur la Seguiet el Hamra et la Mauritanie: “le contexte montre clairement qu’il n’en est rien.” Ibid., 61.
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Map 7.2: 1912 Territorial Distribution of Western Sahara261
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The above legend is written in Hungarian and translates as ‘Country’ (Ország), ‘Territory’ (Terület), and ‘Limit’
(Határ). Map taken from Attilio Gaudio, “Les Populations du Sahara Occidental: Histoire, Vie, et Culture,” (Paris:
Karthala, 1993), 48, in János Besenyő, “Western-Sahara under the Spanish Empire,” AARMS (Academic and Applied
Research in Military and Public Management Science) 9, No. 2 (2010), 201.
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apart from the northern zones and Sidi Ifni, “From Cape Nun southwards the Spanish zone begins
once more, extending on the south to Cape Bojador, the northern limit of our colony of Rio de
Oro, and on the east to meridian 11˚ W. of Paris (see map 7.2 above). The famous Sakiet el
Hamra marks the extreme limit of the Shereefian Empire, if indeed this realm ever extended so
far” (411, 1920). By 1913, Spain began deploying troops to its northern territories. It had
garnered several possessions in the Sahara and across Morocco. However, some of these,
including Ifni, had still not been occupied due to financial setbacks and other military delays
caused by the interruption of World War I.
As agreements indicate, the colonial powers of Europe were cognizant that there was a
physical Kingdom of Morocco and that it had a prominent role in North African politics.
However, it also acknowledged that the Sultan’s influence or authority could not have extended
beyond the disputed areas extending along the coast, in the region of Oued Nun, the Sous, Oued
Dra’a, or farther south to the Sequiet el-Hamra. Based on this understanding, the Spanish, French,
and British undertook bilateral diplomatic and commercial exchanges with the independent tribes.
They viewed these populations as separate political entities distinct from ‘Morocco.’ There was
even more uncertainty inland, to the south and southwest of Morocco, which was also undefined.
These developments rapidly gave the independent tribes of the Western Sahara more power to
maneuver and also gave them a bigger stake in the welfare of the region; in essence, an enhanced
group awareness.
With the exception of the account (section below) of Ma’ Al-‘Aynayn’s creation of a
cohesive force for the purpose of throwing off the colonizers, there was still no evidence of the
formation of a ‘Sahrawi national identity.’ In fact, these treaties and ‘handshakes’ among the
powers of Europe only served to fragment the physical boundaries of the tribal inhabitants. The
bilateral negotiating nature of Britain, France, and Spain with the tribes exploited tribal rivalries
and fears. It also alarmed the Sultan. Independent tribes, cognizant of European meddling with
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fellow rival tribes, maneuvered to counter the threat. They either cooperated to gain (economic)
advantages or resisted to maintain their security with the European powers to offset any
disadvantages with fellow tribes. Thus, a tribal balance of power developed in the Western Sahara
that pitted tribes against each other, but enhancing their group consciousness.
In short, rather than solidify a consensus of ‘national’ resistance, European intrusion only
served to strengthen tribal rivalries, fragmenting them even more. These agreements merely
dictated territorial boundaries, not the manner of governance in these possessions. Clearly what is
observed from these documents and agreements is the recognition of a Kingdom and his
possessions, of which still had not been defined properly. Distinctions that can be made are those
of tribal rule versus dynastic rule, territorial domains of the Sultan and those that were not, and
perhaps a sentiment of opposition against both the Sultan and Europeans. Did these agreements
influence the identity of the populations that were not under the rule of the Sultan? They did not.
They merely acknowledged that the populations south of the Kingdom were governed by other
independent chiefs. These independent confederations of tribes had established tribal identities
but had not begun to coalesce into a distinctive Western Saharan collectivity. A Sahrawi national
identity is still not apparent. Below, the fourth development of the period is analyzed.

Tribal Distinctiveness
Fourth, competing tribal identities was historically the underlying, fundamental obstacle to an
entire Saharan ‘collective.’ By now, an interesting identity paradox vis-à-vis Moroccan identity
had developed. On the one hand, a distinct Saharan culture, divided amongst the several nomadic
and semi-nomadic tribes across the northwestern and southwestern Sahara, had been established.
These claims have been evident in this work and cited by several other Saharan scholars. They
exist in yet-to-be studied manuscripts of the greater Western Sahara. The point here is that this
scholarship highlights the historical, linguistic, and socio-cultural differences between the
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Saharan tribal nomad/semi-nomad and the sedentary, urban Moroccan. These distinctions are
extremely subtle. If one were to speak to the ‘Sahrawi,’ they adamantly differentiate themselves
from their northern neighbors and explicitly re-state how the foods, dress, role of women, and
even the practice of Islam is different from that of a Moroccan.
In keeping with this point, the foods, as experienced while visiting the area, were
somewhat different. These differences reflect an influence by Spanish colonization. At least once
a day, meals included a Spanish paella, which was then customized to Sahrawi tastes. In terms of
dress, there is the daraa robe262 worn by men, in contrast to the djellaba worn by both men and
women in Morocco and Algeria. Sahrawi adult women wear a different outfit that includes a head
covering, called the malahfa263 (or melhfa). In Morocco, the women wear the hijab or niqab,
sometimes with the djellaba. Islam, as the writer was told, also has very subtle differences due to
the urban-nomadic environments. Most of the Arab world, before daily prayers, will complete
ablution with water. Throughout the centuries, the Muslims of the Sahara, due to water scarcity,
have used sand to mimic the cleansing before praying. Perhaps the biggest difference of all is
language. The Sahrawi speak the Arabic dialect of Hassaniya264 (see map 7.3 below) while most
Moroccans speak Derija (Moroccan dialect). Both are not spoken anywhere else in the Arab
world except in their respective regions and they exist mostly in oral form. The two versions are
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The Daraa robe a loose gown with two openings on the sides and a pocket on the breast. The gown is usually either
white or blue. “daraa,” Cultural Website of the Sahara, accessed on January 14, 2016, CORCAS 2016,
http://www.sahara-culture.com/Default.aspx?tabid=416.
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This is a four-meter long by one meter and sixty-centimeter-wide piece of fabric/cloth worn by the Sahraoui woman
wherever she goes. “Al malahfa,” Cultural Website of the Sahara, accessed on January 14, 2016, CORCAS 2016,
accessed on January 14, 2016, http://www.sahara-culture.com/Default.aspx?tabid=416. “The Melhfa is a tradition that
is found in Sahrawi culture far back in time. The Melhfa is one of the cultural traditions that make the Sahrawi nation
distinctive from other peoples.” Silje Rivelsrud, “The Sahrawi Refugees and their National Identity: A Qualitative
Study of How the Sahrawi Refugees Present their National Identity in Online Blogs,” MA Thesis, Universitete I Olso,
May 2010, 52.
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Hassaniya became the dominant language among Saharans in the seventeenth century. Today, it is the national
language of Mauritania, spoken mostly in oral form.
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Map 7.3: Location of Majority Hassaniya Speakers265
not entirely mutually unintelligible but differences exist in phonology and syntax. Although
some scholars describe each dialect as a different language altogether.
One of the more surprising differences with respect to language was the adoption of
Spanish. Many educated Sahrawi today speak Spanish, which is directly tied to the influence of
Spanish colonization. The author found himself pleasantly surprised when many of the
POLISARIO interviewed spoke Spanish. However, in the interviews, none made reference to this
feature as part of their identity. During the author’s stay in Morocco while a Peace Corps
Volunteer and a diplomatic intern in Rabat, the language of choice was French.266 Even while
training as a volunteer in Immouzer-Tandar, Morocco, a predominantly Berber-speaking
265
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(Tamazight) city, most of the educated spoke in French. It was peculiar to find that the people did
not identify with these colonial languages as being part of their respective national identities.
However, despite their dislike of colonialism, both populations use these languages as tools for
advancement, education, and activism267 (as in the case of the Sahrawi).
These apparent, cultural markers seem to differentiate Saharan and Moroccan identity.
On the other hand, the second point in this paradox has been described sufficiently in the previous
chapters. Despite claims of distinctiveness from Morocco, far from being of one mind, or of one
cohesive national identity, the Saharans in this ‘land of the Moors’ “never experienced political
unity” (Hodges 1983a, 30) . As mentioned in previous chapters, Saharan society “was made up
of a number of autonomous, often conflicting emirates, confederations and tribes” (ibid., 30-31).
The northwestern, western, and even peripheral southwestern Saharan emirates, confederations of
tribes and sub-tribes traded and intermarried with each other. Nonetheless, they also commonly
warred with one another, creating deep blood feuds that carried over for hundreds of years. The
violence could include conflict over cattle, land, trade routes, and personal vendettas. In
summary, the overall theme seems to be of a certain separateness from others based on important
socio-cultural characteristics evident to the native Saharan.
Hodges argues that a Western Saharan’s prime loyalties in the twentieth century were
first to “tribe (qabila), tribal fraction (fakhd), and family” (Hodges 1983a, 29). This loyalty, to a
qabila and below, remained the perennial force behind Saharan society. There was also a certain
caste system among and within tribes—free or shurfa tribes, then znaga268 (subordinated) or
lahma), third, the bards and craftsmen, and finally the slaves and ex-slaves (haratin) (ibid., 29).
267
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These “notions of blood loyalty (asabiya)” were very strong before, during, and after the
‘pacification’ (1934) of most of the Western Sahara by French and Spanish forces. The
distinguishing features alluded to by Hodges include the following: Hassaniya dialect of Saharan
Arabic, “an economy based on pastoral nomadism and commerce, the frequent practice of
raiding;” dress; diet; poetry; and Islamic practice (ibid., 30). These tribal features though
stretched beyond modern Western Sahara. In other words, these distinctions were part of the
greater expanse of the northwestern Saharan. Still, these cultural markers apparently had not yet
created a sense of a regional identity.
Since such divisions were present among many tribes in the Western Sahara, it would
have been very difficult for any ruler to bring these groups together for any type of cooperative
action. For example, the Sultan had sent delegations to many tribes in the region with the hope of
‘re-establishing’ Moroccan administration. However, these attempts to gain recognition for the
authority of the Sultanate were thwarted or ignored. According to Hodges, the much bigger tribes
led by “the emirs of Trarza, Adrar, Tagant, and Brakna” were unwilling “to recognize [the
Sultan’s] authority” (Hodges 1983b, 35).

Neither the larger, better established (and more

sedentary) Saharan communities, “[n]or…the Reguibat; and even the main nomadic Tekna tribes
to the south of the Noun, the Izarguien, Ait Lahsen and Yagout” … submitted to the Sultan
(Hodges 1983b, 35). Even when the Sultan or another leader, such as Beyruk controlled parts of
an area, such power was temporary or nominal. “In 1899,” for instance, “a force of Moroccan and
Ait Moussa Ou Ali soldiers, sent from Goulimine by Dahman Ould Beyrouk to chastise the
Izarguien, was routed at Daora…, and when the Ait Oussa, a partly nomadic Tekna tribe centered
on the oasis of Assa in the Djebel Bani, joined the Reguibat in sacking Tindouf in 1895, nothing
was done, by either the [S]ultan or Dahman, to aid the Tadjakant or prevent the Ait Oussa from
aiding the Reguibat” (36). Thus, the area to the southwest of the Sultanate of Morocco was not
controlled by the Sultan, but neither was the population unified as a social group.
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These differences became a bit more complicated when direct European meddling into
the interior of the Sahara began at the beginning of the nineteenth century. At this juncture
appears the most common and perhaps only thread of unity among the Saharan tribes and the
Moroccan population: an aversion to European Christian encroachment on ‘Islamic lands.’ Their
relationship with foreigners had been, since the beginning of early European colonization (14001500s), very reserved to hostile. At specific points in time, if the terms for commerce with the
Christians were advantageous to a tribe or Sultan, hostilities would cease for the purposes of
trading (until grievances by competitors forced an end to trading or the foreign trading partner
was banished from the area). By the 1800s, a time of direct European involvement in the affairs
of Morocco and the rest of the northwestern Sahara, the first widespread countermoves against
the French were evident in West Africa among the ancient, southern Saharan Emirates bordering
the Senegal River Valley. The (Moroccan) Sultan also lobbied against European intrusion and
positioned his military alongside its ‘domains’ from Spanish, British and French settlements. In
general, the inhabitants of the greater northwestern Sahara, including the lands throughout
Morocco, southwest into modern Mauritania, and as far south to the ancient Emirates, approved
of were united in their rebellious behavior toward European, Christian invaders.
Nevertheless, these distinctions were not sufficient to unite the tribes or create a regional
national identity across the whole Morocco/Western Sahara territory. The Spanish explorer,
Enrique d’Almonte spoke of the mistrust between Moroccan and Saharan guides and translators
employed by foreign adventurers. In 1926, Antonio Jaén, a Spanish colonizer,
yet again insisted that the frontier between Morocco and the Sahara was ‘formed
by the river Draa,’ and six years later, José Guillermo Sánchez clarified that
‘although [the Sahara tribes] respect the Sultan of Morocco, they do it because he
is a descendant of the Prophet, not because they have any intention of becoming
his subjects’; as all the Africanist writings of these decades illustrate, the tribes of
the Spanish Saharan dominions have always ‘live[d] with a savage independence,
[and] without a supreme chief’ (San Martín 2010, 25).
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At the same time that the major European powers discussed the partition of Africa, they
slowly engaged in a game of territorial gain through diplomatic, and eventually, coercive attrition
with the Sultanate and the rest of northwest Africa. In light of this threat, the Sultan and finally,
Ma’ al-‘Aynayn, who is discussed below, “swore to uphold the laws of the sultan in the Western
Sahara and Mauritania, and in 1895, his warriors seized Port Victoria” (Abi-Mershed and Farrar
2014, 12). However, Morocco acquiesced to the Great Powers of Europe despite the ‘rebellion’
in secret dealings and treaties negotiated in 1904, with the Sultan in 1906269, and the Treaty of Fes
in 1912. Nonetheless, territorial reality did not conform to the words written in these documents.
“Spain obtained the territory of La Hamada and the border was fixed at parallel 27˚40', but the
territory up to the Draa was left with the uncertain name of Spanish 'zone of influence,' because
the Tekna270 nation remained without a clear definition of how the word 'influence' should be
interpreted”271 (Canales Torres and Del Rey Vincente 2010, 37). The underlying bond was not a
unification of (Western) ‘Saharans’ but a campaign to dislodge the Christian infidels from the
lands of Islam and implement the authority (at least in name) of the Sultan. Yet again, there is no
definitive awakening of a ‘Sahrawi’ national identity. In short, the people of the region did not
have a common political identity, but they did reject the political control of either the Moroccan
Sultan or of European colonialists.
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Ma’ Al-‘Aynayn
Both parties to the conflict (the POLISARIO and the Kingdom of Morocco) have adopted Shaykh
Ma’ al-‘Aynayn and his actions as part of the claims to the Western Sahara. The POLISARIO
have described his exploits as representations of the aspirations of all Western Saharans in terms
of ‘liberating’ these ‘occupied territories’ from foreign intruders and as a symbol of the
development of the Sahrawi ‘nation.’ In contrast, Morocco argues he is an important part of their
national history. The case for either is compelling. Al-‘Aynayn (1830-1910) stands out as one of
the more remarkable events and personalities in the long-running dispute over the Western
Sahara. His actions will be evaluated because he was the first figure in documented ‘Western
Saharan’ history since Nasr al-Din to unite several of the region’s tribes.272 Al-‘Aynayn’s
exploits, adopted by the Sahrawi as part of their history, led to the formation of a more formal
Western Saharan identity.
Ma’ al-‘Aynayn was born into the Sufi Fadiliyya tariqa (order) as the twelfth son of
Muhammad Fadil bin Mamin al-Kalkami who founded the order. His father, family, and his son
claimed Sharifian descent and “lineal relationship to the Lamtuna who were the aristocracy of the
Almoravid Sanhaja” Dynasty (Norris 1954, 889). In terms of national origins, al-‘Aynayn and
his family, are thus direct descendants of the Sanhaja Berbers and therefore ancestors to the
Sahrawi. Ma’ Al-Aynayn had made the Hajj (1857), settled in Tindouf to study (1860), and lived
the nomadic life between the Adrar and the Oued Dra’a thereafter. He moved north to the Sequiet
el-Hamra (1873) but after an unhappy decade, left the region, travelling between the Adrar and
Tiris region (Désire-Vuillemin 1958, 33). In 1898, with the blessing and financial support of
Moulay Abdelaziz, Al-‘Aynayn built the city of Smara, located in Western Sahara. According to
Miské, “Moulay Abdel Aziz was particularly sensitive to the preaching of the great Sahrawi saint.
272
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He even sent an emissary, … wearing an expression of solidarity with the Moorish resistance”273
(1978, 96).
He had gained a saintly reputation from among the Saharan population including “all the
Saharan tribes of the great nomads: Regheibat, Lgouassem, Oulad Delim, [revered] him, and he
[could] count on the support of the majority of the warriors of Adrar” (Désire-Vuillemin 1958,
39). He was also admired for his pilgrimages to Mecca, charismatic demeanor, and ‘miracles,
which quickly gained followers to the Fadiliyya order. However, Ma’ Al-‘Aynayn grew
increasingly troubled and angered at the French and Spanish intrusion of Saharan lands. By 1904,
he declared a fatwa against the foreigners and thrust his weight against the colonizers with direct
support, which he embraced, from the Sultan of Morocco. He had already amassed considerable
support from several Saharan tribes throughout his many nomadic journeys in Mauritania, the
Western Sahara, and Morocco. Al-‘Aynayn was mostly concerned with “the colonial ambitions of
the French that really roused [his] fury.
Cloistered in Villa Cisneros, the Spanish were not very troublesome; but France had
already conquered Algeria, Tunisia and by 1903 both Trarza and Brakna had fallen to
Coppolani274” (Hodges 1983b, 57).

He was supported militarily by the Sultan, Spain, and

Germany (rival to the French for the colonization of northwest Africa), but died in 1910 before he
could complete the purging of Westerners from Saharan territory. Ahmed al-Hiba, Al-’Aynayn’s
son, mounted a campaign against the French when Morocco agreed to the treaty of Fes (1910)
under which the Sultan, Abd al-Hafid, surrendered sovereignty to France. Thereafter, al-Hiba,
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‘the Blue Sultan,’ marched to Marrakesh (1912) and removed the “Sultan of France” for his
betrayal (Miské 1978, 96). Despite this short triumph, the French army defeated him at the Battle
of Sidi Bou Othman on 6 September 1912. In summary, as D’Almonte commented, “the Moorish
forces that acted under the inspiration of Sidi Ma’ al-‘Aynayn included all the tribes of Western
Sahara who traverse the territories to the north of the parallel that passes by Cabo Blanco. To
these collection of tribes were added the nomads of the Adrar-er-Tmar, a part of the sedentary
people of that region and a certain number of Zenagas Moors of the [T]rarza fraction”275
(D’Almonte 1914,164-165).
Today, Morocco has declared Al-‘Aynayn a patriot for its Kingdom, while the
POLISARIO have also claimed him as a hero to the Sahrawi, placing him in Sahrawi folklore
literature. Supporters that claim him for the Sahrawi argue that Ma’ Al-‘Aynayn was not from
Morocco proper. San Martín writes that Ma’ Al-‘Aynayn was born in the Hodh (or Hawd) area,
which is now part of southeastern Mauritania (2010, 31) and D’Almonte stated that “he
established his residence in Chinguetti, an important population of the mentioned Adrar”276
(1914, 157). Mundy suggests that “the Shaykh might have been planning on deposing the then
colonially complicit ‘Alawis to place himself on the throne” (Mundy 2007, 311). It is unclear,
though, what his political program was to be after installing himself as Sultan. He was primarily
concerned with ridding the northwestern Saharan lands of the French invaders and had even
declared, while on a pilgrimage to Mecca, that “his people knew neither rulers nor money” (ibid.,
311). Yet, Moroccan arguments state that he was loyal to the Sultan and argue that he accepted
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the title of khalif of the Sahara on behalf of the Sultan in his quest to oust the French from
Saharan lands.
After the rebellion of Ma’ al-‘Aynayn, Sahrawi ‘national’ sentiment became evident in
limited circumstances. However, post al-Aynayn sentiments have been irregular, unsupported by
the whole of the population, and vaguely viewed as ‘Sahrawi’ rebellions. For instance, after al‘Aynayn’s death, “sporadically, for 30 years, from 1904 to 1934, long-range raiding parties
would set forth from 'Spanish' territory to attack the French” (Hodges 1984c, 81). Meanwhile ElHiba fought the French from the Anti-Atlas until his death in 1919. “His brother, Mohammed
Laghdaf, and other Sahrawi resistance leaders, such as Mohammed el-Mamoun and El-Aissawi
et-Tibari, continued raiding against the French in the desert. However, in 1934, French forces
from Morocco, Algeria and French West Africa finally 'pacified' the border regions of the northwestern Sahara in a coordinated military campaign.” (Hodges 1984c, 81). By then, the Spanish
had already deployed troops, set up and established administrative districts, and included many of
the tribal associations into their presidios. In 1946, “a decree created the Spanish West Africa
administration to comprise Ifni, Tarfaya, and Spanish Southern Morocco, together with Seguia elHamra and the Rio de Oro” (Jensen 2005, 12). Yet in 1958, Francisco Franco ceded Tarfaya and
Spanish Southern Morocco to the Kingdom of Morocco.

The ‘Sahrawi’ Dawn
It was not until the rise of militant Moroccan nationalism after 1953 that many of the Western
Saharans joined the Moroccan Liberation Army (MLA) to fight alongside Moroccan troops
against Spanish and French control. According to Hodges, “thousands of Sahrawis became part of
a broad, trans-frontier anti-colonial struggle only as recently as 1957-8, when they responded to
the insurrectionary appeals of the Moroccan Army of Liberation (Jaich at-Tahrir)” (Hodges1983a,
30-31). These San Martín explains that it was at the insistence of some tribal elders “based in the
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Spanish Sahara” that congratulated the Sultan on his return from exile in 1955 and the
independence of Morocco. They then asked for his assistance to liberate “the Sahara from
colonialism, but stressed that they would not wish to offer ‘in exchange the compromise of
loyalty to the King of Morocco’” (San Martín 2010, 67). The statement read with respect to the
Spanish: “although it occupies a part of our land, we so not wish to make war against it, because
it did not enter by means of force or arms, but through an agreement with the Assembly of the Ait
Arbain [Assembly of Forty]. Therefore, what we want now is the French to leave; after that, we
will not have any problem in achieving an accord with the Spanish” (Briones et. al., 2010, 67).
The key point here is that apparently, an assembly of, or in this case, a group of leaders
and former Army of Liberation fighters from different tribes had been brought together to
promote the cause of decolonization in the Spanish Sahara. They explicitly stated to the Sultan
that they did not want to be incorporated into Morocco upon independence and they would deal
with the Spanish themselves. Did they, however, consider themselves Sahrawi or as a cooperative
group of tribes seeking one goal? The answer may still not be evident because more
documentation is needed to evaluate this event.277 They obviously did believe that a cohesive
front was necessary. They acted in unison but did not readily incorporate themselves as a
‘Sahrawi’ nation.
Many scholars though, such as Hodges, Mercer, Mundy, San Martín, Canales and del
Rey, who write about this period already make use of ‘Sahrawi’ (or Saharaui) as a national
marker of identity. These comments are premature. For instance, Hodges narrates a story of a
rebellion that seems at first glance to suggest a cohesive network of ‘Sahrawi’ guerilla fighters.
However, the narration actually involves certain tribes of the Reguibat, Tekna, Lebouihat
(subtribe of the Reguibat), Ait Bu Amaran of Ifni, and other ‘nomads’ who did not have a
277
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common sense of identity (Hodges, 1983, 73-83). It is not possible to take individual tribes and
suggest that these select few had considered themselves as a whole ‘Sahrawi’ nation. It was also
unknown what were the tribe’s (those who sought the assistance of the Sultan) future plans for the
territory after the possible ouster of the French. How were they to govern the region agreeably
with the Spanish? In another study about Moroccan identity, these group of rebels actually
continued fighting “for the complete liberation of what they deemed Moroccan territory,
particularly the ill-defined Saharan regions in the south that were still under French and Spanish
control…renaming themselves the Army for the Liberation of the Sahara” (Wyrtzek 2015, 279).
Nevertheless, the King278 of Morocco later disowned the Spanish Saharan rebels. Divisions arose.
Subsequently the combined military efforts of the Spanish and French in Operation Ecouvillon
and Ouragan, eliminated all resistance in 1958.
In view of the escalating problems in these colonial possessions, the UN began to
deliberate on procedures for holding a referendum for the “indigenous population” in 1966279
(UNGA 1966, 4). Despite these statements, a flurry of Western Saharan groups emerged in the
late 1960s to challenge colonial (Spanish) control. Some were created to promote unification with
Morocco; others sought independence from Spain for the Spanish Sahara. In 1967, a group
supported by and based in Morocco called the Front de Libération du Sahara sous Domination
Espagnole (FLSDE),280 was created but was largely inactive and swiftly disappeared when the
King opened diplomatic relations with Mauritania (Hodges 1983a, 39). At the same time, a pro-
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independence group named the Harakat Tahrir Saguia al-Hamra wa Oued ad-Dahab281
(Liberation Movement of the Sequiet al-Hamra and Rio de Oro), began to organize peacefully,
and in secret, but revealed themselves during a demonstration in the city square of el-Ayoun
(Layounne) in 1970 that went horribly wrong. The rebellion was put down violently by Spanish
forces. Their leader was captured and was never seen again. The group was subsequently
eliminated (Besenyo 2009, 65; Mundy 2007, 313-314; Hodges 1983b, 154-155). The years of
1972-73 brought opposing resistance movements that divided the Western Sahara population and
also merited support from opposing political forces. For instance, the Mouvement de Résistance
“Les Hommes Bleus” (MOREHOB)282 developed in Morocco, but its leader switched sides at
least twice. This phenomenon was not unique to the disparate groups that proliferated at that time.
Not only was MOREHOB split between supporters of unification with Morocco and those who
desired independence, but there were other groups (Mouvement of Aout 21; PUNS) vying for the
hearts of the Spanish Sahara (Zunes and Mundy 2010, 103).

Finally, in May 1973, the

POLISARIO appeared (Jensen, 15; Mercer 1976, 504). According to Mercer, this was the “first
effective grouping of the nomads” whose purpose was to liberate the lands of the Spanish Sahara
against foreign domination (ibid., 504). Mercer explains that “[t]his liberation movement…had
gradually absorbed the able-bodied men of all tribes except the pro-Morocco Tekna in the north
and the pro-Mauritania Delim and Barik Allah in the south.” [emphasis included] (ibid.).

SUMMARY REMARKS
Based on the research into the limited literature on the subject of Sahrawi identity, the author
finds that in the period beginning in 1913 through 1973, Western Saharan national identity began
281
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to coalesce without the use of a ‘national’ label. Instead of developing a general sense of ‘nation
awareness’ especially in this sixty-year period, the ‘greater’ Western Sahara was regionally
divided among its inhabitants. Independent political entities flourished and established
governments, set rules of engagement against others, and had distinctive avenues of trade. The
Sultan of Morocco, by deploying messages and messengers to the rulers of these political
communities, was tacitly acknowledging their autonomy and authority as the leaders of their
respective populations. Furthermore, it is evident that the emirs of those areas would at times
recognize the Sultan’s spiritual authority but only out of respect, for the benefit of their
population (trade, military gain). The development of tribal loyalty and an accompanying tribal or
confederated tribal identity was evident. They preferred a community of tribes such as the
Reguibayt, Tekna, Oulad Delim or even Kunta but not identified as ‘Sahrawi.’
Just as the Sultan attempted to extend his influence over Sahrawi tribes at the beginning
of the twentieth century, the Europeans landed in the area and began to conspire against the
Sultan’s ambitions. They enacted treaties amongst themselves, with the Sultan, against the Sultan,
or simply without consulting the Sultan. The inhabitants of the greater Western Sahara were
completely irrelevant. All powerholders assumed their passive cooperation. For the most part,
these agreements did recognize the Sultan’s authority, more or less, in Morocco proper. They also
held that south of the Sous, Oued Dra’a, and farther south in the Sequiet al-Hamra River Valleys,
his dominion was questionable. The Sultan’s influence was observable in urban socio-political
environments.
Farther south among the frontier nomads, especially those of the deep Sahara Desert,
allegiances to clan, tribe, and then tribal confederations abounded. There was no sense of loyalty
to the entire population of Spanish Sahara. In addition, the nature of Saharan subsistence differed
from those sedentary dwellings closer to the coast, in the more populated cities, and in the Atlas
Mountains. Patterns of subsistence developed differently in more populated areas from those in
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inhospitable rocky hamadas and dune landscapes. Still, the distinguishing socio-cultural markers:
the loyalties to the immediate tribal ‘family,’ the appearance of independent political entities, and
the encroachment of foreigners all combined to keep the Saharans from cultivating a cohesive
national identity, that which is considered nationhood.
The notion of any ‘Saharan’ identity became an underlying theme when it encountered
aggressive foreign intrusion, especially from the French. The French took advantage of the
European agreements at that time and made their way southwest from Algeria and northeast from
the Senegal River Valley into Morocco and the Greater Saharan desert. This ‘Saharan
Awakening’ was short-lived. Subsequent rebellions were eliminated until the emergence of the
Moroccan independence movement. This movement gave new life to a segment of the Saharan
population, but leaders who were either supported or based in Morocco guided the group. After
the departure of the Spanish, the movement changed its political focus to eliminate the remaining
‘colonizers’—Morocco and Mauritania. Therefore, the rise of anti-colonialism, created by
grievances against France and Morocco at the critical stages of Moroccan independence, allowed
for the establishment of the POLISARIO, which in turn, took hold of the effort and appropriated
the cause.
Perhaps the only indigenous Saharan movement that may be considered the precursor to
the current Sahrawi independence movement was the Harakat Tahrir Saguia al-Hamra wa Oued
ad-Dahab. The remnants of this group would later form the POLISARIO FRONT. In a formal
declaration, the FRONT claimed it was "a 'unique expression of the masses, opting for
revolutionary violence and the armed struggle as the means by which the Saharawi Arab African
people can recover total liberty and foil the maneuvers of Spanish colonialism'" (Mundy 2007,
317). Another statement, named the ‘Guelta Zemmour declaration’ followed (November 28,
1975). It was signed by several "indigenous leaders, shuyukhs, and notables," and it claimed that
the POLSARIO Front was "the only legitimate representative of the Sahrawi people" (ibid.).
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Was this the moment when a real national identity for the inhabitants of the former
Spanish Sahara forged? Do written proclamations by ambitious leaders constitute the formation
of real national groups? Even the term ‘Sahrawi’283 has brought additional confusion. Is it an
adjectival description of Sahara,284 or a cultural marker of symbolic resistance? The author of this
work agrees with Mundy when he examines the ambiguity of the origin of the word and responds
that the "aim is not to deprive Western Sahara nationalism of it dignity, but rather to understand it
more fully" (ibid., 319). However, national identity cannot be tied directly to written concepts or
terminology. Rather, identity has to be viewed in a more holistic manner. National identity
includes common historical experiences, including colonialism; a common culture—language,
perhaps in this case the practice of Islam, dress, food; and the realization by the people that there
is a legitimate enterprise that seeks well-being on their behalf through independence.
Western Saharan ethno-cultural layers (primordial arguments) of identity developed over
time. They formed the building blocks of their identity. These, combined with the developments
of colonialism (constructivist arguments) and leaders of resistance (instrumentalist arguments),
produced a greater Western Saharan group consciousness in this period. By the time Moroccan
nationalists began their pursuit for independence, support for a Western Saharan national identity
was ripe. The critical juncture at which the Sahrawi together made the giant leap toward 'national
identification' resides during this period and culminated in concrete form with the POLISARIO.
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Mundy, Zunes, Castellino and Dominguez-Redondo comment that the meaning for the term ’Sahrawi’ may have
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VIII. CONCLUSION
The Sahrawi are a group of people that currently inhabit Western Sahara proper or reside
in the ‘liberated zones’ and the Algerian ‘refugee’ camps adjacent to these zones. The Kingdom
of Morocco administers the Western Sahara except for a small sliver of desert land that the
POLISARIO has branded as free or ‘liberated zones.’ In the meantime, most of the population
has made their dwelling as guests of Algeria in the remote western Sahara that borders
Mauritania, the liberated zones of the Western Sahara, and southern Morocco. Morocco
appropriated the area, fought the POLISARIO for the land, and continues to negotiate with the
UN (and POLISARIO). The question over its status of the Western Sahara has centered on the
identity of the people: Who is a Sahrawi? The debate now surrounds the nature of Sahrawi
national identity and questions whether one actually exists.
Although there have been several publications and reports about the political situation,
there have been few sources detailing the debate over Sahrawi national identity. Of these works,
only a handful have focused on Sahrawi nationalism and identity. These works highlight the
problems that plague the definition of Sahrawi identity. They relate the Sahrawi experience in
modern or constructivist terms and marginalize arguments derived from other theoretical
frameworks. This work brings these frameworks together and through a Sahrawi socio-historical
analysis has confirmed many of the findings of previous scholars. This project maintains that
these conclusions about the roots of national identity can only be fully understood if the results of
all theoretical frameworks are placed side-by-side. There are three285 major derived: 1) that the
Sahrawi are a distinct grouping of people separated from neighboring peoples by language,
territory, and custom; 2) that the Sahrawi struggle is an extension of anti-colonialism; or that 3)
determined foreign and domestic actors appropriated Saharan identity for their own purposes.
Each argument seeks answers to the origins of Sahrawi national identity and reflects respectively
285
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the primordial, instrumental, and constructivist frameworks. Each chapter deals with all three
perspectives.
The socio-historical timeline, which is not new to the study of Western Sahara, was used
to try to pinpoint at what point in time or in which period can one establish the formal
development of Sahrawi identity. Was there an inciting or landmark moment that could have
made for the creation of a national identity in the past? Could there have been a proper period of
growth or sense of national maturity for the Sahrawi at some point in history? And how could this
identity have been created over time? The author has laid out five full chapters of historical
analysis from antiquity to the invasion of Islam, from the Reconquista to early European
encroachment, and finally from direct European colonization until 1973. This segment will offer
conclusionary remarks for each period written.
Chapter three sought the origins of Sahrawi national identity from antiquity to 1524 when
the army of the Sa’adian Dynasty overran a small Portuguese fort in Santa Cruz de Mar Peqeuña.
Scholarship has not agreed on the original inhabitants of North Africa but lean toward the belief
that groups of people migrated into the area. These groups were a mix of black from the southern
regions of the continent, Arabs that traversed the great deserts into the northwest and southwest
corners of North Africa, and an ‘indigenous’ Berber population. According to a primordialist
framework any sense of homogeneity in the past may have resulted from social (nomadism),
religious (Islam), or geographic (desert) factors. However, the territorial, as well as the spiritual
argument is almost impossible to maintain because it would imply that all those under the banner
of Islam and living as nomads in this vast expanse were of one mind or one identity. Even if this
were so, there is no evidence to indicate that the region acted as one nation or that it identified
itself as a nation.
As stated in chapter three, many scholars argue that the Sahrawi descend from the
Berbers. A few authors insist that the genealogical trace goes even further back to the Bafour in
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5500 BCE. However, there are conflicting debates about the migratory patterns, emergence, and
settlement of the Bafour in North Africa. The disparate nature of the research does not help in
identifying these groups as forefathers of the Sahrawi. As to a Berber origin, there are debates as
to the exact composition of Berbers and thus difficulty in differentiating them from other groups
in North Africa. Nevertheless, the label has been steadily adopted today to include several
minority nationalities across the Maghreb. Since the Sahrawi have claimed only the Western
Sahara and not lands beyond this region, they have narrowed their genealogy to a smaller area of
North Africa and the Sahara Desert. If only a geographical segment of the Berber population were
the ancestors to the Sahrawi, the evidence has to show that they were a northwest African group
directly linked to the modern Sahrawi. Disparate Berber groups even in greater northwest Africa,
make it difficult to pinpoint continuity of a specific Berber population located in the extreme
northwest corner of the Sahara.
Primordial arguments that maintain Sahrawi identity can be traced to antiquity assert that
despite the hybridization of groups, the ‘essence’ of Sahrawiness (the matrix to their origins)
develops between 50 BCE and 400 AD. Scholars point to the beginning of the first century when
independent societies of people distinguished themselves from the Roman-influenced part of the
Maghreb. Groups, such as the Gaetulians, were outside Roman control and were largely nomadic
in nature. Some of these independent groups were absorbed (through intermarriage or conflict) by
the Sanhaja Berber. Most scholars consider the Sanhaja as direct ancestors to the Sahrawi. They
resided in a vast triangular area of the desert whose sovereignty has been an area of contention for
many centuries.
The weight given to these assertions is troubling. First, anthropological and ethnological
scholarship cannot agree over the nature (the actual gene pool, migration routes) of their identity.
Second, the Sanhaja were not a monolithic political entity, but rather a conglomeration of tribes.
They later became the dominant confederation of tribes but the nature of their identity changed

227

over time and makes it quite difficult to prove that the Sanhaja were true ancestors to the Sahrawi.
The research indicates that from the eleventh through the sixteenth centuries the changes in the
Sanhaja through invasion, intermarriage, and nomadism deeply fragmented Saharan society. The
Sanhaja split into northern and southern branches after the rise of the Almoravid and Almohad
Dynasties. The Sanhaja, already subdivided into several main tribes, became further fragmented
when the Banu Maqil Arabs encroached on the greater Western Sahara. Dynastic changes began
to mark differences among those who held affinity or loyalties to shaykhs (tribal chieftains) or
other head tribesmen, especially in the upper northern areas of Morocco. Dynastic changes, the
nature of the nomadic lifestyle, Arab intrusion, and disparate tribal affiliations led to a variable
mix of ethnic identity. Therefore, if the Sanhaja are considered the direct ancestors of the
Sahrawi, it is almost impossible today to ascertain which genealogical line of Sanhaja to follow
because eventually the Sanhaja and its main branches faded through intermarriage and conflict.
Moreover, recent scholarship has moved toward diversity of population origins in the Maghreb.
Chapter Four continues the search for the sources of Sahrawi national identity in the
period beginning in 1524 until about 1757. The chapter acknowledges the effect of trade on tribal
diffusion. This diffusion occurred, not only along the caravan routes of southern Western Sahara,
but also among those tribes in the southern peripheries of Morocco, or northwestern Sahara.
Settlements began to arise but these towns undertook sovereign qualities and sought control over
the immediate southern Moroccan regions through intertribal warfare led by governors or sharifs.
Domestic infighting, the rise of independent fiefdoms, Arab encroachment, the diminished power
of the ‘Moroccan’ dynasties, (especially the Merinids) plagued the Western Sahara region. These
attempted characteristics effectively allowed for several powers to vie for control of the region.
Any power that attempted consolidating regional control would have been met with many
opposing power-brokers. As a result, control garnered by any one tribe or conglomeration of
tribes was temporary at best.
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The lack of power under one banner and the nomadic lifestyle afforded by the Sahara
discouraged cohesiveness and allowed for subtle European intrusion. Most of these pockets of
colonization were located on the coast, and if further inland, usually only along the major
thoroughfares and points of trade. These small foreign incursions could not have been an obstacle
to national collectivity. On the contrary, much of the lack of one identity sprang from (1) small
independencies that broke ranks with other tribal groups; (2) tribal rivalries that fought for control
of grazing land, trade routes, and blood feuds; (3) the weakness of dynastic and sharifian leaders
who held only nominal power; (4) the challenge of organizing disparate nomadic tribes that
preferred to stay clear of any type of subjugation; and (5) (if the claim is to pinpoint the origins of
Sahrawi identity to the Sanhaja) the multiple divisions of the Sanhaja Berber have obscured the
possibility of one lineage for the forbears of the Sahrawi. Therefore, primordial arguments do not
actually fit these findings. Rather, it seems that they can only be explained through a
constructivist framework.
Perhaps the only saving grace for primrodial arguments would be through Smith’s
ethnosymbolic lens. Ethnosymbolism recognizes that there are certain dynamics, influences that
may not be found in purely primordial theory. Ethnosymbolism asserts that any national identity
must include or at least allow for ethnic and cultural characteristics. These socio-cultural elements
may either be contextualized from the past or derived from certain symbols that are deeply rooted
to group identity. These symbols do not necessarily have to be found in the past but they are
certainly tied to places or events in history. Dress, food, religion in general and nomadic behavior
matter less than the appropriation of Ma’ ‘Al-Aynayn as hero, Hassaniya as language, the use of
sand and not water for the practice of Islam, or even historical events such as the ‘war’ against
Spain, Mauritania and subsequently Morocco.
For example, I posed several questions to my interviewees when I visited the Sahrawi
‘refugee camps' outside of Tindouf, Algeria between 26 September –– 03 October 2014. Among
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these were: What did they believe the origins of Sahrawi national identity were based upon?
Where do they believe the origins of their identity came from? The overwhelming majority of
those interviewed focused on the heterogeneous nature of Sahrawi identity. It was most unusual
(at least for the author) to hear them explain that this hybridization was unique to Sahrawi
identity. All three of the representative ‘ambassadors’286 directly would state that their mixed
heritage was undeniable. The SADR ambassadors to the UN and Spain, confirmed that indeed
one cannot simply eliminate arguments derived from primordialism. The attachments that are tied
to Sahrawi identity today may have been with its predecessors all this time but did not fuse to
achieve the nationalism evident among the population today. The SADR representative to Spain
asserted that the struggle is mainly a political one but “the political battle is based upon social,
historical, ethnic, and cultural arguments… otherwise the political [argument] has no right”
(Beyoun 2014).

Along similar lines, the current SADR representative to the United States

allowed for six elements that composed Sahrawi identity. He remarked that the Sahrawi are a
hybrid of Arab, African, Berber, Spanish influence plus geography and a ‘historical trajectory’…
that “no other nation” had these features but the Sahrawi (Beisat 2013). However, the SADR
representative to the UN who agreed with Mr. Beisat’s sentiment, conceded that Sahrawi
nationalism “was shaped on the battlefield…you cannot resist your…enemies without a clear and
profound conviction that you are different—you are preserving your identity” (Boukhari 2013).
The director of the Sahrawi Cultural Museum, an anthropology graduate, responded
slightly differently when she stated that: “any modern society will want to investigate their roots
… this is what happens with us, mainly when it involves a Bedouin society that is characterized
by being in a disperse space, it does not have the notion to construct a very well-organized nation,
or country…that was one of the questions, one of the concerns that modern Sahrawi society has
had, is to begin with the historical act… it starts there” (Malainin 2014). The composition of the
286
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tribes and resistance against invaders are an important part Sahrawi identity. These statements
underscore how important it is to acknowledge that those arguments derived from primordialism
because they establish a base of perennial beliefs that sustain an identity. It also demonstrates
despite these low-level characteristics of identity; more is needed to fuse all these features into a
nation. These features (territory, autonomy) were considered next.
While the great powers divided the continent of Africa at the end of the fifteenth century,
apart from the issues of cohesion and tribal division, the period from the early sixteenth to midseventeenth century, revealed a new battleground over Sahrawi identity. Arguments for Sahrawi
identity early in history were based on ethnic genealogy. Instead of arguing for certain markers of
distinction, this period is highlighted by markers from or against certain territorial claims. The
discussion moves to dissecting at what point there was control over the northwestern Saharan
region by the political entities of northern Morocco. The Merinid and then Wattasid Dynasties
were unable to consolidate control over the southern periphery. However, the Sa’adian Dynasty,
led by Al-Mansur began the drive toward asserting dominion further south than Fes or
Marrakesh. The now-titled Sultan of Morocco began to counter Portuguese, Spanish, Ottoman,
and other contenders to the region. Still, the Sa’adians would not completely eradicate the
Europeans because they were able to negotiate, reservedly, to maintain trade avenues and goods
from Europe at specific points of entry on its coastline.
The Sa’adian rulers would move south, west, and southwest to check tribal rivalry, stop
Christian incursions, and assert power. Scholarship establishes that these attempts to take territory
and secure trade routes were temporary, nominal, and evidently unrecognized by other
confederations of tribes. The most contentious of these areas was, and continues to be, the SARIO
(Sequiet al-Hamra and Rio de Oro) region. The area ran from the northwestern coastline inland
and turned southwestward and then even farther south into the Sahara Desert. This are has proven
to be one of the biggest topics of debate for both parties to the conflict. Thus, the POLISARIO
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distance themselves from any claim by present-day Morocco that the Kingdom had dominion
over that part of the territory in question. Several scholars, travelers of the period, and archival
research surrounding cartographic borders of the period demonstrate that the Sa’adian Dynasty
and subsequent rulers well into the Alawi Sultanate did not ever fully control these areas. It was
not until late nineteenth century European colonization that there was ever one power controlling
the Sous, Dra’a, and Sequiet el-Hamra River Valleys.
The territorial distinction asserted by the Sahrawi is derived from primordialism
arguments. However, the territorial argument is complicated by the ethnic nature of the
inhabitants. In fact, the marker of territory in the case of the Sahrawi is better sustained under
constructivist arguments. Confederations that included the Reguibayt, Tekna, Tadjakant, Oulad
Delim, and tributary tribes can only be identified as tribal or clan-like, not Sahrawi or Moroccan.
The term ‘Morocco,’ based on cartographic archival research, seems to have been used as
geographical designation rather than a delimitation of a nation. Thus, again, the employment of
claims derived from primordial arguments is difficult because of identification discrepancies. In
other words, a nation will usually identify not only with ethnic distinctions (such as religion,
language, custom) but also with collective memories, and in this case, territorial rights. The only
conceivable example that may have matched such a disparity were the Hebrews. Other invading
groups such as the Huns, Goths, Mongols, and perhaps even the Vikings could possibly fit such
national ‘incongruence.’ However, those groups have either disappeared completely or currently
have a sovereign territory.
Nationhood is grounded in an assertion of territorial legitimacy and a socio-cultural
dimension. Sahrawi have territorial claims and infer that they are distinct from Morocco, but the
differentiation is not concretely grounded because of ties to a fragmented tribal society.
Geography did not allow for any one power to control all of Western Sahara because of the vast
distances and barren terrain. Tribes were small; confederations would number at most in the
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thousands. Thus, it is very challenging to label these tribes as small ‘nations’ or have them
designated as part of some bigger cohesive nation. The notion of what constituted a nation would
have had to be reconstituted to exclude territory at this time. Certainly then, there is no definitive
national identity that can be defined as a Sahrawi nation in the period ending the seventeenth
century. The lack of evidence marginalizes arguments from primordial approaches. Still, there
seems to be no reason for eliminating the ethno-symbolic claim that the Sahrawi had never been
dominated by ‘Morocco’ or any of its Sultans, especially south of the SARIO.
Chapter Five follows with the struggles by the Alawite Sultanate to force, coerce, or
entice the more southerly Saharan tribes to acknowledge his authority from 1758 through 1859.
As stated previously, the Alawite Sultanate did at one time invade, subjugate, or coerce other
Saharan political entities to submit to his spiritual authority. However, political authority over
lands outside of direct Alawite influence was almost never recognized and when it was, it was
nominal or temporary. In fact, even before the Alawites came to power in Morocco, the weak
base of power in Marrakesh and Fes unsettled the dynasties especially among the Berber tribes in
the Atlas Mountains. Power struggles appeared during the Alawite Dynasty. Despite each side
pointing to the ICJ rulings for justification of their claims, controversy remains. Nevertheless, the
controversy over territoriality is misplaced in context. The search is for roots of a certain national
identity—a Sahrawi one—not for territorial control. Certainly this is important in the overall
conflict but this answers a different question: Does the land belong to the Sahrawi? It does not
answer at what point or from what point may one find the roots of Sahrawi national identity.
In the territorial debate, the question of the type of authority over those peripheral areas
of Morocco arises. Morocco presently claims that although surrounding tribal entities did not
thoroughly acknowledge the Sultan’s temporal power, most of these groups recognized his
spiritual authority. In this sense primordialists will argue that Islam is an objective element or
innate part of Saharan society (at least after the Arab invasion). The POLISARIO asserts that the
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opposite is true. The Sultan’s spiritual influence was respected, but it was not the kind of power
that controlled the socio-political aspects of everyday life in any given political community.
Morocco had requested that the ICJ allow for their case to be given ‘special status’ as their
conviction relied upon the nature of the Sharifian state—a state that ruled primarily via spiritual
consent rather than by coercion.
Yet, there are weaknesses for holding on to this ‘spiritual’ platform of authority. It may
be a matter of perspective as to whether Islam was properly utilized as an issue of spiritual
consent or was it rather a tool for coercion. Religion can influence minds, but it cannot exert
actual physical force. Any extension of power that includes a ‘spiritual’ component must rely on
the use of military force to gain ‘real’ dominance—especially territorial gains.

Second,

argumentation for the case of Morocco was based not on the religion itself but rather on its use
and conditions of use. Third, it may seem that instead of any religious connotation, the Sultanates
had exercised this mode of authority to expand and maintain economic interests—the Saharan
trade routes. If this were the case, if Islam were exposed in its use for the consolidation of
economic power, then it essentially becomes destitute of objectivism. Islam may have given the
Sultan the general precepts for morality and a course of conduct for individual behavior but it
could not have afforded a straight forward blueprint for conduct in war, governance, and
economic exchange. If a sharif, governor, sultan, or tribal chieftain did so, the leader grounded
the blueprint on a subjectivity that leads away from arguments derived from primordialism and
toward those that lie with the framework for constructivism.
Chapter Five extends the counter-argument by introducing evidence that despite the
Moroccan claim that most, if not, all of the greater Western Sahara, composed part of the Sultan’s
domain, it did not. In fact, the period approaching the end of the eighteenth century was one of
fragmentation and re-composition among the tribal areas of the Western Sahara. Questions
remained surrounding who controlled the southern peripheries of ‘Morocco’ even in the presence
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of a strong Alawite Dynasty. Moreover, several independencies arose that not only competed
amongst each other for power but also ignored both the Sultan’s temporal and spiritual authority.
Counter-claims against the Moroccan historical precedent to dominion over the land in
question include the archival evidence and still-to-be fully studied (and translated) Saharan
documents. European encroachment steadily increased and contributed to more contact with the
local inhabitants in the greater Western Sahara. Several agreements and treaties between the
Sultans and the great European powers demonstrated, albeit somewhat ambiguously, that
Morocco’s frontiers were limited to certain geographical areas. Second, Saharan documentation,
discovered in the past fifty years, has revealed certain curiosities of Saharan history. These
Saharan scholars write that there were, in fact, a number of independent societies scattered
throughout the greater Western Sahara. These documents indicate that there were other power
brokers, lines of division, and accounts of history that have not been thoroughly analyzed. These
manuscripts contradict a monolithic state of Moroccan dominion over the Western Sahara.
None of these arguments indicate a distinct Sahrawi identity. The rise of Independent
political entities, foreign agreements that indicated the vagueness of the Sultan’s dominion, and
manuscripts depicting a literary and historical period independent of ‘Moroccan’ dominance
actually establishes the opposite. Certainly, the European pacts do not prove that there was a
Sahrawi nation but center on the territorial argument. The seventeenth and eighteenth century
Saharan manuscripts depict a Sahara that had well-established societies, including trade, an
Islamic clergy, a flourishing (much to be translated) literature, and a certain hierarchy among its
inhabitants. However, there is no evidence as yet to suggest there were clans or tribes that
composed a specific Sahrawi ‘nation.’ In fact, the documents offer a different view. They indicate
that there were many independent political identities but none (at this point) (either specific
individuals or groups) that identified themselves as Sahrawi. In general, the research conveys the
idea that rather than there being one cohesive Saharan identity, there were many. There is an
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argument for stating that there was one massive Saharan identity which included the environment
(desert landscape), lifestyle (nomadism) (except for some, more urbanized, southern and northern
political communities), religion, and raiding. Saharan society, however, consisted of many tribal
confederations and desert emirates. It is simply difficult to validate, not only the territorial claim
by Morocco, but also the Sahrawi ‘self-awareness’ claim by the POLISARIO.
Chapter Six (1860-1883) begins with similar difficulties in terms of seeking the origins of
Sahrawi identity. Several authors state that Morocco suffered from internal turmoil, that the
Western Sahara was not under any direct control, and several tribes and tribal confederations
governed their own state of affairs. The newly-discovered Saharan history has demonstrated that
there was, in fact, a separate chronicle of Saharan society, different from that of the well-known
Moroccan record. These documents (at least the ones that have been translated and made
available) show that there were other political communities living apart from the influences of the
Sultan and independent of his authority. Based on several writings, it is clear that these tribal
groups fought amongst each other for resources and rivalries. They conducted raids. The
overwhelming number of battles fought between and among tribes occurred without the consent
of the Sultan, and indicated the independent action of each tribe or alliance of tribes.
Tribal organization, an issue that in a much earlier period was the focus of criticism, was
also briefly mentioned. Most pro-Moroccan scholars and skeptics of organizational structures in
Saharan society debate whether there was any semblance of order or tribal accountability. In fact,
sources claim that the Moroccan Sultan, when given the opportunity, swept through a territory,
implemented, and subsequently maintained ‘order.’ However, Chapter Six proves that far from
disorder, there was collective tribal responsibility, dedication to the agricultural cycles of
farming, a process to suspend battle with each other. Many tribes used mediation to resolve
differences. In addition, unruliness and disorder within Moroccan lands could have rivaled at
times the Saharan chaotic lifestyle that some western scholars describe. These issues compounded
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the governance problem for the Sultan whenever he attempted to advance his authority beyond
‘Morocco.’
Still, the attempt to answer the question of Sahrawi national identity is distant even in this
period. Sahrawi origins do not begin here. There are no primordialist-derived arguments that can
sustain a basis for Sahrawi national identity. Arguments that arrive at answering the roots of
identity via constructivism seem more reasonable but there does not seem to be a strong cohesive,
viable catalyst bringing together these disparate tribes. Any claims that try to establish Sahrawi
roots through an instrumentalist justification is just as difficult. The only political entities that
could have aided in the fusion of a Saharan identity were those directed from Morocco or from
the Europeans. Yet, direct European control (except perhaps by the French in the extreme south
in the vicinity of the Senegal River Valley) was not yet significant. Moroccan suzerainty was
nominal and temporary. Even a conglomeration of the independent tribal affiliations did not
converge en masse to ‘claim’ the northwestern Sahara. As such, there is no concrete, viable
evidence to determine at this stage, as late as the 1850s, that there was a developing Sahrawi
nation.
Chapter Seven (1884-1973) details the pressing and more determined efforts by the Great
Powers of Europe to encroach on the northwestern Sahara. They began from the south, at the
mouth of the Senegal River, and from the north in northern Morocco. The Spanish had aspirations
in southern Morocco, certain enclaves in the north, and on the coastal areas of Western Sahara
proper. The treaties and agreements that would pepper the following years with Morocco and a
few of the emirates and political communities in and around the Western Sahara demonstrate the
slow but increasingly more influential European involvement in the region. The European powers
generally perceived the inherent weakness of the Moroccan Sultan. Revolts from the local
inhabitants, the attraction of market opportunities via the Saharan trade routes and coastal trading,
the geo-political and economic importance of the Straits of Gibraltar, and the internecine conflict
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among and within tribes in and around the Kingdom of Morocco allowed for the encroachment of
the foreign powers. The beginning of chapter seven highlights the rise of strong independent
tribal confederations and emirates along with other, smaller, but just as independent, tribal
groups. These independent tribes and other political communities began to rival the Sultan and
indeed began to negotiate with the foreign ‘infidels.’ There is ample evidence to support not only
independent tribal freedom of movement but also negotiated settlements with the foreign
‘infidels.’ They did not seek approval of the Sultan despite the official arguments against this
possibility.
Thus, despite the vast distances and the prevalence of nomadism, the region developed
political entities acting independently of supposed powers that claimed authority over most of the
northwest and Western Sahara. Indeed, the evidence strongly suggests that the Sultan, while at
times moving forces across some of the landscape, congratulating ‘subject’ leaders, granting
investitures, and warring with competitors, never had complete, sovereign control over these
autonomous principalities. Moreover, many, if not all, of the groups in question would only
temporarily, and for political expediency, recognize the Sultan’s authority. Groups such as the
Tekna, Reguibayt, the Oulad Delim, Oulad Tidrarim, Arosien, the Tadjakant, Walati, Kunta, and
a surge of smaller groups of tribes, kingdoms in the Sous and Goulimine, and emirates in the
Adrar, of Brakna, Trarza, and Tagant operated independently.
The general picture then from the accounts in Chapters Six and Seven reveals that neither
the Moroccan kingdom nor any Saharan ‘nation’ had proprietary control over these disputed
regions. Primordial and instrumental interpretations (in the mid-eighteenth to late nineteenth
centuries) cannot support the development of any one dominating Saharan nation. In fact,
Saharan history chronicles several large political communities cohabitating, warring, and trading
with each other. There is not enough support for instrumental and primordial arguments to sustain
group ancestry with the ancient version of the Sanhaja Berber because of the increasing nature of
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hybridization via marriage among Berber, Moor, Arab, and Black. There is difficulty in
establishing Sultanate supremacy over these lands. If one views the dynamic nature of the
northwestern and Western Sahara through a more constructivist approach, there is also the
challenge of building one distinct, self-aware Saharan identity that can be identified as ‘Sahrawi.’
The economic and socio-cultural fabric of Saharan society might have been very similar but this
overlay of Saharan civilization was apparently severely divided among the disparate and
‘roaming’ tribes of the northwestern Sahara.
Of all the developments explained in Chapter Seven that conspired to reduce the
assertions that the Sultan had control over the territory, three of the four focus on the interests and
actions of the European powers. The fourth development, the adherence of these groups to tribal
identity rather than some type of national identity, deterred the unification of tribes. It is almost
impossible to argue for a coalescing national Saharan identity. The first three developments aid in
the development of a sentiment that had been held ever since the intrusion of the early colonizers:
feelings of irritation against increasing European interference in their daily affairs turned into
outright hostility. Direct confrontation became inevitable. By 1912, the first revolts targeted the
major European territorial powerbrokers (France and Spain) and the charismatic personality of
Ma’ al-‘Aynayn led the uprising. These hostilities led to an enhanced awareness of Saharan
identity caused by the juxtaposition between the perceived threat of European identity and their
already established Saharan self.
The exploits of Ma’ al-‘Aynayn are central to a ‘Saharan’ awakening. On the one hand,
the Sahrawi have appropriated this historical antecedent as part of their collective memory and a
primordial feature of their national identity. On the other hand, he can also be considered part of
the great man concept of history287. If so, then his influence would fall under the instrumentalist
arguments. Ma’ al-‘Aynayn is the clearest example of an entrepreneur guiding Saharan identity.
287

A largely nineteenth century concept that explains how history has been influenced by great men and women, rulers,
or highly influential individuals
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His goals, however, were short-sighted. He was angry that Europeans had encroached onto sacred
lands, and his first objective was to oust them. Later, disgusted with the policies of appeasement
by the Sultan of Morocco, he decided to take the throne. It is not clear, though, whether his
ambition included the building of a nation for the whole of Western Sahara. Scholars note that he
was not Moroccan born but from the deep south. He settled south of the Dra’a River Valley, and
founded the city of Smara. Clearly he a catalyst of Saharan awareness and brought together
disparate tribes against the colonial powers, but his untimely death stopped what could have been
a Sahrawi nation. This struggle, however, as Ambassador Boukhari suggests was a key moment
in Sahrawi history because it began to shape the notion of a Sahrawi identity ‘on the battlefield’
(Boukhari, 2014). The struggle continued for more than three decades after his death but was
overcome decisively.
The liberation of Morocco from the French brought together many of the tribes of the
Spanish Sahara. The tribes believed that, in turn, that the Sultan would help them against the
French and Spanish in what was already considered Spanish territory. However, the awaited
reciprocity never came. Although not all tribes had acquiesced to liberating the territory, Sahrawi
awareness had arrived. The moment this confederation of tribes collaborated in a concerted effort
to free themselves from the Europeans in 1954-1956, they had created an identity rooted in
opposition. Not all tribes had formally asked the Sultan for help, but the major tribes within the
Spanish Sahara were present. By organizing themselves as a group, they had adopted the territory
of the Spanish Sahara and all of its history. Divisions did surface eventually because of group
interests, but with the formation of the POLISARIO Sahrawi identity crystalized.
At the beginning of the search, the author believed that the origins of Sahrawi national
identity lay deep in history. Their origins must have included certain features unique to the
Sahrawi or adopted by them sometime in history. However, Sahrawi ‘history’ is a mélange of
elements. In addition, to the author’s surprise, almost all the interviewees admitted that the roots
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of Sahrawi identity were historically numerous. In other words, although there are various
features of identity, the primordial hypothesis did not help in pinpointing when the Sahrawi fused
as a nation. Still, a Sahrawi nation would not have been possible without these basic elements of
identity. For precisely this reason, primordial arguments cannot be discarded. What this study has
presented is a prolonged search via primordial (historical and socio-cultural), instrumental (the
leadership of Ma al-‘Aynayn and the development of autonomous tribes), and constructivist
arguments (territorial boundaries set by the French and Spanish) for the origins of Sahrawi
national identity. This author has found their origins belong in the period of history beginning
with the leadership of Ma al-’Aynayn (1904) and culminating with the creation of the
POLISARIO (1973).
This study acknowledges that constructivist accounts of identity formation are a great
tool for understanding national identity. Its arguments can produce evidence which, placed in
context, can generate a picture of national identity. However, constructivism needs refinement
when pieces of evidence, as in the case of the Sahrawi, come from different segments of history.
History is an assortment of events and socio-cultural markers. These markers are ethno-cultural
resources adopted by groups that developed over time and by themselves may be insignificant.
The sum of these distinguishing resources, socio-historical features and experiences must all be
included, accounted for, and then evaluated for an end result. This study places the moment of
Sahrawi national identity in the twentieth century but adds that this conclusion utilizes essential
markers of differentiations that persist over time; they are the building blocks of any national
identity.
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